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"An outstanding feature of this criterion [of Practicality] is the
restraint it imposes on zealous aspirations to achieve near perfect
conformity with other criteria. Compromises, often quite crude, are
1
forced frequently because dogged Practicality must be heeded."
I. INTRODUCTION

. Since the early 1970s, a taxpayer has been required to capitalize
2
costs of, and transaction costs incurred in connection with, the
acquisition of a separate tangible asset under the origin of the claim
3
doctrine of Woodward v. Commissioner and United States v. Hilton
4
Hotels Corp. These cases stand for the proposition that mismatching
the character of a claimed ordinary deduction when the related income
is tax preferenced by either capital gains treatment or complete
nonrecognition distorts the taxpayer's income. Moreover, such
mismatching would violate section 446 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code), which requires that a taxpayer's method of tax accounting
(which may include the tax treatment of an item's cost as a capital
expenditure or a current expense) must clearly reflect the taxpayer's
5
6
income.
In Commissioner v. Idaho Power, Justice Blackmun
1

Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV.
567, 573 (1965).
The two macro-criteria which rank highest are Practicality and Equity. Of
the two, Practicality frequently must be granted more weight than Equity.
At the second echelon are ranked Free Market Compatibility and concerns
subsumed under the heading of Political Order. Between the two the
former often outranks the latter. Finally, the criteria of Reduced Economic
Inequality and Stability, in that order, appear. in the hierarchy.
!d. at 601-02.
2
Treasury Regulations 1.197-2(c)(12) (as amended in 2001) and 1.3386(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2001) use the term "transaction costs" in the same context
as this article but do not define it. Some use it to mean costs that arise or are incurred
"in connection with" a transaction. See, e.g., 1995 FSA LEXIS 395 (Jan. 24, 1995);
1995 FSA LEXIS 233 (Mar. 22, 1995).
3
397 U.S. 572 (1970) (stating that legal, accounting, and appraisal expenses
incurred in purchasing minority stock interest are capital expenditures); see infra
notes 188-214 and accompanying text. See generally John W. Lee & Nina R. Murphy,
Capital Expenditures: A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 473
(1981).
4
397 U.S. 580 (1970) (stating that consulting, legal, and other professional fees
incurred by acquiring firm in minority stock appraisal proceeding are capital
expenditures).
5
See I.R.C. § 446(c); infra notes 185-92, 197-209 and accompanying text.
6
418 U.S. 1 (1974) (stating that equipment depreciation allocable to
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extended the capitalization requirement to inside transaction costs of
creating a tangible with substantial future benefits in order to prevent
(1) a timing of income mismatch in violation of section 446(b), and (2)
a violation of the judicial rule of tax parity under which inside and
outside transaction costs should be treated the same. For example,
the capitalization requirement would avoid providing a tax advantage
to inside costs over identical outside costs of constructing or acquiring
7
a tangible asset with future benefits. . Capitalization of transaction
costs as to an intangible asset usually yields a far less elegant result,
since the intangible asset can be depreciated only under section 167
8
and only if its useful life can be determined with certainty. Taxpayers
are seldom able to determine the useful life of an intangible asset,
9
particularly with respect to business expansion and start-up costs. To
avoid the distortion of income of capitalization of such costs without
depreciation, many, but not all, judicial and administrative authorities
from the early 1970s through 1992 allowed a current deduction for
expenditures yielding current and future intangible benefits. These
expenditures included recurring business expansion costs, based on
the erroneous reasoning that such costs were deductible if they did not
10
create a separate asset. This line of reasoning was, in turn, based on
construction of capital facilities is to be capitalized; otherwise, taxpayer constructing
own capital assets is tax advantaged over taxpayer purchasing similar assets).
7
See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text
8
See infra note 197.
9
John W. Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses and Section 174: Will Snow Fall?, 27
TAX LAW. 381,411-12 (1974) [hereinafter Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses].
10
John W. Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear Reflection of Income: A
Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform and a Touch of Basics, 6 VA. TAX REV. 1,
17-26, 52-7 (1986) [hereinafter Lee, Start-Up Costs]. While I can take pride in the fact
that my definition of "investigatory" and "start-up costs" was followed in section
195's legislative history, compare Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses, supra note 9, at 38485, with S. REP. No. 96-1036 (1980), I must also confess that I stated that
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971), rejected the
future benefits test. Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses, supra note 9, at 390 n.53. I now
know that was not so, but in any event came to see that the no separate asset reading
was questionable. Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 477 n.29. Daniel Halperin had it
right in a letter to me back then that Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses, was too much of a
brief. I was trying too hard to get the Supreme Court to reject the start-up gloss on
section 162 and, in particular, the holding one's self out as providing goods or services
definition of a trade or business. Of course, I succeeded then only in Snow v.
Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974), holding that sections 174 and 162 were different
(a Supreme Court clerk and former classmate wrote me at the time asking for a copy
of Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses), but adopting for section 174 a regular and
continuous profit-motivated activities test, which I had advocated. John W. Lee, A
Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 TAX L. REV. 347,
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11

a misreading of Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n.
Underneath this mistaken no separate asset doctrine, however, lay
factual patterns which would have supported application of one or
another of the rough justice current deduction factors discussed in
Part IV of this article.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in National Starch and
12
Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner to resolve the conflict between the
two lines of cases. Justice Blackmun, the author of Lincoln Savings
13
and Idaho Power, explained in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner
that Lincoln Savings merely held that the cost of creating or
enhancing a separate asset usually had to be capitalized - not that the
absence of such a tangible asset precluded capitalization
14
notwithstanding more than incidental future benefits. In this sense,
future benefits were a strong, but not irrefutable, indicator of a capital
expenditure.
Part II recounts how, over the last decade, expensing versus
capitalizing of costs with present and future, often intangible benefits
became the most significant federal income tax issue in audits of big
businesses, which report the bulk of both the corporate sector income
15
and additional tax revenues raised by tax audits and collections. An
indicator of this phenomenon was the action of the Internal Revenue
Service (Service) in directing team tax auditors of the largest 1500 or
16
so corporations in the aftermath of INDOPCO to examine specific
expensing/capitalizing issues, particularly those with future benefits
flavor.
This practice generated a flood of Technical Advice
Memoranda (TAM) which .often manifested conflicts between the
Examination Division of the Service and the Office of Chief Counsel.
In addition, this trend produced a few digest, published revenue
17
rulings; and a stream of reported judicial decisions that are
449-51 (1974); Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses, supra note 9, at 403. In Commissioner v.
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987), the Court adopted this test for section 162 as well.
None of these cases cited me but that's my story and I'm sticking to it.
11
403 u.s. 345 (1971).
12
918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990).
13
503 U.S. 79 (1992). See generally, John W. Lee, Doping Out the Capitalization
Rules after INDOPCO, 57 TAX NOTES 669 (Nov. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Lee,
Capitalization Rules].
14
INDOPCO, 503 U.S at 86-87.
15
See infra notes 71, 77 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 73, 94-95 and accompanying text.
17
John W. Lee eta!., Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for
Rough Justice Regulations (pt. 1), 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 631, 657 n.89 (1997)
[hereinafter Lee eta!., Rough Justice I].
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impossible to reconcile. 18
Between 25% and 40% of the audit and litigation resources of the
Large and Mid-Size Business unit (LMSB) of the Service are devoted
19
to INDOPCO issues. After a wave of initial Service victories in the
Tax Court, circuit courts are beginning to reverse these decisions,
particularly where everyday or nondepreciable expenditures are at
20
issue. At the same time, corporate audit rates have rapidly declined
21
over the past five years, and widespread abuse of corporate tax
22
shelters has occurred in the pool of the largest businesses in LMSB.
The media and others have drawn a connection between the decline in
23
corporate audit rates and the use of corporate tax shelters, which are
viewed by many· in the Treasury Department as the biggest tax
24
problem at this time.
Against this backdrop, the Service and the Treasury Department
have provided in an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures25
18

Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002).
19
See infra notes 175-77,182 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 446-48,455,475-78, 529-31 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 128-33, 154-58 and accompanying text.
23
See infra notes 120, 124-26, 128 and accompanying text.
24
See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
25
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3461 (Jan. 24, 2002); see Professor Submits Paper on Capitalization Rules, TAX
NOTES TODAY (May 7, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 1996 TNT
101-20). We then polished and published such a response in a symposium dedicated
to Boris Bittker (who early propounded a rule of reason here, see infra note 584) in
Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, and John W. Lee et al., Restating
Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for Rough Justice Regulations (pt. 2), 23
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1484 (1997) [hereinafter Lee, et al., Rough Justice II]. For our
recommendations on these points, see Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 665
(advising discussion draft), 684 (advising global regulations), and 691 (advising global
regulations). For our other recommendations adopted or considered in the Advance
Notice, see infra notes 244-45 (balancing test), 258 (not more than a twelve-month
safe harbor), 266 (de minimis rule), 306 (regularly recurring) and accompanying text.
See generally, Thomas L. Evans & Gregory W. Gallagher, INDOPCO- The Treasury
Finally Acts, 80 TAXES 47, 48-52 (Mar. 2002). I heartily commend the Treasury
Department and the Service for the format of an Advance Notice and for the
prospect of global regulations, both of which my students and I recommended in
response to Service Notice 96-7, 1996-2 C.B. 9 ("invites public comment on
approaches the Service should consider to address issues raised under §§ 162 and 263
of the Internal Revenue Code particularly in light of INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992)").
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(Advance Notice), a conceptual framework for proposing rules with
respect to "expenditures that create or enhance intangible assets or
26
benefits."
These expenditures include various business capital
transactions such as the acquisition, creation, restructuring, or
reorganization of a business entity or a business assets acquisition
27
subject to section 1060. The Treasury Department and the Service
correctly concluded that:
[b]ecause courts focus on particular facts before them, the
results reached by the courts are often difficult to reconcile
and, particularly in recent years, have contributed to
substantial uncertainty and controversy.
The IRS and
Treasury Department are concerned that the current level of
uncertainty and controversy is neither fair to taxpayers nor
consistent with sound and efficient tax administration.
Recently, much of the uncertainty and controversy in the
capitalization area has related to expenditures that create or
28
enhance intangible assets or benefits.
Accordingly, the Treasury Department and the Service
contemplate proposing several rough justice safe harbors permitting
current deduction of expenditures with future benefits where the
29
burdens of capitalization outweigh its benefits. They also have in
mind a proposed rule which would "require a taxpayer to capitalize
certain transaction costs that facilitate the taxpayer's acquisition,
30
creation, or enhancement of intangible assets or benefits. " Payments
for outside services for such facilitating transaction costs would have
to be capitalized as in INDOPCO, subject to a de minimis, one-year
31
rule for rough justice current deduction exceptions.
In sharp
26

Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 3462.
27
Id. at 3464; I.R.C. § 1060(c).
28
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 3462.
29
[T]he forthcoming notice of proposed rulemaking will recognize that
many expenditures that create or enhance intangible assets or benefits do
not create the type of future benefits for which .capitalization under section
263(a) is appropriate, particularly when the administrative and record
keeping costs associated with capitalization are weighed against the
potential distortion of income.
!d.
30
ld. at 3464.
31
ld. Examples given include payments, subject to the de minimis rule, made to
outside attorneys for services in drafting a three-year covenant not to compete or in
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contrast, the Advance Notice states that the Treasury Department
and the Service expect that the proposed .regulations would exclude
the following in-house or inside transaction costs: (1) "employee
compensation" (except for bonuses and commissions that are paid
with respect to the transaction), (2) fixed overhead, or (3) de minimis
32
costs not exceeding a specified dollar amount, such as $5000, from
the rule calling for capitalization of costs facilitating a transaction.
Inside and outside recurring transaction costs incurred in connection
with, but not facilitating, acquisition, creation, or enhancement of
intangible assets, including acquisition of a business, would be
33
currently deductible.
These contemplated self-created transaction costs rules will
violate the rule of tax parity by favoring inside creation of intangibles
34
over outside purchase. The only principled basis for these rules is
that administrative burdens of capitalization could outweigh the
benefits of a more rigorous matching and adherence to tax parity or
35
horizontal equity.
Accordingly, the proposed regulations should
explicitly justify such rules both in the preamble and in the body of the
regulations on the basis of a balancing of the burdens and benefits of
36
capitalization. Further, burdens to the Service should also be taken
37
into account in such a balancing test, due to the hazards of litigating
the capitalization issues of customarily deducted everyday expenses
even where conceptual rigor would require capitalization, and in
order to allow reallocation of compliance resources from
38
capitalization issues to the "immoral and unethical" corporate tax
defending a trademark.
32
Id.; see infra notes 436, 439 and accompanying text.
33
See infra note 434.
34
Fed. Bar Ass'n, Transcript of Sixth Invitational Biennial Conference on Tax
Legislative Process, Day Two, TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 17, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX
lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 160-17, <JI<J1569-79) (comments of Joseph Mikrut)
[hereinafter Transcript of Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two]. For a
discussion of the rule of tax parity, see infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
35
Lawrence Lokken, Capitalization: Complexity in Simplicity, 91 TAX NOTES
1357, 1359, 1364-65, 1369 (May 28, 2001) (currently deduct where administrative
burden outweighs more accurate matching); Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 55
(administrative burdens of capitalization outweigh lack of tax parity).
36
See infra note 609 and accompanying text.
37
See Miscellaneous Revenue Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong. 1687 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 House Hearings] (statement of John W. Lee) ("our real concern is
avoiding litigation costs on both sides").
38
Sydney P. Freedberg, Now He's the One Making the Tax Rules, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, at 1A (quoting ranking Senate Finance
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39

shelter problem.
The contemplated proposed regulations' limiting of capitalization
of transaction costs to those "facilitating" the acquisition, creation, or
40
enhancement of intangibles appears to be based on various recent
appellate decisions, as well as one Tax Court decision. Part IV asserts
that these decisions are incorrect in their reasoning when measured
against (1) the origin of the claim/acquisition cost doctrine of
41
Woodward v. Commissioner and United States v. Hilton Hotels
42
Corp., and (2) the matching of expense and future benefits or income
43
and the rule of tax parity of Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co. Part
VI maintains, however, that most of the results reached in these postINDOPCO decisions could be justified under a burdens and benefits
of capitalization balancing test for determining minimal distortion of
income by the taxpayer's tax accounting method for transaction costs.
The proposed regulations should further tie the inside transaction cost
rules into these cases but should be explicit in the preamble and body
of the proposed regulations to justify the rules on a balancing of
burdens and benefits of capitalization. Part IV analyzes such a
balancing test, on which the Guidance explicitly based the proposed
"safe harbors," allowing current deduction of certain future benefit
expenses to intangibles (less than a twelve-month benefit, de minimis,
44
and possibly recurring).
The contemplated proposed regulations can be said to have a protaxpayer bias favoring self-construction in permitting current
45
deduction of recurring future benefit expenses. Yet this is precisely
what Congress attempted to effect with exceptions in the legislative
histories to sections 195, 263A, and 197, for the costs of creating
intangibles by an existing business. Congress thus intentionally left
46
simplification of this area of capitalization to existing law, which
Committee member Sen. Charles Grassley).
39
See infra notes 181, 577 and accompanying text.
40
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002).
41
397 U.S. 572 (1970) (legal, accounting, and appraisal expenses incurred in
purchasing minority stock interest are capital expenditures).
42
397 U.S. 580 (1970) (consulting, legal, and other professional fees incurred by
acquiring firm in minority stock appraisal proceeding are capital expenditures).
43
418 U.S. 1 (1974) (equipment depreciation allocable to construction of capital
facilities is to be capitalized; otherwise, taxpayer constructing own capital assets is tax
advantaged over taxpayer purchasing similar assets).
44
67 Fed. Reg. at 3462.
45
See Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 54-55.
46
See in1,E,ra notes 581-84 and accompanying text.
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Congress believed allowed a current deduction. In fact, Congress
48
once explicitly pointed to Lincoln Savings as the source of such a
deduction, (i.e., the no separate asset rule). Due to the pay go
Congressional budget rules that require any tax revision reducing
baseline revenues to be offset by new revenue-raising provisions or by
49
a reduction in spending, and the peculiarities of revenue scoring
rules, Congress cannot explicitly provide a current deduction for such
self-created intangibles that most taxpayers apparently deduct without
paying for the revenue losses from the hypothetical baseline. In short,
the contemplated proposed regulations would take the administrable
rough justiCe approach that Congress would likely have taken but for
5
paygo. ° Further, President George W. Bush has approved of the
51
Advance Notice.
Consequently, such regulations would seem the
ideal candidate for ex post facto Congressional ratification.

47

SeeS. REP. No. 96-1036, at 10-12 (1990) ("In the case of an existing business,
eligible startup expenditures do not include deductible ordinary and necessary
business expenses paid or incurred in connection with an expansion of the business.
As under present law, these expenditures will continue to be currently deductible.").
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 legislative history to section 197
simply states that "[i]t is also believed that there is no need at this time to change the
Federal income tax treatment of self-created intangible assets, such as goodwill that is
created through advertising and other similar expenditures." H.R. REP. No. 103-111,
at 760 (1993).
48
See infra note 582.
49
See infra note 516.
50
See supra notes 46-48.
51
See Pam Olson, Remarks Made at the University of Virginia School of Law
Tax Study Group Meeting (Mar. 22, 2002); see also Nancy Ognanovich, President
Proposes New Tax Breaks Aimed at Helping Small Business Owners, 53 BNA DAILY
TAX REP., Mar. 19, 2002, at G-10 ("The White House also said Bush has directed
Treasury to finalize the proposed rules on the capitalization of intangible assets as
soon as possible. The change, it said, will allow small businesses to focus their
resources on customers and not the Internal Revenue Service."); Jo Mannies &
Christopher Carey, In Stop Here, President Pushes Proposals for Small Business; But
the Big Issue in Every Speech Is Defeat of Terrorism; He Helps Raise Money for
Talent, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 19, 2002, at A1 ("Bush plans to offer more
details today of his program to help small businesses. He wants to reduce taxation
and regulation, allow small businesses to take bigger deductions for capital
investments and help them hold down the cost of health insurance by pooling risks.").

Transaction Costs

2002]

283

II. JNDOPCO ISSUES AND ADMINISTRATION OF TAX AUDITS OF
LARGE AND MID-SIZE BUSINESSES

A.

Service Units of the Internal Revenue Service

Section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Service Reform and
52
Restructuring Act of 1998
(Reform and Restructuring Act)
mandates "reorganization of the Internal Revenue Service,"
eliminating or substantially modifying the then-existing three-tiered
(nation/region/district)
structure
of
the
Service
"with
an
organizational structure that features operating units serving
53
particular groups of taxpayers with similar needs. "
One reason for
this restructuring was to break up perceived "stovepipes" or
54
unconnected functions in the Service.
Accordingly, the Service was
reorganized into four taxpayer service units: (1) individual wage and
investment only individuals (W&I taxpayers), (2) small businesses and
self-employed (SB/SE), (3) large businesses (Large and Mid-Size
Business, or LMSB), and (4) the tax-exempt sector (employee plans,
55
exempt organizations and state and local governments).
Although
Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti asked his restructuring consultants
to consider the appropriateness of the above four service units, his
56
proposed groupings appear to have been carved in stone.
52

Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
53
144 CONG. REC. H5100, H5149 (daily ed. June 24, 1998) (Conf. Explanatory
Statement). At least the principal Senate sponsors of this legislation viewed
subsection 1001(a)(3) as merely codifying Commissioner Rossotti's then "current"
identification of "four different groups of taxpayers with similar needs." 144 CONG.
REC. S7631 (daily ed. July 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Kerrey); id. at S7644 (statement
of Sen. Baucus).
54
See Report of the National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue
Service, A Vision for a New IRS, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 26, 1997) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 97 TNT 123-15) ("In a stovepipe operation,
functional units such as taxpayer services, exam, collection, appeals, and counsel set
and implement their own priorities and objectives, which often are disconnected from
the other functions and the organization as a whole."). The National Commission
superficially considered reorganization of the Service along categories of taxpayers
lines.
55
S. REP. No. 105-174 (1998); IRS 0RG. BLUEPRINT 2000, Doc. No. 11052, at
1-14 to 1-15 fig.1-4 (revised Apr. 2000) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT 2000].
56
See Hearing before Sen. Fin. Comm. on IRS Restructuring, 105th Cong. 77
(1998) (colloquy between Sen. Kerrey and former Commissioner Alexander); see also
144 CONG. REC. S4406 (daily ed. May 6, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Minority Floor
Manager of H.R. 2676, Sen. Kerrey, Co-Director of the National Commission on
Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service); id. at S4417; 144 CONG. REC. S7631
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Prior to restructuring, the Service concentrated its income tax
57
audits on (1) large corporations, including those with more than $250
million in assets and, to a significantly lesser extent, those with $10
million to $250 million in assets; (2) small businesses, including small
58
C corporations and sole proprietorships but largely ignoring S
59
corporations and partnerships; and (3) high income individuals.
(daily ed. July 8, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Kerrey). With an Oversight Board,
whatever plan the IRS comes up with and the Commissioner comes up
with ... the Congress will support that plan ... taxpayers are going to say
that it is an awful lot easier now that the Commissioner has organized the
IRS by individual taxpayers, corporate taxpayers small, corporate taxpayers
big, and by non-profits.
!d.; S. REP. No.105-174 (1998).
57
See, e.g., Hearings Before a House Comm. on Appropriations Subcomm. on
Treasury, Postal Serv., and Gen. Gov't Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992, 102d
Cong. 775-76, 800-02, 833, 918, 968-70 (1991) (statement of Commissioner Fred T.
Goldberg, Jr.).
58
The audit rate for small business is higher than for taxpayers in general and
two-thirds of such audits result in recommended assessments.
GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: TAX REQUIREMENTS OF SMALL
BUSINESSES 2, 14 (1999). The Service's data showed that about 2.3% of the income
tax returns filed by small businesses in 1997 were audited (prior to the substantial
post-1998 drop off of audits in general), generally through audits conducted by the
Service's district offices. ld. By contrast, the Service audited 1.3% of all returns filed
in 1997. The audit rate for sole proprietors (individuals filing Schedule C) was 3.2%,
compared to 1.2% for individuals not filing Schedule C. Small business taxpayers
tend to have more compliance problems than other taxpayers, e.g., employment tax
compliance due to working capital shortages. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: IRS FACES SEVERAL CHALLENGES AS IT ATTEMPTS TO BETTER
SERVE SMALL BUSINESSES 6 (2000). Self-employed persons (sole proprietors and
partners) and supplemental income earners (individuals with rental or royalty
income) made up almost 40% of individual examination and collections cases. !d.
Historically, most of the individual audits involved sole proprietors. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS CAN BETTER PURSUE
NONCOMPLIANT SOLE PROPRIETORS 2, 5 (1994) (sole proprietors made up just 13% of
all individual taxpayers but 40% of individual noncompliance, filed more complex
returns, were intentionally noncompliant more often, and tended to be better-off
financially than individuals in general. Sole proprietors accounted for 36% of the
1992 estimated tax gap and accounted for 15% of assessed taxes owed by individuals
in 1993); accord GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: TAX
COMPLIANCE OF NONWAGE EARNERS 1-2, 7, 11 (1996) (74% of taxes owed by
individuals was attributable to nonwage income of which self-employment income
made up the largest portion).
59
Historically, individual audits concentrated on upper-income filers for "they
have more to hide from the government and better opportunities for hiding it."
William Kates, IRS Audits Poor More than Rich: Report, CHI. SuN TIMES, Apr. 16,
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Because both INDOPCO issue audits and corporate tax shelters are
concentrated in the LMSB taxpayers, this article will concentrate on
that service unit while briefly noting some parallels and discontinuities
with other service units.

B. LMSB Service Unit
As discussed below, audits of INDOPCO issues are concentrated
in the LMSB service unit which covers firms, C corporations, S
corporations, and partnerships, including limited liability companies
60
61
(LLCs), initially with assets of $5 million or more (now $10 million

2000, at 41 (in the early 1990s, taxpayers with incomes of $100,000 or more were
audited at five times those earning less than $25,000). In 1999, however, audits of
individual taxpayers with less than $25,000 in income exceeded for the first time ever
the audit rate for upper-income taxpayers, generating much media attention. David
Cay Johnston, I.R.S. More Likely to Audit the Poor and Not the Rich, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2000, at A1 (drop in audit rate of corporations and self-employed, although
more likely to cheat than the poor; and smallest self-employed more likely to be
audited than larger self-employed). This was not the case for face-to-face audits,
reflecting that many Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) audits consisted of inquiries
as to identification numbers for children.
60
The basis for an asset criterion is that existing corporate and partnership data
from the Service are categorized by size of assets. Preliminary IRS Modernization
Conference Transcript: Small Business/Self-Employed, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 4,
2000) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2000 TNT 24-67, 'lJ 33) [hereinafter
SB/SE Hearing Transcript] (statement of SB/SE TEC Director Songy). This
categorization, however, only roughly corresponds with income. John W. Lee, A
Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey the Stars
Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do", 78 TEx. L. REV. 885, 904 nn.115 & 119 (2000)
[hereinafter Lee, Business Tax Entities]. The Service expects that some business
taxpayers with small assets are more like a large multi-national firm, e.g., big service
entities, and some with more than $5 million in assets are really more like small
businesses. SB/SE Hearing Transcript, supra, 91 33 (statement of SB/SE TEC Director
Songy).
61
Prior to restructuring, the Service divided corporations along a $10-million-inassets line. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON
LARGE CoRPORATIONS 1 (1995). Large corporations were further divided into those
1500 to 1700 largest corporations subject to the Coordinated Examination Program
(CEP) and about 40,000 other large corporations. ld. The Service established CEP in
1966 to audit corporations with $250 million in assets and above due to the growth of
such corporations in the 1950s and 1960s and to the realization that "one case, one
agent" was no longer effective. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS
NEED IMPROVEMENT 16 (1994). The CEPhas been renamed Coordinated Industry
Cases (CIC). Sheryl Stratton, IRS Issues First Report on Prefiling Agreements, 91 TAX
NOTES 198 (2001).
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62

or more).
The LMSB service unit was first estimated to cover
approximately 210,000 taxpayers, of which 9300 were large firms and
63
the remaining 200,700 were mid-size firms.
As of April 2001, the
Service had already received 240,000 LMSB returns, return volume
64
running 9% ahead of 2000. As of 2000, the total income tax liability
of filers in the LMSB service unit was $466 billion and they paid $712
65
billion to the Service including employee wage taxes. The average
66
tax liability per filer was $2,231,274.
Without fanfare, the Service raised the dividing line · between
67
LMSB and SB/SE to $10 million, thereby lowering the number of
taxpayers in the LMSB service unit to 149,000, of which 60% are
68
corporations.
It is likely that this reduction had little effect on
LMSB's share of corporate income taxes and employee wage taxes
given the concentration of such items at the $250 million or more
assets level and, to a lesser degree, at the $100 to $250 million in assets
69
level as discussed immediately below. The average tax liability per
corporate taxpayer, however, should nearly double since the number
of corporations in LMSB has almost halved.

62

In the restructuring of the Service after 1997, the floor for the LMSB service
unit was lowered to $5 million in assets, increasing the group to 170,000 taxpayers; by
2001, the group increased to 248,000 taxpayers. Compare IRS Announces New
Headquarters Locations, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 25, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 99 TNT 15-15), with BLUEPRINT 2000, supra note 55, at 4-1 and
4-19 to 4-23; Preliminary Transcript of Modernization Conference Now Available,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 14, 2000) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2000
TNT 24-63 at <J1230) (statement of Larry Langdon, LMSB Commissioner).
63
See BLUEPRINT 2000, supra note 54, at 4-1, 4-19 to 4-23; The New IRS Stands
Up Transcript, supra note 62, <JI 230 (statement of Larry Langdon).
64
John E. Hembera, Head of Retailers Industry Segment Reports on
Developments, 91 TAX NOTES 219 (2001).
65
BLUEPRINT 2000, supra note 55, at 1-13 fig.1-4.
66
/d. at 1-13 fig.l-4.
67
See Rev. Proc. 2002-1, 2002-1 I.R.B. 1, 7 (Jan 7, 2002). Indeed, there was so
little publicity that the Joint Committee reporting in May 2002 on the restructuring of
the Service still used the $5 million benchmark. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS
REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 44 (Joint
Comm. Print 2002).
68
Unofficial Transcript of Finance Committee Hearing on Tax Shelters, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Mar. 27, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT
59-31, <jJ 194) [hereinafter Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters]
(statement of Larry Langdon, Commissioner of Large and Medium Business
Division, Internal Revenue Service).
69
See infra notes 71-72, 77, 94-95 and accompanying text.
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SB/SE Commissioner Joe Kehoe's explanation of the rationale
for such change, which he had announced at the Virginia Annual
Federal Income Tax Conference held at the University of Virginia on
June 8, 2001, was that both LMSB and SB/SE planned to concentrate
audit resources on higher income taxpayers in their service units;
therefore, the $5 to $10 million category of business firms would
receive more audit coverage in SB/SE than in LMSB. This is a sound
move, given my belief that the appropriate floor on mid-size
businesses should be $50 to $100 million in assets based on reported
70
earnings. Generally, more than 80% of corporate sector income is
reported by the largest 6000 or so publicly-traded corporations with
$100 million or more in assets by adjusted basis, which is usually less
than fair market value (75% is reported by the 3000 with such assets
71
over $250 million, encompassing the CEP corporations). The 40,000
or so mid-size, mostly closely-owned corporations generally reporting
average annual income of $2 million historically reported another
72
10% or so of corporate sector income.
C. Historic Audit Patterns of Large Corporations

Historically, the Service selected roughly 1500 corporations for
CEP status based on criteria such as size ($250 million and greater in
73
assets) and complexity.
The Service conducted CEP audits with
74
teams of more experienced revenue agents and technical specialists.
70

John W. Lee, Sleeper Stigmatisms in "A Vision for a New IRS" Reorganized
"Along Customer Lines", Address Before the William & Mary Law School Alumni 6,
51,58-62 (April23, 1999) (copy on file with the Virginia Tax Review).
71
Lee, Business Tax Entities, supra note 60, at 904.
72
Id. at 921-22.
73
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON
LARGE CORPORATIONS 2 (1995).
74
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: FACTORS
AFFECTING RESULTS FROM AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS 11, 12 (1997) (eightand-a-half years versus eighteen years CEP; also move every six years to another
industry rule). In contrast to CEP large corporation team audits increasingly directed
by Industry Specialization Programs (ISPs), the remaining large corporations (mostly
$10 million to $250 million in assets) previously were audited by a single revenue
agent or "auditor" using his or her judgment to select taxpayers to audit and issues to
raise. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON
LARGE CORPORATIONS 2 (1995). CEP auditors were directed through ISBs as to the
issues to raise in audits of CEP corporations. The Service used mathematical
formulas (discriminant function, or DIP) for scoring individual returns and small
corporation returns on the likelihood of significant noncompliance. See GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL AUDIT: EXAMINATION OF IRS' FISCAL YEAR 1993
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The General Accounting Office reports that "[c]ontrary to IRS
testimony, IRS did not audit every CEP taxpayer every year. Using
IRS' method of calculating audit coverage for other groups of
taxpayers, we found that CEP audit coverage ranged from 66 percent
75
in 1987 to 77 percent in 1991."
Part of the discrepancy may be
attributable to the fact that the Service generally does not audit CEP
returns with little or no revenue potential insofar as they report net
76
operating losses. CEP audits accounted for 65% of all increases in
income taxes recommended for all Service audits of individuals and
77
corporations in 1992.
Historically, CEP audits used 20% of the
78
Service's examination resources.
CEP and income tax audits of
larger corporations, or those having $100 million or more in assets,
79
have long been the major component of the Service's audit program.
The percentage of resources allocated to capitalization issues in
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 15 (1994); see
also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS' RETURN
SELECTION PROCESS 1, 2 (1999) (59% of audited tax returns for 1992-94 selected by
DIF for which all individual returns are automatically scored). See generally, Jim
Gallagher, What Makes Audit Computers Tick, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1996, at C-3.
75

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE
MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 23 (1994);
see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS EFFORTS TO
IMPROVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2 (1992) (69% for 1990; 77% for 1991);
Compliance Official's Statement at IRS Commission Taxpayer Rights Meeting, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Feb. 27, 1997) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 97 TNT 3961) (statement of James E. Donelson, Chief Taxpayer Service/Acting Chief
Compliance Officer Internal Revenue Service; audit rate for CEP taxpayers is about
85%). More recently, the number of annual CEP audits has fallen to the 450 to 575
range. See infra note 113.
76

See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CORPORATE TAXES, MANY BENEFITS
AND FEW COSTS TO REPORTING NET OPERATING LOSS CARRYOVER 13 (1993) ("IRS
generally did not audit CEP returns that had little or no revenue potential, such as
those reporting NOLS.").
77

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE
MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 16 (1994);
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON LARGE
CORPORATIONS 31 (1995) ($1,318 million for assets of $100 million and more versus
$698 million for assets from $10 million to $100 million for 1988 through 1994).
78
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE
MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 2 (1994);
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATUS OF OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS, IMPROVING
OPERATIONS OF FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 124 (1998).
79

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY, VALUE-ADDED TAX:
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS VARY WITH COMPLEXITY AND NUMBER OF BUSINESSES 123
(1993) (in 1990, the Service allocated 40% of all staff years devoted directly to
corporate audits to CEP audits).
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LMSB has increased with the overall decrease in corporate audits in
80
2000 (down 13% from a 1999 record low ), while business audit
81
resources remain concentrated on CEP audits.
Indeed, a Service
official recently stated that capitalization issues alone accounted for as
82
much as 25% of audit resources,
and capitalization is
83
overwhelmingly an LMSB issue.
The LMSB Commissioner pointed out two major problems with
the Service's pre-restructuring large and mid-size corporations
compliance activities: (1) audit of CEP corporations "is a flawed
process in that both sides basically play Russian roulette with regard
84
to both facts and the law"; and (2) compliance coverage as to the
80

David Cay Johnston, Rate of All I.R.S. Audits Falls; Poor Face Intense
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at Al.
81
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS
REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998 app. (Joint
Comm. Print 2001) (letter from Tax Executives Institute, Inc., to Lindy Paull, Chief of
Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation 2 (Apr. 12, 2001)).
82
Alison Bennet & Brant Goldwyn, Olson Calls for Broad Business Cost Rules,
Signals Doubt on Future Value of Intangibles, 152 BNA DAILY TAX REP., Aug. 8,
2001, at G-2; TEl Urges Careful Consideration of INDOPCO Coalition's
Capitalization Proposals, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 9, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 218-35) ("IRS's Large and Mid-Size Business Division
has reported that more than 25 percent of its audit resources are devoted to
capitalization issues in some industries."); Treasury Proposals to Curb Abusive Tax
Avoidance Transactions, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 21, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 55-25) (noting that research and experimental (R&E)
credit and capitalization issues account for 40% of audit resources); Fiscal Year 2003
Budget's Analytical Perspective on Bush Administration's Tax Simplification
Proposals, 25 BNA DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 6, 2002, at L-2 ("The present uncertain
legal environment has elevated capitalization to the top of the list of contested audit
issues for businesses.").
83
See Lee et a!., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 643.
84
Preliminary IRS Modernization Conference Transcript: Afternoon, January 13,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 4, 2000) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2000
TNT 24-64, 'l[46) (statement of LMSB Commissioner Langdon).
[T]here [are] a number of years open at the examination cycle, ... a number
of cycles open at the appeals level, and perhaps some cycles in litigation.
Sometimes that spans nine, fifteen years.
It's a very costly process for all of us. It's a very frustrating process for us
to manage- with our resources- manage all of those open years.
Preliminary IRS Modernization Conference Transcript: Large and Mid-Sized Business
(Feb. 4, 2000) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2000 TNT 24-66, 'l[ 365-66)
[hereinafter LMSB Hearing Transcript] (statement of Richard Goelz, Director of
Field Operations for Retailers, Food and Pharmaceuticals Industry Group).
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nearly 250,000 non-CEP corporations with $5 million and more in
85
assets, is "not optimal." In fact, the audit rate for non-CEP large
86
corporations declined only 50% from 1998 to 2000.
CEP teams generally began auditing returns five to six years after
87
filing and took two to three years to complete them.
Thus, on
88
average, a CEP audit of a given tax year was ten years old, and any
litigation often occurred twelve or more years after the filing year,
89
resulting in an "archeological dig" aspect.
Moreover, the Service
devoted 95% of its corporate filer audit resources to post-filing
90
activities. There were too many layers from auditing agent in field to
91
manager with authority over exam and collections.
Additionally,
poor coordination between the Office of Chief Counsel and the
Examination division resulted in delays in the completion of audits,

85

!d. 'lJ 56 (statement of LMSB Commissioner Langdon).
See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
87
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE
MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 2 (1994)
("[T]he 1,700 audit staff years devoted to the program are modest compared to the
formidable task of the auditing the 1,700 largest, most complex corporations. Given
this task, CEP audits may not start for several years after the return is filed and take
several more years to be completed.").
88
!d. at 18.
89
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS
REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998 app. (Joint
Comm. Print 2001) (letter from Tax Executives Institute, Inc., to Lindy Paull, Chief of
Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation 2 (April 12, 2001)); GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE
CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 39 (noting that as of 1992 one case still in audit
since 1961).
90
TEl Asks: Who's Controlling the Audit in the New IRS?, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Mar. 25, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 1999 TNT 57-2).
91
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS
REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 11-12 n.36
(Joint Comm. Print 1999).
86

The [IRS] Deputy Commissioner [for modernization] said that a territory
manager will have authority over joint collection and exam issues and that
the five layers of management will be eliminated. An issue will go from an
agent to the group manager to the territory manager, who controls both
exam and collection functions.
Id.; accord ABA Tax Section: New IRS Will Have 'Territories,' 'Areas', TAX NOTES
TODAY (May 3, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 1999 TNT 84-2).
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which typically resulted in rejections of capitalization treatment. 92
Such poor coordination is, of course, a manifestation of the stovepipe
93
phenomenon.
With respect to 1994 tax returns, the Service's audits of the
returns of the 1700 CEP corporations and of 45,000 additional large
corporations (those with assets from $10 to $250 million in assets)
generated about two-thirds of the additional taxes recommended for
94
all income tax audits of that tax year. In 2000, corporations with
$250 million or more in assets accounted for 64.5% of all additional
income taxes and penalties recommended by the Service's agents,
95
while amounting to only 0.5% of audited income tax returns. CEP
large corporations protested almost 80% to 90% of the proposed
96
97
additional income taxes, prevailing most of the time, with the end
result that only 20% or so of the proposed increases were sustained in
98
administrative appeals.
As of 1997, almost all (97%) of such
assessed taxes for the 1992 tax year had been paid by CEP large
92

See Christopher Bergin, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Rossotti Says Chief
Counsel Is Becoming Integral Part of IRS Management, 91 TAX NOTES 1213 (May 21,
2001) (pointing out that Commissioner Rossotti stated that, traditionally, "Counsel
was viewed as an organization that said 'no,' and took too long to say it."). I suspect
that this attitude reflects at least in part the conflict between Chief Counsel and
Examination on INDOPCO issues where a large number of Chief Counsel TAMs
reversed Examination's call for capitalization. See also Lee et al., Rough Justice I,
supra note 17, at 657-80,657 n.90.
93
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
94
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON
LARGE CORPORATIONS 1 (1995).
95
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., IRS District,
Service Center and International Audits and IRS Auditor Findings of Additional Taxes
and Penalties Owed, Federal Income Tax Returns of Individuals and Corporations
Fiscal Year 2000, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/nationaUaudDollars (last visited
Jan. 20, 2003) (noting that the same 65% portion existed over a decade); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON LARGE
CORPORATIONS 2, 16 (65% for 1992); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: IRS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 23 (1992)
(commenting that CEP taxpayers accounted for 90% of all recommended increases in
corporate income taxes for 1991).
96
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON
LARGE CORPORATIONS 19.
97
Id. at 41-42.
98
Id. at 42 (citing a 19.72% assessment rate for corporations with $250 million
and more in assets); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS MEASURES COULD
PROVIDE A MORE BALANCED PICTURE OF AUDIT RESULTS AND COSTS 10 (1998); id.
at 3 (noting that "historically, IRS has actually collected 22 percent of the additional
taxes that IRS revenue agents have recommended in CEP audits.").
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99

corporatiOns.
On an administrative level, the Service prevailed more often when
the adjusted basis assets of business taxpayers tended to be lower, but
100
it was less often able to collect these assessments.
In the end, the
Service collected from $1 for every $5 dollars recommended in audit
to $1 for every $3 recommended. The Service estimated that in 2000,
individuals paid 83% of the income taxes that they owed voluntarily
101
with enforcement bringing in another 3%. While this 3% is actually
the amount of additional taxes recommended in audit, only 1% was
actually collected. Moreover, the estimate of 83% is based on
representative, exhaustive audits of classes of taxpayers last permitted
102
by Congress to be conducted in 1988.
99

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS MEASURES COULD PROVIDE A MORE
BALANCED PICfURE OF AUDIT RESULTS AND COSTS 10; GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON LARGE CORPORATIONS 41-42.
100
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS MEASURES COULD PROVIDE A MORE
BALANCED PICfURE OF AUDIT RESULTS AND COSTS 10 (commenting that the
assessment rate as of 1997 for the non-CEP large corporations ($10 million or more in
assets) was 33%, but only 73% of that was collected, which resulted in a net of 24% of
the additional taxes recommended in audit); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT
TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON LARGE CORPORATIONS 43; GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: FACTORS AFFECTING RESULTS FROM AUDITS OF
LARGE CORPORATIONS 3 (1997) (noting that for 1988-94, 27% of recommended taxes
as to large corporations assessed); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE MEASURES AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS
NEED IMPROVEMENT 5, 29-30 (1994). In contrast to non-CEP large corporations,
however, in 2000, small and mid-size corporations accounted for 4% of audits and
10% of additional taxes and penalties recommended by the Service's agents.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COMPLIANCE MEASURES
AND AUDITS OF LARGE CORPORATIONS NEED IMPROVEMENT 25-29, app.2 tbls.II.111.5; see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS MEASURES COULD PROVIDE A
MORE BALANCED PICTURE OF AUDIT RESULTS AND COSTS 25 (noting that collection
rates for smaller corporations, those with less than $10 million in assets, were lower
than for CEP and mid-sized corporations, and that the Service assessed 52% of the
recommended additional taxes, but collected only 58% of the amounts assessed,
resulting in a net collection of 30% of the additional recommended taxes).
101
Janet Novack, Are You a Chump, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122.
102
/d.; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: INFORMATION ON
IRS' TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE MEASUREMENT PROGRAM 3 n.4 (1995); see also

Transcript of Hearing of the Senate Finance Committee on Schemes, Scams and Cons,
Part II, the IRS Strikes Back, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (Apr. 11, 2002) (Commissioner
Rossotti stating that the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) was
too intrusive, and that the Service is initiating a far more acceptable "National
Research Program"); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT
RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM
AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 34 (Joint Comm. Print 2002). See generally,
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D. Decline in Audit Rates of LMSB Corporations
For the 1994 tax year, the Service audited 77% of the 1700 CEP
103
returns and about 24% of the returns of the other 45,000 large
104
corporations.
Declines in audit rates commenced in 1968, but
"accelerated in 1995, after Congress, by then controlled by
Republicans, cut [the Service's] spending sharply and required the
105
agency to devote more resources to customer service."
Congress
also directed the Service to devote more audit resources to EITC
106
issues largely for political reasons. The audit rates for all taxpayers
O'Neill Statement on National Research Program, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 17, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 12-41); Kathleen David,
Compliance Survey, Retooled Audit Process Focus of SBISE Efforts, Kehoe Tells
Attorneys, 93 BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 14, 2002, at G-2.
103
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AUDIT TRENDS AND TAXES ASSESSED ON
LARGE CORPORATIONS 2.
104
/d. at 1 n.4.
105
David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Figures Show Drop in Tax Audits for Big
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at Al.
106
Targeting the Poor, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 24, 2000, at B-2 ("Much of the
blame lies with a Republican Congress. First, Republicans - miffed that Democrats
wouldn't let them gut the earned income taX credit - mandated that the IRS give
greater scrutiny to the program."); David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. More Likely to Audit
the Poor and Not the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at A1 (noting a drop in the
audit rate of corporations and self-employed, despite the increased propensity with
which they cheat on taxes relative to the poor, and citing a negative correlation
between the likelihood of a tax audit and the size of a self-employed individual's
business); A Weakened I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at D-14; Auditing the Poor,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, at A14; Albert B. Crenshaw, A Kinder IRS Raises New
Worries as Audits Plummet, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2000, at H1 (commenting that
Newt Gingrich actually proposed in 1995 to gut the EITC program and Clinton
countered with a plan to bolster audits); Misdirected IRS Eyeball, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
18, 2000, at A14 (pointing out that EITC audits and nonfiler audits account for
greater audits of the poor, that EITC noncompliance often involves confusion and
misunderstanding rather than criminal intent, and that it often involves disputes over
which taxpayer is entitled to the dependency exemption for a child of divorced or
separated parents); Liz Pulliam Weston, Low Incomes More Prone to Audits by IRS,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at A1, A42 (noting that 20% to 25% of EITC filings
contain errors or are fraudulent); O'Neill's Refreshing Candor, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS (Denver), Apr. 19, 2002, at 49A.
In a fit of pettiness, the Republican Congress ordered the Internal Revenue
Service to step up audits of taxpayers claiming the earned income tax credit,
a refundable tax credit aimed at helping the working poor. O'Neill's way of
putting it was that the IRS must "examine the devil out of" those receiving
the tax credit, which, to be frank, is a form of welfare. The tax has a high
error rate, maybe due to fraud, maybe due to confusion. A number of
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have continued to decline year after year since 1995. Thus, of the
largest 8500 firms, slightly more than one in three were audited in
1998, down from two in three in 1988, and hours spent on corporate
107
audits declined 12% from 1992 levels. This trend continued in 1999
with 35% of the largest asset corporations (those with $250 million or
108
more in assets) being audited as contrasted with 55% in 1992.
In
2000, the audit rate for these largest asset corporations further
09
declined to 31%/ while "[t]he number of hours devoted to such
audits fell by just 9 percent [from 1992] suggesting that the search for
major corporate tax-evasion schemes is consuming a big share of the
110
[Service's] dwindling ... capacity to audit such businesses."

Republicans suspect fraud. The result has been that one out of 50 lowincome taxpayers gets audited by the IRS, three times the rate for taxpayers
earning over $100,000. "You think I like that?" O'Neill asked a House
Appropriations subcommittee. "I hate it."
O'Neill observed correctly that all this auditing firepower recovered very
little money for the government because people claiming the tax credit pay
little or no income taxes. In any case, most Americans, and all low-income
taxpayers, pay more in payroll taxes than they do in income taxes.
While fraud may be widespread in the tax credit, there's a good
argument to be made for confusion. O'Neill said the IRS has 54 pages of
instructions for claiming the tax "for the lowest-income people who struggle
to make a living. We've given them an impossible tax code to interact with
and then we ridicule them" for not following it.
/d.
107

David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Figures Show Drop in Tax Audits for Big
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at A1; Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., Corporate Federal Income Tax Returns with Assets
$250 Million and. More, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/national/largeCorp (last
visited May 23, 2001).
108
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., Corporate
Federal Income Tax Returns with Assets $250 Million and More, at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/nationalllargeCorp (last visited May 23, 2001 ); see
Albert B. Crenshaw & Stephen Barr, A Kinder IRS Raises New Worries as Audits
Plummet, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2000, at H1 (noting that Commissioner Rossotti said
that the Service continues to audit the largest 1500 corporations regularly "because
that is where the biggest money and legal issues are at stake.").
109
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., Corporate
Federal Income Tax Returns with Assets $250 Million and More, at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/ findings/nationaUaudpctcompare-corp {last visited Apr. 15,
2002) [hereinafter Tracirs/largeCorp ].
110
David Cay Johnston, Income-Tax Enforcement Is Broadly Declining, New
U.S. Data Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2001, at C2; Tracirs/largeCorp, supra note 109;
David Cay Johnston, Rate of All I.R.S. Audits Falls; Poor Face Particular Scrutiny,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at Al.
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In summary, the General Accounting Office reported in April
2001 that since 1997, the Service's audits of large corporations
decreased by 60%, audits of partnerships decreased by 40%, and
111
audits of individuals decreased by 62%.
Contemporaneously,
Commissioner Rossetti expressed concern in a letter to the Chair of
the Senate Finance Committee that "[w]hile the IRS continues to
audit the 1,100 largest corporations every year, the audit rate for all
other corporations has declined from 3.0% in 1992 to 1.1% today." 112
In fact, there was less than half the number of CEP audits claimed by
113
Commissioner Rossotti.
Interestingly, the amounts of

Audits of corporations also fell, by nearly 13 percent from the record low
in 1999. The I.R.S. did not release data on audits of the largest
corporations, with more than $250 million of assets, which pay more than 80
percent of corporate income taxes.
Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti, disclosing the new figures yesterday,
attributed the decline in audit rates to the shrinking of the I.R.S. auditing
staff even as the number of tax returns grew, and to the diversion of I.R.S.
employees to other functions as required by several new laws aimed at
protecting taxpayers from abuses.
[Rossotti] said the number of auditors, which fell to 12,550 last year from
13,061 in 1999 and nearly 16,000 in 1996, may grow slightly in the coming
year.
/d. This, however, proved not to be the case as the number of auditors fell further to
11,598 in 2001. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT
RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM
AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2002).
"' GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: INFORMATION ON
SELECTED IRS TAX ENFORCEMENT AND COLLECTION EFFORTS 4, 7 (2001).
112
Grassley Responds to Rossotti's Letter on IRS Audit, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Mar. 29, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 61-21, en 11).
This statistic, however, misleadingly includes small corporations. The audit rate for
mid-size corporations is much higher than 1.1 %. In 2000, the audit rates were: 6.84%
of mid-size corporations with assets from $5 million to less than $10 million, down
from 18.78% in 1992; 11.57% of mid-size corporations with assets from $10 million to
less than $50 million, down from 23.20% in 1992; 14.27% of mid-size corporations
with assets from $50 million to less than $100 million, down from 28.48% in 1992; and
17.20% of mid-size corporations with assets from $100 million to less than $250
million were audited, down from 31.31% in 1992. Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., IRS District Audits of Federal Income Tax Returns
Filed by Corporations, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/nationaUaudpctcomparecorp (last visited May 23, 2001).
113
TIGTA Releases Audit Report on Prefiling Agreement Pilot Project, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 5, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT
172-16, en 4) ("The LMSB Division annually examines 20,000 returns, including 450 to
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recommended taxes and penalties dropped by about 25% for the
largest corporations and by around 50% for mid-size corporations
114
from 1998 to 2000.
The audit rate for small S corporations and
115
partnerships is 0.39%, or virtually nonexistent as practitioners
always assumed was the case, except perhaps for traditional individual
tax shelter limited partnerships during their heyday. David Cay
Johnston, a Pulitzer prize winning journalist for the New York Times,
reported this 2000 tax year data in the form of the odds of a taxpayer
being audited, which varied greatly by market segment: CEP
corporation, one in three; small sole proprietor ($25,000 or less in
gross receipts), one in thirty-seven; working poor (EITC applicants),
one in forty-seven; smaller corporations ($1 to $5 million in assets),
one in forty-nine; larger sole proprietorships ($100,000 or more in
gross revenue), one in eighty-three; high income individuals ($100,000
or more in adjusted gross income (AGI)), one in 145; Subchapter S
corporations, one in 233; partnerships, one in 400; middle-income
individuals ($50,000 to $100,000 AGI), one in 435; and lower-income
116
individuals ($25,000 to $50,000 AGI), one in 455.
E. Decline in Audit Levels and Corporate Tax Shelters
A number of factors contributed to these declines in large and
mid-size corporation audits. Returns from corporations with $250
575 of the nation's largest corporations.").
114
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., IRS District
Audits of Federal Income Tax Returns Filed by Corporations, at http://trac.syr.edu/
tracirs/findings/ national /taxpen-corp (last visited May 23, 2001).
115
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., JOINT REVIEW OF THE
STRATEGIC PLANS AND BUDGET OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 16 (Joint
Comm. Print 2001).
A particular source of concern is the growing number of entities, such as
partnerships, trusts and S-corporations, which pay no income tax at the
business level, but pass on their net income to their shareholders or
partners.
In 2000, these "passthrough" entities filed 7.4 million returns, reported
$5 trillion of gross revenues and $680 billion of income. However, the IRS
audited only 29,057 of them, or only one of every 256 returns - the
equivalent of .39 percent.
Id. at 16. This 0.39% audit rate for passthrough entities continued in fiscal 2001.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT RELATING TO THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND
RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2002).
116
David Cay Johnston, Affluent Avoid Scrutiny on Taxes Even as I.R.S. Warns
of Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at Al.
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million or more m assets doubled from 1988 to 2000 while the
117
permanent Service staff has been cut by almost one-third.
Moreover, after the Restructuring and Reform Act, the Service
shifted the equivalent of approximately 1200 full-time employees from
Examination and Collection duties to Customer Service to meet filing
season workload peaks in the new customer service Toll-Free
118
Telephone and Walk-In Assistance Programs. The Service hopes to
"reduce by 50 percent the Customer Service reliance on short-term
details of compliance staff. By reducing the diversion of· revenue
agents, tax auditors and revenue officers from enforcement casework,
audit coverage and collection effectiveness are expected to

117

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., TraciRS,
New Findings, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/aboutiRS/KeyFindings (last visited
May 23, 2001); Tracirs/largeCorp, supra note 109; Christopher Bergin, ABA Section
Meeting - Rossotti Says Chief Counsel Is Integral Part of IRS Management, 91 TAX
NOTES 1213 (May 21, 2001) (noting that Commissioner Rossotti said the decline in
audit rates was attributable to declining resources and Restructuring and Reform Act
impediments to appropriate and timely compliance); Albert B: Crenshaw, Reform
Could Prove Overtaxing for IRS, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1999, at H1 (noting the shift of
2400 workers from compliance to customer service; some officials and members of
Congress say the pendulum swung too far); David Cay Johnston, Inquiries Find Little
Abuse by Tax Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15 2000, at Cl.
Representative Lloyd Doggett, a Texas Democrat who sits on the House
Ways and Means Committee, said that while he voted for the law because
he heard evidence of I.R.S. abuses, he thinks Congress has gone too far in
restricting the agency.
Mr. Doggett said he now thought the 1998 law was "another example of
the Republican priority of demonizing the I.R.S. and limiting its resources
to fulfill its responsibilities, which I believe is all aimed at trying to end
income taxation."
Id.; David Cay Johnston, Job Fears Push I.R.S. Workers to Relax Effort, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 1999, at A1 (noting that seizures of property are down 98% primarily due to
Service workers' job fears of violating ten "deadly sins"; with Congressional freezes in
budget, funds for modernization and retraining come in part from scaling back audits
and collections); David Cay Johnston, Tax Professionals See Pitfalls in New I.R.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1999, at A1; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG.,
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS
REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 5, 30 (Joint Comm. Print 2002)
(commenting that levies tripled in 2001 from 2000, liens increased 50%, and seizures
increased from 74 to 274; all are, however, still much lower than their respective levels
in 1997 of 19%, 79%, and 2%, respectively).
118
Rossotti Testimony at House Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing on IRS
Budget, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 3, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit.,
2001 TNT 86-74, <J[ 53).
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,119

mcrease.
A critical question is whether the decline in corporate audits for
CEP and large corporations (i.e., LMSB taxpayers) has resulted in
12
greater noncompliance. ° Commissioner Rossotti, seeking to obtain
more funding for additional revenue agents and to move corporate tax
auditors from deployment to customer service during tax season and
then back to corporate audits, testified in May 2001 that while the
workforce declined 17% (due to Congressional budget cuts), the
121
number of returns filed increased 13%.
Consequently, the number
122
of audits declined. Commissioner Rossotti further testified:
The IRS is also deeply concerned about the continued
drop in audit and collection activity. Clearly, the declines we
have witnessed in the past few years must stop or the fairness
and effectiveness of our tax system will be undermined. The
risks of these declines are not simply the dollar value of the
taxes left uncollected. The greatest risk is that the average
taxpayer who honestly pays taxes loses confidence if the IRS
fails to act effectively and efficiently to collect from those who
123
do not pay what they owe.
The media widely reported the drop in the tax audit rate for large
124
firms, growth in use of tax shelters by such firms as audit scrutiny
119

!d. '1!54.
David R. Francis, Audits Drop, Fraud Concern Rises, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 16, 2001, at 1 (noting that "experts are concerned that the laxer
enforcement will increase the ranks of those who don't [honestly pay their taxes,]"
and may induce wealthier and more sophisticated taxpayers to take more risks with
respect to paying the proper amount of taxes); see also The Cost of Ignoring Tax
Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001, at A18; Amy Feldman, Please, IRS: Stop Playing
Nice Guy, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2001, at A15; Rick Montgomery, Decline in IRS
Audits Tests Taxpayer Honesty; IRS Worries About Integrity of System, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Apr. 15, 2001, at A1; David Cay Johnston, Wealthiest Pay Declining Share of
Their Incomes in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001, at C2 (commenting that the top
1% had a 28.9% effective tax rate in 1996, a 27.9% effective tax rate in 1997, and a
27.1% effective tax rate in 1998).
121
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., JOINT REVIEW OF THE
STRATEGIC PLANS AND BUDGET OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 14 (Joint
Comm. Print 2001).
122
!d. (Commissioner Rossotti noting other factors include a need to assign
compliance staff to customer service).
123
!d. at 13, 14.
124
A Weakened I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at D14; David Cay Johnston,
I.R.S. Figures Show a Drop in Tax Audits for Big Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1999, at Al. ("The decline in audit rates began in 1968 but accelerated in 1995, after
120
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25

faded/ and decline in reported taxable income while book earnings
126
soared.
At the same time, the corporate share of individual and
127
corporate income taxes declined from 21% in 1996 to 14% in 2001.
The General Accounting Office shares concerns "expressed in
Congress and by tax practitioners that these declines in audits,
Congress, by then controlled by Republicans, cut I.R.S. spending sharply and
required the agency to devote more resources to customer service."); see also
Montgomery, supra note 120; Amy Feldman & Joan Caplin, Should You Cheat on
Your Taxes?, MONEY, Apr. 2001, at 108; Novak, supra note 101, at 122.
125
See David Cay Johnston, Tax Magicians/A Special Report; Sham Shelters for
Business Flourish as Scrutiny Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A1 [hereinafter
Johnston, Sham Shelters] ("[T]he recent weakness of I.R.S. because of budget cuts
and new restraints imposed by Congress has only emboldened corporations .... The
Treasury Department has identified corporate tax evasion as the nation's biggest tax
enforcement problem, and ... shelters are at the core of it."); see also Francis, supra
note 120, at 1.
126
See generally Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax
Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43,45 n.2 (2001); David
Cay Johnston, Corporations' Taxes are Falling Even as Individuals' Burden Rises,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at A1 (pointing out that stock options are one factor in
drop in corporate effective rate, but the "most troubling factor is the rapid spread of
tax shelters, especially among large corporations" and what particularly alarms the
Service and the Treasury Department is the "growing willingness by prominent
companies ... to engage in the kind of tax avoidance tactics more characteristic of the
most disreputable companies." It should also be noted that while corporate profits
are 252% higher for 1997 than for 1990, tax revenues have increased just 191%.
Moreover, less than 70% of profits reported to shareholders are reported as taxable
income for 1997 as contrasted with 91% for 1990. "The tax department is viewed
more as a profit center and a place that has more of an obligation to more or less
aggressively reduce the tax burden."); Martin A. Sullivan, News Analysis: Shelter
Fallout? Corporate Taxes Down, Profits Up, 84 TAX NOTES 653 (Aug. 2, 1999) (noting
that corporate taxes, as a share of corporate profits, are at their lowest level since
President Ronald Reagan's massive 1981 corporate tax cut indicating "that the efforts
of corporate tax advisers to shelter their clients' profits from tax have had more than a
marginal effect"); Martin A. Sullivan, News Analysis - Despite September Surge,
Corporate Tax Receipts Fall Short, 85 TAX NOTES 565 (Nov. 1, 1999); David Cay
Johnston, Study Finds That Many Large Companies Pay No Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 2000, at C2 (according to Citizens for Tax Justice, "[c]orporate taxes are not rising
with profits because companies have found all sorts of ways to get around the [Tax
Reform Act of 1986.]" Congress has given a lot of help in gutting the minimum tax
rules, "in many cases because of the growing use of stock options, which are an
expense for tax purposes but do not count against profits reported to shareholders.").
127
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse Univ., Federal
Income Tax for Corporations and Individuals, I910-1000, at http://trac.syr.edu/tnicirs/
findings/national/incomeTax1910_presG.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002); see also
Robert S. Mcintyre, The Taxonomist, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 24, 2000, at 14 (17% in
2000).
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enforcement actions, and collections may increase incentives for
taxpayers either to not report or to underreport their tax
128
obligations."
Moreover, tax avoidance at the high-income
129
individual level has also soared.
Leading practitioners have called
130
for tougher penalties to deter corporate tax shelters, which are of
131
grave concern to both the Treasury Department and the Service.
128

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS MODERNIZATION: CONTINUED
IMPROVEMENT IN MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY NEEDED TO SUPPORT LONG-TERM
TRANSFORMATION 2 (2001); see also id. at 8; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: PROGRESS CONTINUES BUT SERIOUS MANAGEMENT
CHALLENGES REMAIN 29 (2001).
129
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:
ENHANCED EFFORTS TO COMBAT ABUSIVE TAX SCHEMES- CHALLENGES REMAIN 1
(2002).
As of February 2002, IRS estimated that in tax year 2000 about 740,000
[individual] taxpayers had used abusive schemes. IRS caught about $5
billion in improper tax avoidance or tax credit and refund claims, but
estimated that another $20 billion to $40 billion had not been identified and
addressed. Recent developments suggest that the number of individuals
involved in one type of abusive tax scheme involving offshore accounts may
be greater than what IRS estimated just 2 months ago, and thus, potential
lost revenues may be higher.
Id. at 1; Transcript of Hearing of the Senate Finance Committee on Schemes, Scams
and Cons, Part II, the IRS Strikes Back, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (Apr. 11, 2002)
(statement of Commissioner Rossotti) (the largest category of promoted schemes is
the "use of devices such as trusts· and offshore bank accounts to hide income, and
these are used mostly by upper income individuals"; offshore schemes may involve as
many as 505,000 taxpayers with tax losses ranging from $20 to $40 billion); John D.
McKinnon, IRS Data Show More Taxpayers Are Using Scams, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15,
2002, at A6 (commenting that 700,000 or more individuals are underpaying taxes by
tens of billions of dollars); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG.,
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS
REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 29 (Joint Comm. Print 2002) (noting
that the "IRS estimates losses in the tens of billions of dollars.").
130
See David Cay Johnston, Top Tax Expert Calls for Tougher Penalties to Deter
Corporate Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at C2. See generally, Peter C. Canellos,
A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in
Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47 (2001);
LMSB Hearing Transcript, supra note 84, 9I'Il 259-62 (statement of Sax, Chair of ABA
Section of Taxation).
131
See LMSB Hearing Transcript, supra note 84, <JI<JI 242-44 (statement of LMSB
Commissioner Langdon).
[I]nvestment bankers would come in with the various typical, quite
appropriate tax reorganization proposals; and then they would say, "And
we also have products whereby you don't have to pay the capital gains tax
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Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Sommers is reported to
have warned in February 2000 that "illegal corporate tax shelters were
costing taxpayers at least $10 billion a year." He further said that
illegal corporate tax avoidance "may be the most serious compliance
132
issue threatening the American tax system today."
In 2000, the
Treasury Department contended that
a growing number of corporate executives, under intense
pressure from shareholders and Wall Street to boost earnings,
are using complex tax-evasion schemes to cheat Uncle Sam
out of billions of dollars every year . . . . As evidence, the
Treasury points to a widening gap between profits large
companies report to their shareholders and profits subject to
taxes that they report to the IRS. The gap in 1997 was $122
133
billion, nearly twice as big as in 1995.
.
this

Likewise, Enron appears destined to become a poster child for
phenomenon, ~ although WorldCom/MCIi l l more closely

on that transaction, and if your tax department doesn't know about how to
avoid capital gains tax, they're out of date." ... Of course, they would make
these presentations through [tax unsophisticated] corporate development
people ... and so in effect, tax departments are constantly in the mode of
dealing with ... people coming in with proposals ... that frankly are not
sound, that won't be sustained by the courts, and are areas of material
concern.
!d. 9l'll 242-44; accord Johnston, Sham Shelters, supra note 125.
132
David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Offers Amnesty to Companies that Admit Tax
Indiscretions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001, at Cl [hereinafter Johnston, Amnesty]
(waiver worth as much as $2.9 billion to the ninety-five companies disclosing for
2001). The amnesty is from penalties for abusive shelters, not the taxes owed, and
brought in fifty-two more disclosures in addition to 325 prior disclosures. See also
Glenn Kessler, Tax Shelter Disclosure Falls Short, IRS Says; Agency Seeking to Halt
Corporate Abuses, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2002, at E1 [hereinafter Kessler, Tax Shelter
Disclosure Falls Short]; David S. Hilzenrath, Accountants' Tax Services Draw Fire,
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2002, at E1 ("The Internal Revenue Service has estimated that
abusive tax shelters cost the U.S. Treasury about $10 billion a year.").
133
Owen Ullmann, IRS Hunts Corporate Schemes, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 2000,
at A1 ("Despite record profits, corporations paid 2% less in federal taxes last year
than in 1998. And the share of all federal taxes paid by corporations has been
shrinking since 1997, while individuals have been shouldering a steadily rising
burden.").
134
See Kessler, Tax Shelter Disclosure Falls Short, supra note 132.
The burgeoning business of corporate tax shelters has received added
scrutiny since the collapse of Enron . . . [which] aggressively used tax
shelters peddled by Wall Street and accounting firms ... [and that t]he
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resembles a situation involving capitalization versus expensing.
Section 6111 requires the promoter of a tax shelter to register it
136
with the Secretary of the Treasury.
Professor Michael Graetz, past
master of tax administration, policy, and reform, and especially le mot
juste, once defined a tax shelter as "a deal done by very smart people
137
that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid."
The Wall
Senate Finance Committee is nearing an agreement to obtain access to
Enron's tax filings to learn more about the transactions.
!d.; David Cay Johnston, Enron Avoided Income Taxes in 4 of 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17,2002, at A1; Bill Ghent, Gimme Shelter, 34 NAT'LJ. 547 (Feb. 23, 2002) ("It is
a sin to say it, but 'thank God for Enron,' [Senator] Grassley recently told reporters,
'because we are going to do something about these corporate tax shelters."').
135
Peter J. Howe, 2 Charged with WorldCom Fraud Former Officials Surrender
to FBI in Telecom Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2002, at E2 ("An internal
WorldCom auditing memo filed with court papers yesterday gave some details of how
Sullivan and Myers shifted operating expenses known as 'line costs' over to capital
accounts where they could be written off over years, improving WorldCom's reported
cash flow."). Glenn Walberg maintains that capitalization for tax purposes is often
more concerned about timing issues (when costs are recognized for tax accounting
purposes) so that as long as taxpayers are taking legitimate positions on their tax
returns, capitalization is not an abusive transaction. In WorldCom, the financial
accounting treatment of the line costs does not appear to me to have been legitimate.
136
See I.R.C. § 6111. See generally, STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH
CONG., BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LAW RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS 2 (Joint
Comm. Print 2002).
137
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND
PRESENT LAW RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS 2 n.2. The report provides the following
example of a transaction without economic substance:
Both the Tax Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
transaction [in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.
1998), affd 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017
(1999)] lacked economic substance. The Third Circuit held that "both the
objective analysis of the actual economic consequences of ACM's
transactions and the subjective analysis of their intended purposes support
the Tax Court's conclusion that ACM's transactions did not have sufficient
economic substance to be respected for tax purposes." The court observed
that the economic substance doctrine can apply equally to "shams in
substance" as "shams in fact" and that even if the purported activity in the
transaction actually occurs, the transaction may be disregarded when (other
than tax consequences) the transaction results in "no net change in the
taxpayer's economic position." In other words, as an objective matter, to be
respected for tax purposes, a transaction must have practical economic
effects other than the creation of tax losses. The court found that there was
"a lack of objective economic consequences arising from ACM's offsetting
acquisition and virtually immediate disposition of the floating-rate notes ....
We find that these transactions had only nominal, incidental effects on

2002]

Transaction Costs

303

138

Street Journal reported Graetz's definition, and the Joint Committee
140
139
Staff and Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus repeated
it, while ranking minority member Senator Charles E. Grassley
141
paraphrased it as the "street" definition. Section 6111, on the other
142
hand, provides one definition aimed at traditional tax shelters, and
another aimed at corporate tax shelters that ·have the purpose of
avoiding federal income tax plus confidentiality and promoter fees in
143
excess of $100,000.
Assistant Secretary of Treasury Mark
Weinberger testified at the hearing that

[w]hile well-intentioned, you had to trigger two of five criteria
to determine whether you had to actually come within the
requirements of filing. Then once you triggered those, there
were three very subjective exceptions to the rules that you
could rely on to get out of having to disclose. So, I think a lot
of taxpayers were reading the rules broadly for the
144
exceptions, narrowly for the requirements ....
The Joint Committee Report on Tax Shelters provides both a
handy list of Code provisions that may apply to tax shelters and an
145
outstanding glossary of tax doctrines used to battle corporate tax
shelters in the courts. This effort initially met with universal victory in
146
that arena, but has recently suffered several circuit court losses that
ACM's net economic position."
Id. at 12.
138
Tom Herman, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at Al.
139
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND
PRESENT LAW RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS 2 n.2 (Joint Comm. Print 2002).
140
See Transcript of2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 91 10.
141
!d. 91 160 ("Perhaps the most illuminating definition of a shelter comes from
the street, as I have tried to indicate. It is a bad deal done by a lot of smart people
who would not do it but for the tax benefits.").
142
A mechanical ceiling of 2:1 "tax shelter ratio," i.e., the ratio that deductions
(and translated credits) bear to the investment base cash and adjusted basis (like the
"amount at risk" under section 465); substantial investment (at least $250,000); and at
least five investors. I.R.C. § 6111(c)(2); I.R.C. § 6111(d).
143
I.R.C. § 6111( d)(1 ).
144
Transcript of Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 9191 199-200
(statement of Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Mark Weinberger).
145
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND
PRESENTLAWRELATINGTOTAX SHELTERS 7-28 (Joint Comm. Print 2002).
146
Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 9191 418
(Chief Counsel John Williams, former Tax Court judge, stated that generalist judges
have more of a sense that tax avoidance is a legitimate business objective than Tax
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seem to be in line with the view of the House GOP leadership toward
the end of the Clinton Administration, which did "not consider
147
corporate tax shelters a threat to the tax system." Those GOP
leaders, of course, bitterly opposed the "progressive" federal income
148
tax and even expressed the desire "to tear it out by the roots."
Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus and Chief Counsel
John Williams discussed in the 2002 Senate Finance Hearings on Tax
Shelters the difference in results in the tax shelter cases at the Tax
Court Level and in some circuit courts. At the same time, Senator
Baucus averred that Tax Court judges had a better understanding of
corporate tax shelters than some circuit courts. In response to this
comment, Chief Counsel Williams said, "the generalist judges have
more of a sense that tax avoidance is a legitimate business objective
149
than tax court judges do. "
Court judges). Chair Baucus less diplomatically put it that Tax Court judges tend to
understand these cases relatively well while appellate judges do not. !d. Cj['l[ 410-11.
147
Ryan J. Donmoyer, GOP Leadership: Shelter Problem, What Shelter
Problem?, 86 TAX NOTES 1039 (Feb. 21, 2000) ("House Majority Leader Richard K.
Armey, R-Texas, made it clear last week that the GOP leadership does not consider
corporate tax shelters a threat to the tax system."); Ryan J. Donmoyer, TEl
Conference - Archer Tells Administration No on Shelters and Be Careful with FSCs,
86 TAX NOTES 1815, 1816 (Mar. 27, 2000) (Archer "made it final that Congress will
not pursue broad legislation anytime soon to crack down on the proliferation of
corporate tax shelters . . . . He even endorsed the use of low-tax domiciles like
Bermuda by insurance companies that want to reduce their tax liability legally.
'That's legitimate,' he said.").
148
International Trade Commission to Endorse Consumption Tax, TAX NOTES
TODAY (July 20, 1998) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 98 TNT 138-2)
("Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Archer, R-Texas, has said he wants to 'tear
the income tax out by its roots' and replace it with a consumption tax."); accord
Taxwriters Exchange Pleasantries, Draw Lines on IRS Reform Conference, TAX
NOTES TODAY (June 11, 1998) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 98 TNT
112-3); Howard Gleckman, Tax Reform Is Coming, Sure. But What Kind?, Bus. WK.,
June 12, 1995, at 84; Rostenkowski Criticizes Congress Tax Cut Plan; Ex-Lawmaker
Lauds Bush for 1990 Hike, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999, at N5; David Cay Johnston, A
Tax Cut Your Lawyer Will Love, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1997, at A26; cf Treasury
Secretary O'Neill's Statement on OECD Tax Haven Initiative, TAX NOTES TODAY
(May 11, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 92-39) (Bush
administration would not support an overly broad effort to impose sanctions on tax
havens); David Cay Johnston, Former I.R.S. Chiefs Back Tax Haven Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2001, at C1 ("Seven former commissioners of the Internal Revenue
Service urged Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill yesterday to withdraw his
opposition to a proposed crackdown [by Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] on Caribbean nations and others that are considered tax havens.").
149
Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 'l[Cj[ 410-11,
417-19. See Alexandra M. Walsh, Formally Legal, Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax
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When the Treasury Department and the Service determine that a
transaction has a substantial tax avoidance purpose, the Service issues
150
a "Notice" informing taxpayers of the details of the transaction. 151 A
series of penalties is applicable to tax shelter users, as well as tax
return preparers and promoters who fail to register tax shelters. 152
Compliance with these registration rules, however, is in the words of
153
Senator Baucus, "to put it bluntly, a joke." Even so, the ninety-nine
reporting big corporations revealed staggering revenue losses from
154
such tax shelters, sixty-four of which were "listed" transactions.
These transactions generated $14.7 billion in deductions and losses for
155
2000.
On December 21, 2001, the Service issued Announcement
156
2002-2,
which provides a 120-day opportunity for taxpayers
Shelters, Practical Reason and the New Textualism, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1541 (2001), for
an academic discussion of this phenomenon. See also David P. Hariton, Tax Benefits,
Tax Administration, and Legislative Intent, 53 TAX LAw. 579 (2000); George K. Yin,
Business Purpose, Economic.Substance, and Corporate Tax Shelters: Getting Serious
About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209
(2001) (considers history of tax shelter activity in the 1970s and 1980s and applies
lessons from response to that problem to current corporate tax shelters and argues for
a change to an adjusted book income tax base for public corporations).
150
See Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 301.6111-2T(b)(2) (2002).
151
See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., BACKGROUND
AND PRESENTLAWRELATINGTOTAXSHELTERS 33 (Joint Comm. Print 2002).
152
See id. at 31-37.
153
Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 'll'll 19, 191
(for 2001, there were 272 disclosures from ninety-nine taxpayers, with sixty-four listed
transactions and 208 reportable transactions). These transactions resulted in tax
savings, or often tax avoidance, of $14.9 billion. See infra note 155.
154
Section 6662(d)(2)(D) of the Code authorizes the Treasury Department to list
positions for which it believes there is no substantial authority in the Federal Register.
155
See Kessler, Tax Shelter Disclosure Falls Short, supra note 132. David Harris,
manager of the Service's office of tax shelter analysis, said:
the 272 transactions disclosed by 99 companies in 2001 resulted in total tax
savings of $14.9 billion, while the 52 additional disclosures under the
amnesty resulted in more than $1.2 billion in claimed losses or deductions.
Not all the transactions are considered by the IRS to be abusive. But ... a
preliminary analysis of the 2001 filings suggests that 200 of the deals have
been listed as abusive tax shelters or appear to raise concerns.
ld. While this article implies that "tax savings" equals the amount of tax reduction, a
subsequent announcement by the Service shows that "tax savings" must mean tax
deductions and losses. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
156
See I.R.S. Announcement 2002-2, 2002-2 I.R.B. 304 (Dec. 21, 2001) (Service
will waive the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 for underpayments due to
negligence and the penalty for underpayments due to substantial understatements of
income tax, and substantial valuation misstatements, provided that the taxpayer
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voluntarily to disclose tax shelters and other questionable items
reported on their tax returns so they may obtain a waiver of accuracy
penalties. As of two weeks before the end of such period, the Service
had received disclosures from more than 250 taxpayers involving 458
tax shelter transactions with reported deductions and losses of more
157
than $8.5 billion.
Senator Baucus questioned LMSB Commissioner
Langdon as to the size of the pool of potential purchasers at a recent
Senate Finance Committee Hearing on Tax Shelters; he responded
158
that there were 90,000 to 100,000 large corporations in LMSB.
Thus, the ninety-nine reporting taxpayers are probably just the tip of
the iceberg.
For a rough idea of the potential magnitude of the corporate tax
shelter problem, this $14.7 billion in lost revenue may be contrasted
with the $358 billion in taxable income reported for 1998 by the bigger
LMSB regular corporation taxpayers. While two million regular
corporations reported $477 billion in taxable income for 1998 (the
159
latest year for which data is available), based on historical trends,
more than 75% of this was probably reported by the largest
60
corporations with $250 million or more in assets/ or roughly $358
billion in total. Thus the ninety-nine reporting large corporations
accounted for revenue losses equal to around 4% of the taxable
161
income reported by such large corporations.
The Treasury
Department thought that many more of the large LMSB corporations
162
would report, so the revenue loss could easily approach half of the
discloses tax shelters and other questionable transactions before the earlier of April
23, 2002, or the transaction is raised during an examination); Tim Reason, Tax
Shelters- Of Beans and Carrots, CFO, Feb. 1, 2002, at 16 ("Companies that spill the
beans about a tax shelter . . . can avoid the 20% penalty on any resulting
understatement of tax.").
157
IRS Reminds Taxpayers of Deadline for Voluntary Tax Shelter Disclosure,
TAX NOTES TODAY (April10, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002
TNT 69-38).
158
See Transcript of Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 9191 194-96.
159
See Patrice Treubert & William P. Jauquet, Corporation Income Tax Returns,
1998, 21 STAT. INCOME BULL. 66,67 (2001).
160
See supra note 71.
161
$477 x 0.75 = $358, and $14.7 I $358 = 4.1 %.
162
See Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, 9191 36,
168 (Mark Weinberger, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, stated, "The results are in.
We have now received and reviewed the first year of filings and disclosures. We are
disappointed in the number and types of transactions that have been disclosed.").
The tax shelter penalty waiver initiative, however, exceeded expectations. Brant
Goldwyn, Langdon Says Shelter Disclosures Have Exceeded Service's Expectations, 92
BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 13, 2002, at G-2. Most of the 1000 taxpayers so
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income reported by large LMSB corporations.
On the other hand,
Tax Notes Economic Correspondent Martin A. Sullivan reported that
the corporate effective rate has been "remarkably steady," from
164
25.4% to 22.4%, over the past fifteen years.
Thus, he concluded
that there is no evidence from the data "to indicate that the much
ballyhooed increase in corporate shelter activity has had a significant
165
impact on corporate tax receipts."
Yet the corporate effective rate
after wider swings from 1987 through 1997 has steadily declined from
166
1998 to 2003, the last five years of this period.
Moreover, Sullivan
pointed out that in the first quarter of fiscal 2002, the 24% decline in
corporate profits from the preceding fiscal year while the decline in
corporate tax payments was only 40% from "an already weak year in
167
2001 is still a dramatic change and well worth keeping an eye on. "
In any event, as discussed immediately below, agents have been
tied up with capitalization issues instead of examining these troubling,
168
unpatriotic corporate tax shelters, which are also spreading to high169
income individuals.
The negative effect on taxpayer confidence in
170
the tax system of such shelters has been widely noted. Less obvious
disclosing were individuals (fifty to 100 recent corporate disclosures, id.), which may
well reflect "IRS's John Doe summonses on credit card companies for the names of
offshore account holders." Amy Hamilton, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Has IRS
Found Way to Detect Unreported Income?, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 13, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 92-13); STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 30
(Joint Comm. Print 2002); Treasury Statement on Offshore Credit Card Schemes, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Mar. 26, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT
58-21).
163
1000 = 10 times the number reporting. 10 x $14.4 = $144 billion. $144 billion I
$358 billion= 40.2%.
164
Martin A. Sullivan, Corporate Tax Revenues: Up, Down, and All Around, 95
TAX NOTES 25 (Apr.1, 2002).
165
I d. at 28.
166
Id. at 27 fig.2B.
167
Id. at 28.
168
Cf Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, CJICJI 7-8
(marketer of "inversion deals" said that some companies conclude that "the
improvement on earnings is powerful enough that maybe the patriotism issue needs
to take a back seat." This was very troubling to the Chair, "especially now as we all
try to pull together, most particularly since September 11, as a Nation and work
together to help our people meet the problems that we are facing.").
169
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
170
Transcript of 2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, CJi 9
(statement of the Chairman, Senator Baucus) ("These tax shelters could do serious
harm. They undermine public confidence in the tax system, clearly. They make
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may be their effect on baby boomer investors' confidence in the stock
171
market itself.
Such a lack of confidence could have a strong
172
•
d
. I f a IIout. 173
economic an po1·ttlca

F. LMSB Audits and Capitalization Issues
Historically for large corporations, an additional recommended
income tax "typically [arose] from different interpretations of an
ambiguous and complex tax code. Upon audit, IRS auditors may
interpret the tax provisions differently and, as a result, recommend
174
adjustments to the corporation's tax liability."
INDOPCO issues
are the poster child of this process. In the wake of 1NDOPCO,
expensing versus capitalizing costs with present and future, often
intangible, benefits became the most significant federal income tax

average taxpayers feel like chumps; we have to pay more because the big guys are
paying less.").
171
A recent article suggested that baby boomers might lose confidence in the
market when they became aware of the widespread use of corporate tax shelters (and
the back taxes and penalties hopefully triggered by the media publicity fueled by the
Enron scandal). See Marcia Vickers et al., The Betrayed Investor, FORBES, Feb. 25,
2002, at 104; Steven Pearlstein, Andersen: One Player in Big Drama, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2002, at E1 (explaining that lack of confidence of baby boomers in stock
market and corporate financial statements exemplified by the Enron scandal may
exaggerate bust in market); John Lancaster, Senate Democrats Set an Agenda on
Enron, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at All ("According to a Senate leadership aide,
they were 'trying to give people, both sophisticated and ordinary investors, the
confidence that there's going to be corrective action."').
172
Transcript of2002 Senate Hearing on Tax Shelters, supra note 68, <Jill.
Abusive corporate shelters create a tax benefit without any corresponding
economic benefit. No new product, no technological innovation, just a tax
break. This could have a perverse effect, forcing perfectly honest
companies to consider setting up a shelter of their own to avoid being
placed at a competitive disadvantage. That, in a nutshell, is the problem.
/d. (statement of the Chairman, Senator Baucus); cf Kenneth R. Gosselin, Market
Risk Finally Hitting Home; Unfamiliar with Long Downturns, Some Take Financial,
Psychological Hits, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 18, 2002, at A1 (explaining that
boomers may withdraw from stock market due to recent downturn after eighteen
years of growth).
173
Vickers et al., supra note 171 (new investors, mostly baby boomers, have lost
30% of the value of stock investments in the past two years; "Never before have the
politicians faced the wrath of so many disaffected investors."); cf Marianne Means,
Privatize Social Security? Hal, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 17,2002, at 15A.
174
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: ANALYZING THE
NATURE OF INCOME TAX GAP 4 (1997).

2002]

309

Transaction Costs
175

issue by far in audits of big businesses.
In large part, this
phenomenon reflected the Service's directing its CEP auditors,
176
through many Industry Specialization Programs (ISPs), to look in
the aftermath of INDOPCO for specific deduction versus
capitalization issues, particularly with future benefits flavor, in various
market segments at the CEP level applicable to the largest 2000 or so
177
corporations.
The administrative responses to expensing and
capitalization issues often manifested conflicts between the
178
Examination division and the Office of Chief Counsel.
Such
regulation by audit and litigation contradicts the vaunted shift by the
179
Service to rising voluntary compliance,
a goal of its recent
restructuring. Moreover, the propensity of the Service's auditing
agents and litigators once again to capitalize transaction costs to
intangibles with no depreciation, or to tangibles with a longer
recovery period than the future benefit of the expenditure,
predictably led to courts allowing current deductions under
180
questionable reasoning.
At the same time, corporate audit rates
have rapidly declined and been disproportionately directed to these
175

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: RECURRING ISSUES
IN TAX DISPUTES OVER BUSINESS EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS 2 (1995) (reporting that of
117 Service Office of Appeals cases filed by large corporations, capital expenditure
issues comprised 42% of the total number and $1.1 billion of the $1.9 billion in
proposed tax adjustments, or 58%); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: RECURRING TAX ISSUES TRACKED BY IRS' OFFICE OF APPEALS 56, 14, 22-23 (1993).
176
ISP papers provide guidance to the Service's agents auditing large corporate
taxpayers in the CEP. See Marion Marshall et al., The Changing Landscape of IRS
Guidance: A Downward Slope, 90 TAX NOTES 673,679 (Jan. 29, 2001); IRS Publishes
List of ISP Guidelines, December 31, 1996, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 7, 1997) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 97 TNT 26-32) (citing a number of
capitalization/amortization issues, some predating INDOPCO). See generally, Lee et
al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 655-56. Glenn Carrington points out that all of
the publicity over capitalization versus expensing after INDOPCO may have alerted
some taxpayers to the possibility of deducting costs that they otherwise might have
capitalized.
177
See supra note 176.
178
Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 655-58.
179
Sheryl Stratton, Tackling the Tax Gap on Tip Income, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Apr. 18, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 75-3).
180
Having thought for some time about a world without the no separate asset
doctrine and about the tendency of government auditors and litigators to argue for
capitalization without depreciation, I cautioned that "the lesson is clear: unjust rules,
capitalization without adequate amortization, will cause some (but not all) courts to
seek other solutions promoting uncertainty. The Treasury/IRS goal of 'rough justice'
is welcome and to be celebrated." Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 677.
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181

losing capitalization issues while widespread abuse of corporate tax
shelters has continued unchecked.
"Resolution of issues such as capitalization and the R & E credit,
which the IRS has indicated consumes nearly 40% of the audit
resources in the IRS Large & Mid-Size Business Division, will free up
resources for better use - such as targeting abusive tax avoidance
182
schemes." As former Chief Counsel and Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy Ken Gideon stated:
If the current level of INDOPCO disputes at the audit level

continues, we are going to be spending enormous resources
on questions of capitalization. It strikes me, given the other
problems of the income tax, that that's a bad call. The much
better call would be to write some rough justice rules and say,
183
okay, these are the rules.
The new Chief Counsel, and former Tax Court Judge, B. John
Williams, has wisely decided on the course of "using litigation as an
enforcement tool rather than to establish novel legal interpretations;

181

Only 20% of the proposed increases in CEP audits are sustained in
administrative appeals and assessed as additional taxes. Almost all (97%) of the soassessed taxes are paid by CEP large corporations. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
IRS MEASURES COULD PROVIDE A MORE BALANCED PICTURE OF AUDIT RESULTS
AND COSTS 3-4 (1998).
182
Treasury Proposals to Curb Abusive Tax Avoidance Transactions, TAX NOTES
TODAY (Mar. 21, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 55-25);
IRS Memo Provides Guidelines for Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 9, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 90-8, !jJ 6) (explaining that the
Service's examination resources are better utilized on other high-risk compliance
areas rather than capitalization issues described in the Advance Notice). For the
contrary argument that the Service should allocate more resources to fixing up the tax
accounting rules, see Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Tax Shelter Opponents Turn
Practical, 95 TAX NOTES 1111, 1112 (May 20, 2002).
Tax accounting is where the rubber meets the road. The tax administrator
should reallocate resources to devote the necessary brainpower to fixing up
tax accounting rules that affect all taxpayers. That, of course, includes the
capitalization rules, where the Bush Treasury is showing an inclination to
reverse the presumption of capitalization. At least if businesses emerge not
paying tax because they are allowed to deduct all of their costs, they should
be incurring those costs for something more productive than tax shelter
promoters' fees.
/d. at 1111-12.
183
Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two, supra note 34, !JI 586.
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Ill. ACQUISITION COSTS UNDER WOODWARD/HILTON HOTELS AND
IDAHO POWER

An ordinary business or investment expense is currently
deductible under section 162 in the tax year incurred or paid. An
expenditure capitalized under section 263, in contrast, may be
deducted from ordinary income only through (1) amortization or
depreciation under section 168 over the statutory "recovery period"
(or under section 167, usually ratably, over the useful life of the asset
acquired, created, or improved by the expenditure); or (2) upon
destruction, other realization, or abandonment prior to the end of
185
such life as a loss under section 165. Thus, sections 162 and 263 are
86
designed to calculate net income more accuratell by generally
matching expenses with revenue in the taxable periods in which the

184

Sheryl Stratton, Federal Bar Association - Williams Sketches Agenda for
Office of Chief Counsel, 94 TAX NOTES 1430, 1430 (Mar. 18, 2002); accord Lee A.
Sheppard, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Chief Counsel Talks About Shelter Litigation,
TAX NOTES TODAY (May 10, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002
TNT 92-4) ('"Litigation is not a proper tool for making tax policy. It is an
extraordinarily ineffective way to do it,' he said. 'Litigation is an enforcement tool."');
Brant Goldwyn, Simplification, Improving Guidance Process Are Top Priorities for
Treasury, Olson Says, 47 BNA DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 11, 2002, at G-2 ("Treasury and
IRS believe taxpayers should be provided clear guidance through the rulemaking
process, Olson said, rather than through litigation." Litigation should be used to
enforce existing guidance).
185
See Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 10, at 9-10. Most taxpayers, of course,
would prefer a current deduction because it is worth more on a present value basis
than the same amount capitalized and then amortized or depreciated over the current
and a fixed number of future tax years. Fishman v. Commissioner, 837 F.2d 309, 312
(7th Cir. 1988) ("Because of the time value of money - real riskless rates are
positive- a deduction taken today is worth more than one taken a year from now.");
see also Kevin J. Coenen, Note, Capital or Ordinary Expense? The Proper Tax
Treatment of a Target Corporation's Expenditures in an Acquisitive Reorganization, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 583, 586 (1997).
186
Taxing net annual income is a fundamental policy of the Code. See 50 CONG.
REc. (Part 4) 3849 (Aug. 28, 1913) (remarks of Sen. John S. Williams, D-Miss.).
Today the keystone is section 446's mandate that a taxpayer's method of income tax
accounting must clearly reflect income. See I.R.C. § 446(b). A taxpayer's practice of
expensing or capitalizing an expenditure has been held such a method of accounting.
See Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36; Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8; Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,328 (Jan. 23, 1985). It should be noted that Glenn Walberg suggests that
permanent capitalization of costs might not constitute a method of tax accounting
because it arguably does not involve a timing element.
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187

A. Woodward/Hilton Hotels and Origin of the Claim/Acquisition Cost
Doctrine

The origin of the claim doctrine holds that the transaction out of
which an expenditure arises, rather than its consequences or the
taxpayer's purpose for expenditure, controls its characterization for
188
tax purposes.
The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a taxpayer
from distorting income by mismatching timing and/or character of
income and expenses, lest the tax treatment of an expenditure or
method of tax accounting for that item violate the clear reflection of
189
income mandate of section 446.
The courts often speak of
190
preventing "double deductions."
In the context of a capital
transaction, income distortion would arise if a capital gain,
preferenced as to individuals from 1942 until fifteen years ago by a
50% to 60% deduction (and now by a rate ceiling for individual
capital gains roughly equivalent at many, but not all, brackets to a
191
50% deduction ), were coupled with an ordinary deduction for an

187

See generally Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax
Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1984).
188
See, e.g., Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 484-99; Timothy A. Rodgers, Note,
The Transaction Approach to the Origin of the Claim Doctrine: A Proposed Cure for
Chronic Inconsistency, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 905 (1989) (citing Lee & Murphy, supra
note 3); Edward J. Schnee & Nancy J. Stara, The Origin of the Claim Test: A Search
for Objectivity, 13 AKRON TAX J. 97 (1997); Robert Willens, "Origin of the Claim"
Doctrine Determines Whether an Expense May Be Deducted, 145 BNA DAILY TAX
REP., Jul. 30,2001, at J-1.
189
Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967); I.R.C.
§ 446(b).
m Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 507, 525; John W. Lee & Mark S. Bader,
Contingent Income Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative
Adjustments and Clearer Reflection of Income, 12 J. CoRP. L. 137, 207 n.439 (1987).
191
Examples of rough equivalency or better in 2002 are 10% capital gains rate
versus 25% individual income tax bracket; 18% capital gains rate versus 35%
individual income tax bracket; the parallel disappears at the 18% capital gains rate
versus 27%, 31%, and 38.5% income tax brackets, and especially the 8% capital gains
rate versus the 10% individual income tax bracket, where there are almost no capital
gains realized anyway. The complexity here is incredible. II STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., RECOMMENDATIONS TO SIMPLIFY THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM 103 (Joint Comm. Print 2001) ("Adopt a uniform percentage deduction for
capital gains in lieu of multiple tax rates"); NYSBA Tax Section Sends Tax
Simplification Report, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 20, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 54-48).

2002]

Transaction Costs

313
192

expenditure related to its acquisition or disposition.
Prevention of
such distortion is accomplished by ensuring that the taxpayer does not
deduct against ordinary income expenses that arise from a capital
transaction, but instead adds such costs to the basis of the capital asset
acquired or subtracts such costs from the amount realized to reduce
the proceeds of the disposition of the capital asset.
The Supreme Court first fashioned the origin of the claim
doctrine to deal with attempted character of loss distortion, or treating
a loss as income-seeking rather than personal in origin, in United
193
States v. Gilmore. In Gilmore, the taxpayer deducted attorney's fees
related to a divorce, arguing that the expenses were currently
deductible under section 212 since the taxpayer's purpose was to
"conserve" as much of his estate as he could from his ex-spouse's
194
marital claims.
The Court in Gilmore sustained the Service's
contention that deductibility turned on the origin and nature of the
claim giving rise to the legal expense, here the personal marital
relationship, such that the attorney's fees in a divorce contest were not
deductible due to section 262, notwithstanding such preservation
purpose or consequence.
195
In Woodward v. Commissioner and United States v. Hilton
96
Hotels/ the Supreme Court extended in sound common law fashion
the origin of claim doctrine from such business versus personal
situations to transactions where the context or purpose of the
expenditure clearly was business or profit motivated, but where the
character of the expenditure still was at issue. Now the issue was
whether the expenditure constituted a current deduction or a capital
197
expenditure, presumably amortizable over a number of years.
In
the case of an expenditure incurred in connection with a business
capital transaction, allowance of an ordinary deduction for the
expenditure, although income from the transaction would constitute
capital gains, would distort the taxpayer's income possibly as to timing

192

Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 474,484,489, 503.
372 u.s. 39 (1963).
194
I d. at 43.
195
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
196
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
197
In t he case of a cost incurred in connection with the acquisition of an
intangible, depreciation is available only if the life of such intangible was
determinable with certainty. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2000). This was
often not the case resulting in "perpetual capitalization." See infra note 254 and
accompanying text.
193
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198

Such mismatching of a current
and certainly as to character.
ordinary deduction and future capital gains has the practical effect of
199
a forbidden "double deduction," and underlies seemingly disparate
doctrines or rules. These rules include the origin of the claim doctrine
00
as articulated in Arrowsmith v. Commissione/ and United States v.
201
Skelly Oil Co.
Other rules under this rubric are the tax benefit rule,
the year two deduction under the claim of right doctrine, and the
202
cancellation of indebtedness doctrine.
Justice Marshall correctly
03
explained in Skelly Oit that prevention of the equivalent of double
deduction was the conceptual or policy basis of the Court's prior
204
decision in Arrowsmith.
"The rationale for the Arrowsmith rule is
easy to see; if money was taxed at a special lower rate when received,
the taxpayer would be accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments
were generally deductible from receipts taxable at the higher rate
205
applicable to ordinary income. "
198

Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 484, 488-89.
Charles Ilfield Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934) (Consolidated Return
Regulations are not to be construed as permitting the practical equivalent of a double
deduction of the same losses, first as subsidiary company losses in consolidated
returns for earlier years, and again in the eventual loss to the parent company from its
investment in the subsidiary); see United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 685
(1969) ("[I]f money was taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer
would be accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally deductible
from receipts taxable at the higher rate applicable to ordinary income."); Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (stating that exclusion of allowable
deprecation deductions from consideration in computing gain would result, in effect,
in a double deduction on the same loss of assets); Lee & Bader, supra note 190, at 207
n.439.
200
344 u.s. 6 (1952).
201
394 U.S. at 685; see supra note 198.
202
Lee & Bader, supra note 190, at 205-25; Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 475,
503-04, 507-09, 525, 544-46.
203
394 U.S. at 684-85; Lee & Bader, supra note 190, at 169-70 nn.211-20.
204
Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952) (explaining that annual
accounting principle is not breached by examining year one transaction to determine
character of year two transaction). Arrowsmith really constitutes the characterization
component of the year two deduction for a repayment of an amount reported as
income under a claim of right in year one. Lee & Bader, supra note 190, at 169
nn.213-14; Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 506-09; cf Deborah H. Schenk,
Arrowsmith and Its Progeny: Tax Characterization by Reference to Past Events, 33
RUTGERS L. REV. 317, 338-41 (1981).
205
Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. at 685. Joel Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transaction
on Federal Income Tax Consequences of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L.
REV. 85, 87-94, 102-04, 127-30 (1972), erred in looking for a literal constructive sale or
exchange in year two instead of conceptualizing the year two transaction as a
199
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The Woodward and Hilton Hotels decisions capitalized a
corporation's transaction costs relating to buy-outs of dissenting
shareholders expressly in order to prevent just such distortion of
income. The Court explicitly rejected the taxpayers' argument that
their "primary purpose" in paying for an appraisal of the shares of
minority shareholders who did not agree to a perpetual extension of
206
the corporation's charter was to allow its business to continue.
The
Court reasoned that the argument "would encourage resort to
207
formalisms and artificial distinctions. " Instead, the Court in both
Woodward and Hilton Hotels applied the Gilmore origin of the claim
208
standard to the capital versus ordinary deduction issue.
Since
establishing the price of the dissenters' shares was a crucial part of the
purchase of the capital assets - in this case, their shares of stock - the
appraisal costs were characterized as part of the cost of the stock
209
210
acquired and not a deductible expense. As discussed below, A.E.
211
Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner effectively revived a
primary purpose test with its intent to facilitate or hinder a capital
212
transaction test.
The Fifth Circuit and the Claims Court extended the origin of the
claim analysis to business expansion costs at least where a separate
213
location or a separate license is required. Moreover, the Court cited
214
Gilmore with approval in INDOPC0.
The proper issue is whether
the "asset" in such expansion and similar cases is the business as a
whole, the license/branch, or a separate "freestanding," amortizable

balancing entry. Lee & Bader, supra note 190, at 212-13 n.468; see also Myron C.
Grauer, The Supreme Court's Approach to Annual and Transactional Accounting for
Income Taxes: A Common Law Malfunction in a Statutory System?, 21 GA. L. REV.
329, 338, 357-58,362-67, 369-70 (1986).
206
Lee & Murphy, supra note 3, at 487,523.
207
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970).
208
In the companion case of United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 585
(1970), involving the cost of an appraisal arising from dissenters' rights in a merger~
the taxpayer unsuccessfully sought to distinguish Woodward on the grounds that title
to the dissenters' stock passed prior to a value being determined.
209
Woodward, 397 U.S. at 578-79.
210
See discussion infra Part V.B.
211 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'g and remanding 105 T.C. 166 ( 1995 ) .
212
See id. at 488.
213
Cent. Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir.
1984); accord Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 225, 229
(1985).
214
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1992).
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B. Idaho Power and Indirect Transaction Costs
The Court began to base capitalization of costs relating to the
acquisition of a long-lived asset solely on the anti-timing distortion leg
of the clear reflection of income mandate in Commissioner v. Idaho
216
Power Co.
There, the Court faced the issue of "whether the
construction-related depreciation is to be amortized and deducted
over the shorter life of the equipment [used in the construction
process] or, instead, is to be amortized and deducted over the longer
217
life of the capital facilities constructed." Justice Blackmun set forth
in Idaho Power the now-classic timing matching of income and
expense rationale for the capitalization of indirect self-production
218
costs of a tangible asset.
The matching of a current year's expenses
that benefit future years with such future years' income (by
capitalization and basis recovery) is necessary in order to prevent
distortion of income under the section 446 requirement that a
taxpayer's method of tax accounting clearly reflect income. Under
this rationale, the addition of capitalized transaction costs to the basis
of a tangible asset would more closely match those costs to future
income. Specifically, this would result from the depreciation of the
cost of such tangible asset over its useful life under section 167 or a
subsequently enacted statutory recovery period under section 168.
Justice Blackmun also based his decision in Idaho Power on the
rule of "horizontal equity," which holds that similarly situated
taxpayers should be taxed in the same manner with respect to

215

See Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 10, at 27-28; cf infra notes 376-79 and
accompanying text.
216
418 u.s. 1, 13-14 (1974).
217
!d. at 10.
218
There can be little question that other construction-related expense
items, such as tools, materials, and wages paid construction workers, are to
be treated as part of the cost of acquisition of a capital asset. The taxpayer
does not dispute this. Of course, reasonable wages paid in the carrying on
of a trade or business qualify as a deduction from gross income.
§ 162(a)(1) . . . . But when wages are paid in connection with the
construction or acquisition of a capital asset, they must be capitalized and
are then entitled to be amortized over the life of the capital asset so
acquired.
/d. at 11, 13. These indirect costs as to tangibles in most cases now would be
capitalized under section 263A. See infra note 279.
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219

economically identical transactions.
Under this judicial rule of tax
parity, inside and outside transaction costs should be treated similarly
in order not to provide a tax advantage to inside costs over identical
outside costs of constructing or acquiring a tangible asset with future
. 220
b ene f It.
221
Justice Blackmun reaffirmed in INDOPC0 the future benefits
analysis which he propounded two decades earlier in Idaho Power. 222
He reiterated in INDOPCO that when an expenditure benefits future
periods, it generally should be capitalized instead of being currently
deducted or expensed so that it might reflect net income more
accurately. In short, the "matching" notion is that the capitalized
expenditure will be amortized or depreciated over the period
223
benefited by such expenditure.
This article discusses below when
219

Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 14; see also Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374,
398 (2001).

The Court [in Idaho Power] concluded that requmng the taxpayer to
capitalize its depreciation would maintain tax parity between it and another
taxpayer who retained an independent contractor to construct the
improvements and additions for it. In the latter case, the Court stated, the
depreciation on the equipment used by the independent contractor would
be part of the cost that the contractor charged on the project. The Court
believed it unfair to allow a taxpayer to deduct the cost of constructing its
facility if it has sufficient resources to do its own construction work, while
requiring another taxpayer without such resources to capitalize its cost
including the depreciation charged by the contractor. The Court expressed
no opinion as to the fact that the taxpayer in the Idaho Power case had been
regularly and routinely improving its facilities throughout most of its long
existence, nor that these improvements had for the most part been made by
its employees.
ld. (citations and footnote omitted); see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,171 (June 20,
1977).
[T]he capitalization of construction-related depreciation by the taxpayer
who does its own construction work maintains tax parity with the taxpayer
who has its construction work done by an independent contractor and who
must capitalize the entire cost of the contractor's services, which would
include depreciation allocable to the use of the contractor's equipment in
the construction work.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,171.
220
See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 963 (4th Cir. 1981). For
discussion of the idea that the rule of parity may yield to administrative convenience,
see infra notes 540-41 and accompanying text.
221
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
222
418 u.s. 1 (1974).
223
Due to the vagaries of tax depreciation and amortization, the match between
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this theoretically correct matching should yield either to a current
deduction or amortization over some safe harbor period to produce
224
minimal distortion of income.
Significantly, Idaho Power approvingly cited the Tax Court
225
opmwn in Perlmutter v. Commissioner,
which required
226
capitalization of the portion of the salaries of the top executives of a
the expenditure and the future benefit or income in fact is seldom very exact.
Moreover, over the years, the varying "recovery periods" for real estate
improvements under section 168 reflect at each turn political deals. The increase in
the recovery period for real estate improvements from fifteen years to eighteen years
in 1984 was a compromise instead of twenty years with the difference in revenues paid
for by changes to installment reporting (section 453(i), taxing all depreciation
recapture in the year of sale). Daniel Bernick, Real Estate Write-off Change
Approved by Finance Amidst Disagreements Within Industry, TAX NOTES TODAY
(April 9, 1984) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., Apr. 9, 1984). This
favored factory owners over real estate developers who tend more to churn. /d.; see
How the Options Industry and Realtors Escaped the Tax Bill's Axe, TAX NOTES
TODAY (July 20, 1984) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 84 TNT 153-22).
The increase in the recovery period in 1993 from 31.5 years to 39 years for
nonresidential real estate improvements was to pay for the section 469(c)(7) real
estate operator exception to passive activity losses (PALs). Unofficial Transcript of
May 11 IRS Hearing on Passive Activity Losses, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 18, 1995)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 95 TNT 97-37) (statement of Toby
Bradley, representing National Association of Realtors). A rare exception yielding
more exact matching may occur where the income forecast method of depreciation is
available under section 167(g), which seeks to match capital recovery deductions with
the income stream which the capital generates. Another even rarer exception
possibly producing still closer matching may occur under Associated Patentees v.
Commissioner and its progeny. Associated Patentees, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.
979 (1945), acq. 1959-2 C.B. 3 (taxpayer paid as royalty for patent a percentage of
income produced by it for fixed number of years; to clearly reflect income, taxpayer
allowed to deduct as depreciation the amount paid each year under the formula).
They permit an ordinary deduction of the entire amount paid during a tax year of, for
instance, a theretofore contingent royalty payment tied to the taxpayer's profits or
some other measure that correlates with his or her income for the period because
such tack produces minimum distortion of income. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. United
States, 159 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Ind. 1958) (installment cost payments for year pertained
to that year since measured by income over that year); Liquid Paper Corp. v. United
States, 2 Cl. Ct. 284 (1983) (such royalty payments accurately reflect the annual cost
of patent with minimum distortion of income); Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58.
224
See discussion infra Part IV and notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
225
44 T.C. 382, 404-05 (1965), affd., 373 F.2d 45 (lOth Cir. 1967).
226
Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 286 (1967),
distinguished Perlmutter on the grounds that
the taxpayer conceded that some allocation of overhead was proper and
that the sole dispute was as to the measure of the allocation. In any event,
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real estate leasing corporation allocable to the three to five hours a
week one top executive spent, and the five to seven hours a week the
other spent in overseeing construction of a building for use in their
rental business. One line of pre-section 263A authorities, epitomized
227
by Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, approved full absorption
rules governing inventory accounting and requiring the capitalization
228
of indirect costs of acquiring or constructing tangible assets in
229
reliance upon Idaho Power.
In contrast to the Adolph Coors line of cases, the Tax Court in
30
Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissione/
found that both full
absorption and incremental accounting methods were equally
permissible, in that both methods clearly reflected income under
231
section 446 with which section 263 is "inextricably intertwined."
Consequently, Fort Howard Paper permitted the taxpayer to deduct
in both of these cases, the taxpayer's very business was the construction of
fixed assets, i.e., buildings, and its personnel was employed for that very
purpose. This is a far cry from the situation involved herein, where a large
manufacturing concern engages in self-construction activities not at the
expense of normal operating time but as a fill-in for slack periods.
Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. at 286 (citation omitted).
227
519 F.2d 1280 (lOth Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976).
228
The "full absorption" cost method involves capitalizing direct costs of
materials and labor plus an allocable portion of all overhead. The "prime
cost" method involves capitalizing only direct materials and labor costs.
The "incremental cost" method involves capitalizing direct labor and
material costs plus that portion of overhead which can be directly identified
with the self-construction project. Where construction ordinarily takes
place only where regular facilities and personnel are not being fully utilized
(i.e., during "slack" or "idle" time), there may be no overhead which can be
directly identified with the project.
Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. at 283 n.4.
229
Treas. Reg. § 1.471-ll(c)(2)(ii) (2002). STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986,
at 504-05 (Joint Comm. Print 1987), noted this conflict between two lines of presection 263A cases. One line held that the Service is justified in requiring
capitalization of overhead costs of construction, i.e., full absorption accounting under
"clear reflection of income" and Idaho Power. Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner,
519 F.2d 1280 (lOth Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976). ·
230
49 T.C. at 283.
231
/d. Fort Howard Paper's undergirding of capitalization versus expensing with
the concept of clear reflection of income lies at the heart of the concept of minimum
distortion of income and provided the conceptual underpinning for Cincinnati, New
Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 569 (Ct. Cl. 1970) for
its adoption of a minimum capitalization rule under the clear reflection of income
standard.
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currently the portion of its overhead expenses allocable to repair and
maintenance personnel who during their spare time constructed,
renovated, and repaired fixed assets used in its manufacturing
232
operations.
Fort Howard Paper was decided, however, prior to
Idaho Power; and while employing a clear reflection of income
233
analysis, it preceded that analysis with the background that the
taxpayer had used the incremental method for thirty-five years and
the Service had previously audited the taxpayer without objection to
234
such method.
The reasoning of the Office of Chief Counsel in General Counsel
Memorandum 38,788 ably considered the teaching of Idaho Power,
Perlmutter, and Adolph Coors with respect to indirect costs and
235
overhead regarding the construction or acquisition of tangibles.
It
concluded that "[i]n each case the cost of doing the work or
performing the contract included not only the direct costs of tools,
supplies, materials and labor, but also all the indirect costs reasonably
related or incidental to performance of the work or contract." 236
There is no sound policy-based reason looking solely at the origin
of the claim and rule of tax parity doctrines to distinguish indirect
costs and overhead incurred in creating or acquiring an intangible
asset from such costs incurred in creating or acquiring a tangible
237
asset.
The possibility of a different result under a burden and
232

The maJonty in Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 398 (2001)
significantly pointed out that "[t]he Court expressed no opinion as to the fact that the
taxpayer in the Idaho Power Co. case had been regularly and routinely improving its
facilities throughout most of its long existence, nor that these improvements had for
the most part been made by its employees." Id.
233
Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. at 283-85.
234
I d. at 282.
235
Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,788 {Aug. 26, 1981).
236
I d. at 29-3.
237
David Lupi-Sher, Proposed IRS Capitalization Rules Raise Questions, 94 TAX
NOTES 804, 807 (Feb. 18, 2002). According to law professor Martin McMahon, the
"[i)nternal costs and external costs must be treated identically if they serve the same
function." I d. McMahon further commented that
"[i]n ignoring Idaho Power, the Eighth Circuit in Wells Fargo either totally
misread settled law or was trying to create a distinction in the treatment of
indirect costs of tangible assets on the one hand, and indirect costs of
intangible assets and long-term benefits on the other hand. There is no
sound basis for drawing such a distinction. Allowing a current deduction for
internal costs that relate to the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset,
whether tangible or intangible, or which produce an INDOPCO-like longterm benefit, distorts the tax base and is contrary to the sound reasoning of
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321
238

IV. BALANCING OF BURDENS AND BENEFITS OF CAPITALIZATION:
ROUGH JUSTICE EXCEPTIONS TO FUTURE BENEFIT
CAPITALIZATION

A. Balancing of Burdens and Benefits of Capitalization: The

Pragmatic Test
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner indicates that future benefits
are a strong characteristic of a capital expenditure, but the case is not
controlling insofar as an "incidental" future benefit may be currently
239
Assistant Solicitor General Kent Jones, when arguing
deducted.
INCOPCO, advocated the use of a "pragmatic" test: "The test is a
functional one of properly matching expenses with the years they
benefit income, but it's a pragmatic test at the same time. It's not
240
pus h e d to extremes."
The emerging standard, manifested in U.S. Freightways, suggests
that expenses with future benefits should nevertheless be currently
41
deducted where the burdens to the taxpayel of such capitalization
the Supreme Court in Idaho Power, as well as the deep theory behind
Section 263A."
!d.
238

See discussion infra Part VI. For the argument that burdens of capitalization
can trump the rule of tax parity as well as future benefit see infra notes 576-77 and
accompanying text.
239
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1992). INDOPCO
rejected the rule that an expenditure not creating or enhancing a separate asset was
per se currently deductible in favor of a rule that an expenditure generating more
than "incidental" future benefits should be capitalized in order to match the expense
with such future benefits. The court capitalized the outside transaction costs (fees to
investment bankers, attorneys, and accountants) paid by a corporation acquired in a
friendly acquisition).
240
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, No. 90-1278, 1991 WL 636242, at *28 (Nov. 12, 1991); see also id. at
*39.
241
The emerging U.S. Freightways v. Commissioner standard would also assist
the government in determining whether to contest the taxpayer's deduction of the
expenditures in question. See John W. Lee et al., Capitalizing and Depreciating
Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs: More-Trouble-Than-It's-Worth?, 17 VA. TAX
REV. 161, 185-86 (1997) [hereinafter Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance]
(citing the reasoning in General Counsel Memorandum 34,262 (Jan. 30, 1970)); 1993
House Hearings, supra note 37 (the real concern with capitalization under INDOPCO
should be avoiding litigation costs on both sides; I had in mind the pre-section 197
morass as to amortizable purchased intangibles). See generally U.S. Freightways
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outweigh "the gain in precision for the taxing authorities" of more
242
exact matching from capitalization.
The Seventh Circuit adopted
just such an approach, agreeing with the Commissioner that
the mere fact that certain expenditures recur does not negate
the distorting effect of expensing that predictably occurred
here- the interest-free government loan that comes from the
deduction remains the same regardless of whether the ...
expenses are unchanged throughout the corporate life of
Freightways.
But perfection is a lot to ask for, even in the
administration of the tax laws, which we acknowledge
endeavor "to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable
period to which they are properly attributable, thereby
resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax
purposes."
... [P]erfection in temporal matching comes at too high a
price for these kinds of expenses. At some point the
"administrative costs and conceptual rigor" of achieving a
more perfect match become too great.
Encyclopedia
Britannica, 685 F.2d at 216. Here, there is a considerable
administrative burden that Freightways and any similarly
situated taxpayer will bear if it must always allocate one-year
expenses to two tax years, year in and year out. It argues that
the gain in precision for the taxing authorities is far
outweighed by the administrative burden it will bear in
performing this task. . . . The kind of change in the
company's tax accounting system for which the Commissioner
is arguing will impose an administrative burden regardless of
the way its financial accounts are kept.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001)
242
U.S. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1146 (arguing that the gain in precision for the
taxing authorities from a more perfect matching of expense and income is outweighed
by the administrative burden the taxpayer would bear in such matching); see Gen.
Couns. Mem. 33,968 (Nov. 18, 1968) (advocating current deduction of writer's
prepublication expenses, which, it reasoned, conceptually creates an intangible
capitalizable under authorities such as Perlmutter, as an "administrative policy" based
on the difficulty of allocating continuing, recurring overhead type expenses); Gen.
Couns. Mem. 34,959 (July 2, 1972) (advocating a de minimis rule based on the clear
reflection of income mandate of section 446); Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13,
at 679-80, 683 (cited by Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH)
997 (1993) by Judge Tannenwald, one of the three judicial giants as to capitalization
along with Justice Blackmun and Judge Posner).
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We conclude that, for the particular kind of expenses at
issue in this case -fixed, one-year items where the benefit will
never extend beyond that term, that are ordinary, necessary,
and recurring expenses of the business in question - the
balance of factors under the statute and regulations cuts in
favor of treating them as deductible expenses under I.R.C. §
243
162(a).
The Advance Notice commendably adopts a similar balancing test
of whether the taxpayer's "administrative and record keeping costs
associated with capitalization" outweigh "the potential distortion of
244
income" from currently deducting such future benefit expenditures
as the basis for its rough justice rules. This test includes a twelvemonth limit and a de minimis rule in order "[t]o reduce the
245
administrative and compliance costs associated with section 263(a)."
246
I have long advised just such a balancing test, which is now the
247
conventional wisdom among many academics, former high tax
243

U.S. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1146-47 (citation omitted).
The forthcoming notice relating to proposed rulemaking "will recognize that
many expenditures that create or enhance intangible assets or benefits do not create
the type of future benefits for which capitalization under section 263(a) is
appropriate, particularly when the administrative and record keeping costs associated
with capitalization are weighed against the potential distortion of income." Guidance
Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462
(Jan. 24, 2002); accord Susanne Pagano, New Rule Proposal to Reduce Uncertainty,
Administrative Issues, Treasury Official Says, 14 BNA DAILY TAX REP., Jan. 22, 2002,
at G-5 (Turgeon "said the proposal was an effort to balance competing tax policy
goals of clear reflection of income and what is administrable."); see Brant Goldwyn,
Treasury and IRS Seek to Issue Rules on Capitalization in 2002, 50 BNA DAILY TAX
REP., Mar. 14, 2002, at G-9 ("Christine Turgeon, senior tax specialist in the Treasury
Department's office of tax legislative counsel, said that the Treasury wants to balance
the need for rules that clearly reflect income with the need to simplify tax
administration and reduce the drag on IRS resources.").
245
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 3462.
246
We recommended to the Service such a balancing of burdens and benefits of
capitalization approach in our response to Notice 96-27. See Lee et al., Rough Justice
I, supra note 17, at 665; Lee et al., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1520. See
generally, Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 180-82.
Following the lead of Professor Alan Gunn, I have been advocating such a minimum
distortion of income model for more than fifteen years. Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra
note 10, at 13 & n.37.
247
Although the courts and the IRS have rarely referred directly to
administrative concerns, they should be considered relevant, perhaps
determinative in many cases. For example, the reservations that some
244

324
administrators,
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and the Advance Notice. The

courts have expressed about making significant future benefit a touchstone
of capitalization likely reflect an unexpressed belief that this approach
would extend capitalization to situations where the burden of separating
capitalized costs from current costs would outweigh the benefits of greater
accuracy in income measurement.
Lokken, supra note 35, at 1363-65.
[I]t may be harder to identify certain assets, assets of, say, short-term
durability; and therefore, once we add administrative costs to the balance,
we may be more justified in allowing expensing or a different treatment for
short-term assets than for longer-lived assets. But that's why we have to
think· about it - because of the high costs of identification rather than
because of lower benefits to capitalization. We should care as much about
getting it right for these short-term assets, capitalization is equally
important. It's only a question of costs of identifying these things or getting
them right that would make us have a different type of regime.
Unofficial Transcript of Tax Simplification Conference, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 25,
2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 17-37, <Jl<Jl 721-22)
(statement of Professor David Weisbach); Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 48,
54-55 (excellent analysis of political, administration, and theoretical factors; future
benefit should not be allowed to prevail over the need for administrative feasibility
and practicality) (Mr. Evans is currently in practice but was formerly an academic and
before that served in the Treasury Department).
248
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Gideon, Laurence Neal Woodworth Memorial Lecture
(Nov. 6, 1998), reprinted in Kenneth W. Gideon, Tax Law Works Best When the Rules
are Clear, 81 TAX NOTES 999, 1003 (Nov. 23, 1998), and in Kenneth W. Gideon,
Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
101, 110 (1999).
Any proposal to capitalize ought have to overcome a threshold showing that
the increased revenue flow to the government from it is at least as great as
the extra compliance costs imposed on the taxpayer. Note that the more
intensive the special purpose record-keeping system required to implement
a capitalization proposal, the more difficult it is to satisfy this criterion.
ld. (former Chief Counsel and Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy); Unofficial
Transcript of Tax Simplification Conference, supra note 247, <Jl<Jl 805-06 (comments of
Jerry Cohen, former Chief Counsel); cf Harry L. Gutman, Reflections on the Process
of Enacting Tax Law, Laurence Neal Woodworth Memorial Lecture, 26 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 183, 190 (2000) (proposing legislative rough justice solution of expenditure
classes in a combination of a section 168 and 197 model which, although distorting
"accurate periodic income measurement," is worthwhile where "the cost of measuring
income accurately (even if we could) outweighs the benefits, in terms of compliance
and other administrative costs, of a system that has struggled with, but has been
unable, to determine, on an ad hoc basis, the appropriate tax treatment of these
expenditures.") (former Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and
Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel, who was present at the birth of both sections 195
and 197).

2002]

Transaction Costs

325

Advance Notice's contemplated proposed safe harbors for current
deduction of the costs of creating or acquiring intangibles produce less
distortion of income than capitalization where no depreciation is
250
available.
This concept is also known as "perpetual
251
capitalization."
Even where available depreciation would more
closely match the expense with future income, and if the distortion of
income is minimal and the burden is heavy, a current deduction is in
252
order as U.S. Freightways recognized.
Such current deduction of
future benefit expenditures may be viewed as rough justice or minimal
253
distortion of income.
The rough justice balancing exceptions to future benefit
capitalization manifest several patterns where a current deduction
produces minimal distortion of income: (1) future benefits of not more
than twelve months, i.e., overlapping two-tax years; (2) insubstantial
costs or incidental future benefits; (3) short term or variable future
benefits; (4) regularly recurring expenditures; (5) difficulty in
allocating the expenditure between current and future benefits; (6)
future benefits are speculative; or (7) capitalization and depreciation
are more trouble than they are worth, as in income forecast
254
depreciation for writer's prepublication costs.
Often the rough
justice exceptions rest on more than one of these factors.
Additionally, where a capitalized expenditure is not depreciable, or is
depreciable but only over a much longer period than its actual future
benefit, a current deduction may produce less income distortion than
255
capitalization with no or slow depreciation.
Avoidance of both
extremes and allowance of depreciation over some fixed period if the
expenditure is substantial and not recurring over a relatively short
period would be even better, as a policy matter, than a current
256
deduction.
249

U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1146, 1146-47 (7th Cir.

2001).
250

See infra notes 361-73 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Gideon, supra note 248 at 109 (noting that perpetual capitalization
distorts the taxpayer's income); see also Martha Kessler, Parts of Coalition
Capitalization Proposal May Be Overly Broad, Treasury Official Says, 205 BNA
DAILY TAX REP., Oct. 25, 2001, at G-4 ("[M)any IRS agents have proposed
adjustments to capitalize costs (often with no amortization) that taxpayers have
historically deducted.").
252
U.S. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1146-47.
253
See supra notes 220, 228, 243 and accompanying text.
254
See Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 176-200.
255
See infra notes 367-73 and accompanying text.
256
See infra notes 383-87 and accompanying text.
251
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B. The Twelve-Month Rule
57

U.S. Freightwayi approved a current deduction under a not
more than twelve-month life rule as to recurring costs of licenses and
insurance, reasoning that the gain in precision for the taxing
authorities from a more perfect matching of expense and income was
outweighed by the administrative burden the taxpayer would bear in
such matching. Similarly, the Advance Notice announced that the
Treasury Department and the Service expect to propose a twelvemonth rule under which capitalization would not be required as to
expenditures to create or acquire an intangible benefit unless its
benefits "extend beyond the earlier of (i) twelve months after the first
date on which the taxpayer realizes the rights or benefits attributable
to the expenditure, or (ii) the end of the taxable year following the
taxable year in which the expenditure is incurred."258 Earlier
259
authorities had applied this rule to tangible property. The Office of
Chief Counsel has acknowledged that this one-year life overlapping
two tax years rule may result in some distortion of income, but some
260
departure from a "strict reading of Section 263" is called for here, as
it would result in a minimal distortion of income. The one-year rule
"is a 'rule of reason' that is clearly reasonable under the circumstances
261
involved."
The Seventh Circuit in U.S. Freightways agreed with
both points, as did the pre-INDOPCO Fourth Circuit panel opinion in
262
NCNB Corp. v. Commissioner.
257

U.S. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1146-47.
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002); accord Lee et a!., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at
1522.
259
Rev. Rul. 59-249, 1959-2 C.B. 55 (costs of tires and tubes on new equipment
used in motor transportation currently deductible where used in tax year or average
useful life is less than twelve months even though extends into next tax year). This
Revenue Ruling was considered by Chief Counsel in General Counsel Memorandum
33,370 (Nov. 10, 1966). See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,618, at 2 n.3 (Jan. 23, 1981);
Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,778 (Dec. 7, 1978).
260
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959, at 25 (July 25, 1972).
261 !d.
258

262

[W]here an expenditure will take no more than a year to generate the
matching income, it may nevertheless apply partly in the current year, partly
in the next. Theoretically, the part attributable to the latter year should be
capitalized. However, the tax treatment will then vary between taxpayers
depending on the time of year when the expenditure is made. [One] who
pays in January would usually have a tax advantage over [one] who pays
later in the year. Since income distortion is unlikely to be great, as a
recognition of greater simplicity and convenience for all, a slight deviation
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C. The De Minimis Rule

The Court of Claims (now Federal Circuit) in Cincinnati, New
263
Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. United States permitted current
deduction of de minimis or insubstantial capital expenditures ($500)
64
under a balancing tese much like that approved by U.S. Freightways
265
and as applied in the Advance Notice.
The Advance Notice
announces that the proposed regulations are expected to provide "'de
minimis rules,' under which certain types of expenditures less than a
266
specified dollar amount are not required to be capitalized. "
Professor McMahon has "argued that there is no statutory foundation
267
for a de minimis rule."
The Treasury Department, however, has
authority under the clear reflection of income mandate of section 446
to permit a de minimis rule determined with a balancing of burdens
268
and benefits standard, which the U.S. Freightways court effectively
from completely accurate accounting principles is permitted and
capitalization is not required.
NCNB Corp. v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 942, 953 n.21 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter
NCNB I], rev'd, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter NCNB II], overruled by
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). We have wondered whether
INDOPCO's overturning of NCNB II revived NCNB I. See Lee eta!., Rough Justice
I, supra note 17, at 636 n.8.
263
424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
264
Where the burden on both taxpayers and Service to account for each
item of property separately is great, and the likelihood of distortion of
income is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and so impracticable that it
demands that nevertheless all items be accounted for individually, no matter
what the trouble or the onus .... The burden on plaintiff, if the minimum
rule is not to be followed for income tax purposes, would be heavy; at the
same time, the clearer reflection of income would be exceedingly slight if
there were any at all.
Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 587.
265
See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text; see also Goldwyn, supra note
244 (Turgeon said de minimis rule "is a rule of administrative convenience and cannot
necessarily be applied in other areas."). The case-law rule originated, however, in the
context of acquisition costs of tangibles.
266
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002); see also Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra
note 241, at 193-94; Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 680; Lee eta!., Rough
Justice II, supra note 25, at 1523-27.
267
Lupi-Sher, supra note 237, at 807 (according to law professor Martin
McMahon, "[i]f Congress had to create de minimis expensing of tangible assets, it's up
to Congress, not the Treasury, to create de minimis expensing of intangible assets").
268
See Lee et a!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 180-82;
Lee eta!., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 689 n.235, 708; Lee eta!., Rough Justice
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confirmed by espousing a one-year rule under a burdens and benefits
269
70
balancing test.
Recent Revenue Procedure 2002-2i similarly
based a safe harbor accounting method for tires on commercial
vehicles on (1) the Commissioner's "broad authority to determine
whether a method of accounting clearly reflects income," and (2) the
administrative convenience of minimizing disputes over useful lives of
271
original and replacement tires.
II, supra note 25, at 1523-27. Both sources cite General Counsel Memorandum 34,959
(July 25, 1972), where relying on Cincinnati, Chief Counsel advocated a de minimis
rule:
We recognize that by regulations and longstanding ruling practice the
Service has definitely limited the Commissioner's discretion in this area.
However, we are unaware of any such limits that would prevent the exercise
of the discretion we now propose. As we suggested in [General Counsel
Memorandum] 34,547, pp. 9-12, we believe section 461 gives the
Commissioner authority to direct the timing of deductions in a manner that
will clearly reflect income. Although the exercise of this authority has
generally been aimed at proscribing methods that fail to clearly reflect
income, there is little doubt that it is broad enough to permit the recognition
of additional methods that allow a clear reflection of income, even though
such methods may appear to be a variance with a narrow interpretation of
specific language of the Code.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959, at 13-14 (July 25, 1972); see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784,
at 45 (Mar. 28, 1968) (noting that "expenditures can not be currently deducted if they
are expected to contribute more than incidentally to the realization of income in
subsequent taxable years.").
269 s
ee supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
270
Rev. Proc. 2002-27,2002-17 I.R.B. 802.
271
As we suggested (Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 709-10; Lee et
al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 182-86, 189; Rev. Proc. 200227, 2002-17 I.R.B. 802), the rough justice Original Tire Capitalization Method
(OTCM) for tires on business vehicles was based upon the Commissioner's section
446(b) "broad authority to determine whether a method of accounting does not
clearly reflect income." Rev. Proc. 2002-27, § 2.04. The procedure justified the result
(a) capitalize original tires and depreciate over same MACRS recovery period as the
vehicle and (b) replacement tires may be currently deducted, as an administrative
rule, i.e., "to minimize disputes regarding the useful lives of original tires and
replacement tires." Rev. Proc. 2002-27, § 2.06. In addition to administrative
convenience, several safe harbor factors were probably present. See infra notes 32122 and accompanying text. Capitalization of the cost of the original tires and
depreciation over the recovery period for the vehicle is similar to composite
depreciation; separate deduction of the original tires is similar to component
depreciation. Component depreciation is barred under MACRS. STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE "JOB
CREATION AND WORKER ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2002, at 25 n.38 (Joint Comm. Print
2002).
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Incidentally, the suggested $5000 de m1mm1s amoune for
intangibles is more or less equal to the 1940 $500 de minimis rule
approved in Cincinnati when adjusted for current cost of living
273
274
increases.
Applying the $5000 de minimis amount to tangibles
would, however, overlap section 179 and, depending on how the de
minimis rule was applied in the aggregate, likely bypass its ceiling
restrictions. If a ceiling amount of de minimis expenses or threshold
approach were taken, a handy model based on section 179 would be a
$25,000 annual cap on expenditures each not exceeding $5000, or
275
stretching, perhaps a $200,000 limit.
This would, of course,
effectively limit the benefits of this minimum expense rule to smallincome taxpayers.
General Motors advocates, not as comments on the Advance
Notice but instead as items that should be included in the 2002-03
"guidance priority" list, the use of an elective nominal asset value
current tax deduction rule to the extent assets (implicitly including
276
tangibles) are expensed for financial accounting purposes.
This
approach would bypass any de minimis dollar amount such as $5000,
as well as any aggregate limitations on de minimis deductions that
might be proposed. The General Motors proposal would further
obviate case law limitation of a de minimis rule based on Cincinnati
where the amounts in the aggregate are insubstantial compared to
277
gross and net income and depreciation.
With respect to tangible
assets, General Motors' book expensing rule would similarly bypass
278
the ceilings under section 179 as to additional first year depreciation.
272

Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3462, 3463 (Jan. 24, 2002).
273
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. V. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 572
(Ct. Cl. 1970). The Consumer Price Index has increased 12.82 times from 1940 to
2002. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Consumer Price Index Calculator, at
http://woodrow.mpls. frb.fed.us/research/data/us/calc (last visited Dec. 12, 2002).
274
See supra note 267 for the implication that a de minimis rule would not be
applicable to so-called tangibles.
275
Section 179 provides for elective expensing of the cost of depreciable property
purchased for use in the active conduct of a trade or business up to $25,000 in
aggregate (for tax years beginning on or after 2003 and $24,000 for tax years
beginning in 2002). The deduction, however, is phased out dollar for dollar by the
amount such expenditures exceed $200,000.
276
General Motors Asks for Safe Harbor Guidance on 2002-03 Guidance Priority
List, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 21, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit.,
2002 TNT 98-20).
277
See Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 572.
278
See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, this book expensing rule would conflict with section 263A
with respect to the capitalization of indirect costs and as to production
279
or acquisition of tangible property.
It is unlikely that Congress
would have intended these results.
280
Public Choice analysis
calls into question the financial
expensing approach that General Motors proposes insofar as the
General Motors method would extend a section 179 preference for
extra depreciation to some taxpayers and the section 263A exceptions
to other taxpayers. Public Choice would view the section 179
deduction and the exceptions under section 263A as tax expenditures
granted by Congress largely to small business taxpayers. Courts and
administrators must effectuate strictly the terms of such agreements,
but should not extend the tax preferences to classes of taxpayers not
covered by the Congressional agreement according to the Public
281
Choice idea of Devil's Obligation.
282
Commentators on the Advance Notice, as usual, often took
positions reflecting their particular circumstances; for instance, some
worried that a de minimis rule would act as a ceiling on the amount of
283
future benefit expenditures that could be currently deducted. Other
279

Section 263A provides for the capitalization and inclusion in inventory costs
of certain direct and indirect costs of acquisition of property for resale or creation of
property by larger taxpayers. See infra note 582.
280
Public Choice theory views some legislation as a private contract between
legislators seeking to retain their seats and private interests. See Lee et al.,
Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 206-07.
281
Where the fact-finder (i.e., the Service in rulings and the courts in litigated
cases) can determine that a particular tax provision is the product of private
compromise and that it produces asymmetrical benefits, as is the case with respect to
simplified expensing and uniform capitalization lives, the terms of the statutory
contract should not be extended to other similar tax items. Rather, taxpayers are
entitled to the preferences that Congress explicitly awards by relying on form even in
cases where there is little or no economic substance apart from such tax preferences;
this is the Devil's Obligation. See Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra
note 241, at 207-08. I believe that this idea supports the Tax Court's statutory tax
shelter rather than the generic tax shelter doctrine (as articulated in Rose v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386 (1987), affd on other grounds, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir.
1989)). For an excellent discussion of the generic tax shelter test, see Note, The Tax
Court's Rose Test: More Thorns in the Sides of Taxpayers, 8 VA. TAX REV. 905 (1989).
I also believe the notion of Congressionally intended subsidy underlies certain
administrative practices. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B. 112. This Revenue
Ruling was considered by Chief Counsel in General Counsel Memorandum 38,117
(Sept. 28, 1979).
282
See Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 667-68 n.122.
283
Though many of the costs associated with making certain types of loans
may fall within the suggested threshold of $5,000, the ABA [American
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commentators suggested a $10,000 ceiling, or that any ceiling take
285
into account the taxpayer's size.
On the other hand, some
commentators suggested that there be no ceiling to the extent that
expensing was permitted under a taxpayer's financial accounting
286
method.
Almost all commentators opposed any ceiling applied on
Bankers Association] is concerned that the underlying basis for allowing a
current deduction for loan origination costs has been overlooked. We
support the added administrative convenience of knowing a threshold safeharbor may be available, provided such de minimis amount is applied to
loan costs on a transactional basis. However, we continue to maintain that
the historic tax treatment of loan origination costs as "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses under IRC Section 162(a) must be preserved
in future regulatory guidance. Therefore, it should be acknowledged in
future guidance that "regular and recurring" loan costs that exceed any
threshold amount are not subject to the general rule requiring
capitalization.
Mark R. Baran, Bankers Association Offers Suggestions for Rules on Capitalizing
Costs of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 5, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit. 2002 TNT 66-26, <Jl 8).
284
Pamela J. Pecarich, A/CPA Suggests Changes to Proposed Regs on
Capitalizing Expenditures, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 17, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX
lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 96-18, <Jl 24) (recommending that "the de minimis
threshold dollar amount be increased to $10,000, and that the threshold be applied on
a transaction-by-transaction basis.").
285
Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., INDOPCO Submits Additional Comments on Proposed
Capitalization Regs, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 25, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 80-38, <Jl 5) ("We agree that the regulations should provide a
de minimis exception of at least $5,000, and encourage the IRS and Treasury to
provide a higher threshold amount for larger taxpayers."). Compare Fred Goldberg's
comment with the following statement by Stephen Elkins:
No matter how diligently a taxpayer seeks to comply perfectly with the tax
laws, it may be impossible accurately to capture and to analyze costs
incurred daily and in the ordinary course by the various operations of a
large company. Such costs (i) may or may not create or enhance intangible
assets with respect to which capitalization under Section 263(a) is
appropriate, (ii) relate to transactions that may or may not be
consummated, (iii) may or may not result in an assets right that lasts beyond
the end of next year, (iv) may or may not be de minimis individually or in
the aggregate, and, (v) may or may not be regular and recurring.
Stephen Elkins, Writers Comment on Proposed Regs on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of
Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 23, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 2002 TNT 78-23, <Jl22).
286
Scott Cahill, Organization [National Retail Federation] Seeks Clarification of
Deductible Expenses, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 17, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 96-33). Conversely, many commentators opposed book
conformity as a limitation on a current deduction but wanted its availability as a floor.
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an aggregate basis. 287 Allowing expensing of costs incurred in
connection with intangibles that would otherwise be capitalized if
incurred in connection with tangibles presumably would create
economic inefficiencies between the costs of acquiring or enhancing
288
tangibles and intangibles.
The Service and the Treasury
Department have thus requested comments on this problem:
The IRS and Treasury Department request comments on how
expenditures should be aggregated for purposes of applying
the de minimis exception, whether the de minimis exception
should allow a deduction for the threshold amount where the
aggregate transaction costs exceed the threshold amount, and

Financial, regulatory, and tax reporting have different objectives when
measuring the recognition of income and expense and, as a result,
frequently adopt differing standards. As a result, TEl recommends against
prescribing a standard rule of capitalization whereby a taxpayer's income
for tax purposes is determined by reference to financial or regulatory
accounting methods. There may be limited circumstances, however, where,
as a matter of administrative convenience, the taxpayer's financial or
regulatory accounting method can serve as a reasonable proxy for an
income tax accounting method (e.g., a de minimis expenditure rule for
tangible or intangible assets otherwise subject to capitalization).
Robert L. Ashby, TEl Suggests Changes to Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles,
TAX NOTES TODAY (May 15, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002
TNT 94-26, 'II 39); INDOPCO Submits Additional Comments on Proposed
Capitalization Regs, TAX NOTES TODAY (April 25, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 80-38, 'II 31); Victor Gomperts, Organizations Comment
on Possible Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 2,
2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 115-52, 'II 8); Companies
Suggest Changes to Proposed Regs on Capitalization of Intangible Assets, TAX NOTES
TODAY (June 14, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 115-53,
'11'11 6, 8); Charlotte M. Bahin, [American Community Bankers] Says Loan Origination
Costs Should Be Deductible, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 8, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX
lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 89-26, 'II 18); Mark R. Barkan, Bankers Association
Offers Suggestions for Rules on Capitalizing Costs of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Apr. 5, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 66-26, 'II 15).
287
PricewaterhouseCoopers Suggests Changes to Proposed Regs on Intangible
Asset Capitalization, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 30, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 83-18); Bankers Association Offers Suggestions for Rules on
Capitalizing Costs of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 5, 2002) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 66-26); Thomas E. Wheeler, CTIA
Suggests Changes to Proposed Guidance on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 29, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDT AX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002
TNT 61-23).
288
Cf. supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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whether there are certain expenditures for which the de
289
minimis exception should not apply (e.g., commissions).
The Tax Court decision in Alacare Home Health Services, Inc. v.
Commissionel}() contains the seeds for an administrable approach to
de minimis expenses in the aggregate. In that case, the taxpayer, a
Medicare-certified home health care provider, expensed all capital
items for which it paid less than $500 in compliance with guidelines in
291
The Tax Court
the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual.
held that this method of accounting did not clearly reflect the
taxpayer's income and distinguished Cincinnati on the grounds that
the ratios of disputed items to various measures of the taxpayer's size
292
were substantially larger than in Cincinnati.
The Tax Court also
compared the disputed items to its gross receipts and to its operating
expenses and found that the ratios were much higher than in
293
Cincinnati.
Alacare Home Health Services thus suggests that an
aggregate ceiling be imposed on de minimis expenditures. Some
possibilities are 15% of depreciation, 15% of assets on hand at the end
of the year, some percentage of net profits, or a lower percentage of
94
gross revenues. The Office of Chief Counsef similarly suggested a
percentage of net or gross income ceiling or industry-wide guidelines.
The Service, while recommending against requesting certiorari in
Cincinnati, still took the position that "if in a case it is found that the
taxpayer's 'minimum capitalization' rule for financial purposes is
unreasonably high, so that use of that rule for tax purposes would
produce a definite and substantial reduction of taxpayer's income, the
289

Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3462,3464 (Jan. 24, 200). See infra p. 360.
290
2001 T.C.M. (CCH) 1794 (2001).
291
/d. at 1795-96.
292
For example, in Cincinnati, the taxpayer's disputed items were less than
one percent of the taxpayer's net income in the 3 years at issue, see
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d at
571; in the instant case, the disputed items were 165 percent of petitioner's
1995 taxable income and 83.5 percent of its 1996 taxable income. In
Cincinnati, the taxpayer's disputed items were less than 2 percent of its total
deduction for depreciation for the years in issue; in contrast, petitioner's
disputed items were 288 percent and 189 percent of its total depreciation
deduction for 1995 and 1996.
/d. at 1798.
293
The taxpayer's ratios of "de minimis" items to its gross receipts were ten to
twenty-eight times larger than those in Cincinnati; the ratios of "de minimis" items to
its operating expenses were fourteen to 112 times larger than those in Cincinnati. /d.
294
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959, at 31-33 (July 25, 1972).
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295

D. Short- Term or Variable Benefit
The Advance Notice makes no reference to a safe harbor for
short-lived assets lasting more than twelve months; however, the
notion that current deduction of short-lived and recurring assets
produces minimal distortion of income had pre-INDOPCO case law
support and is a key concept to defensibly currently deducting certain
transactions costs. One such pre-INDOPCO case is Iowa-Des Moines
296
National Bank v. Commissioner,
which, in allowing a current
deduction for purchased credit information, emphasized that such
297
information was short-lived and subject to sudden change.
These
characteristics would preclude depreciation under the certainty
requirement for intangibles. The Court of Claims applied similar
298
reasoning in Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, in finding that
capitalization without amortization resulted in both distortion of
income and hardship to the taxpayer. Since the asset, an oil and gas
survey, had an unpredictable and variable life, and therefore
amortization was unavailable, a clear reflection of income required a
current deduction of the survey costs. This suggests that Lychuk v.
Commissioner was incorrect in requiring capitalization of regularly
recurring origination costs of automobile loans that had an average
duration of less than twenty-four months and were rather uncertain
299
since made to high credit risk car buyers. Regularly recurring costs
295

A.O.D. 1977-97 (July 15, 1977).
592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979).
297
Any credit information is short-lived and subject to sudden change.
Thus, credit information must be current to be valuable and the taxpayers
soon had a history of who did or did not pay the credit card charges. This
new information was far more useful to taxpayers than the information
purchased with the payments in dispute here. The fact that there may be
some ensuing benefit and future effect from the expenditure beyond the
taxable year when paid is not controlling. Where the prospective benefit is
very slight, capitalization is not easily supported.
/d. at 436 (citation omitted).
298
582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
299
See 116 T.C. 374, 376 (2001) (holding that overhead expenses were currently
deductible because they were indirectly related to acquisition of loans which the
taxpayer then serviced, and hence provided only incidental future benefits; salaries to
the extent allocable to the 60% of loan applications which the company rejected were
currently deductible; 40% of salaries allocable to the loans that the company reviewed
and accepted had to be capitalized). The average lives of accepted car loans were 17.5
months and 19.5 months for the tax years at issue. /d. at 420 n.1 (Swift, J., concurring
296
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of intangibles, such as those on at least a two- or three-year cycle,
should be currently deductible. In the context of repairs to tangible
00
assets, the Tax Court in Ingram Industries, Inc. v. Commissione/
permitted current deduction of insubstantial costs of inspecting tow
boat engines recurring on a three-year cycle when the tow boats were
still operable. This might suggest that the costs of making a repair on
a three-year cycle should be currently deductible at least where they
amount to less than a specified percentage of the value of a
301
reconditioned item.
Similar to Southland Royalty's notion that current deductibility of
survey costs, rather than amortization, is appropriate where an asset
302
has an unpredictable and variable life,
General Counsel
303
304
Memorandum 33,784, in considering Revenue Ruling 68-561,
mostly to show that PNC Bancorp erred in its reasoning).
300
80 T.C.M. (CCH) 532 (2000).
301
[I]f the cost of a used towboat (approximately $2 million) is used, the
cost-to-maintenance ratio would be 5 percent ($100,000 divided by $2
million). If the cost of new engines is used ($1.5 million) the ratio would
increase to almost 7 percent ($100,000 divided by $1.5 million). Finally, if
the cost of a [sic] completely overhauled or rebuilt engines is used
($600,000), the ratio would be almost 17 percent ($100,000 divided by
600,000). Ultimately, the difference between the cost of the procedures to
maintain ($100,000) and the cost of completely overhauled or rebuilt
engines ($600,000) is more telling. Plus, there is also the extra cost of
removal, installation, and refitting a new or rebuilt engine.
Id. at 539 n.7. Compare id., with Vanalco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH)
251 (1999), affd sub nom. Smith v. Commissioner, 300 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2002). In
Vanalco, the parties stipulated that the recovery period for "repairs" made every
three years in replacing bricks in walls of aluminum ore reduction cells was three
years. The Tax Court required capitalization under the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine where the brick replacement costs amounted to 22% of the costs of a
reconditioned cell. Id. at 256 n.8. The difference between the 17% of reconditioned
value cost of the repair in Ingram Industries and the 22% cost in Vanalco does not
seem material. The Ninth Circuit in affirming the Tax Court on this issue did not
discuss the general plan of rehabilitation, notwithstanding doing so as to another
issue.
302
The useful life of the survey is very uncertain; as the trial judge found,
the estimates in a reserve study are subject to change at any time and have
to be updated every few years to take account of subsequent developments.
In those circumstances, it is not compulsory to amortize such a recurring
item over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it appropriate to require
capitalization without amortization; such a requirement would clearly
distort Southland's income.
582 F.2d at 618. See generally Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 680; Lee et
a!., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1527-28.
303
Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784 (Mar. 29, 1968) (explaining that promotional
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reasoned that the difficulty in determining the usefui life of
intangibles created by salaries paid to employees conducting
305
promotions supported a current deduction.
This reasoning is a
critical component of the balancing of burdens and benefits analysis of
inside transaction costs.
E. Regularly Recurring

The Service and the Treasury Department are also considering
additional administrative relief, for example, by providing a "regular
and recurring rule," under which transaction costs incurred in
transactions that occur on a regular and recurring basis in the routine
operation of a taxpayer's trade or business are not required to be
306
capitalized. The Advance Notice raises another aspect of this issue:
The IRS and Treasury Department are considering
alternative approaches to minimize uncertainty and to ease
the administrative burden of accounting for transaction costs.
For example, the rules could allow a deduction for all
employee compensation (including bonuses and commissions
that are paid with respect to the transaction), be based on
whether the transaction is regular or recurring, or follow the
financial or regulatory accounting treatment of the
transaction. The IRS and Treasury Department request
comments on whether the recurring or nonrecurring nature of
a transaction is an appropriate consideration in determining
whether an expenditure to facilitate the transaction must be
capitalized under section 263(a) and, if so, what criteria
should be applied in distinguishing between recurring and
nonrecurring transactions. In addition, the IRS and Treasury
Department request comments on whether a taxpayer's
treatment of transaction costs for financial or regulatory
accounting purposes should be taken into account when
payments produce less speculative future benefits than ordinary advertising because
acquisition of new customers can be attributed directly to particular expenditures;
depreciation allowed over the life of the constructed building).
304
1968-2 C. B. 117 (determining that cash allowances made to construct all gas
homes or to convert heating systems to gas result in future benefits through increased
sales of gas as a result of obtaining new customers; salaries and advertising are less
directly and significantly productive of future benefits).
305
Cf infra notes 354-57 and accompanying text.
306
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002).
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developing simplifying assumptions.

337

307

Minimal distortion of income is produced by the current
deduction of an expenditure with future benefits where the
expenditure recurs regularly or annually in roughly equivalent
amounts as illustrated by Judge Posner in Encyclopaedia Britannica v.
Commissioner:
We can think of a practical reason for allowing authors to
deduct their expenses immediately, one applicable as well to
publishers though not in the circumstances of the present
case. If you are in the business of producing a series of assets
that will yield income over a period of years - which is the
situation of most authors and all publishers - identifying
particular expenditures with particular books, a necessary
step for proper capitalization because the useful lives of the
books will not be the same, may be very difficult, since the
expenditures of an author or publisher (more clearly the
latter) tend to be joint among several books. Moreover,
allocating these expenditures among the different books is
not always necessary to produce the temporal matching of
income and expenditures that the Code desiderates, because
the taxable income of the author or publisher who is in a
steady state (that is, whose output is neither increasing nor
decreasing) will be at least approximately the same whether
his costs are expensed or capitalized. Not the same on any
given book - on each book expenses and receipts will be
systematically mismatched- but the same on average. Under
these conditions the benefits of capitalization are unlikely to
exceed the accounting and other administrative costs entailed
308
in capitalization.
Judge Posner noted a further distinction between recurring and
nonrecurring expenses in Encyclopaedia Britannica. If one really
takes seriously the concept of a capital expenditure as anything that
yields income, actual or imputed, beyond the period in which the
309
expenditure is made (conventionally one year), the result will be to
force the capitalization of virtually every business expense. Judge

307
308
309

!d. at 3464.
Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 215 (7th Cir. 1982).
See United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (lOth Cir. 1968).
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Posner noted that this is a result courts naturally avoid.
Such an
approach would require capitalizing every salesman's salary since such
selling activities create goodwill for the company and goodwill is an
asset yielding income beyond the year in which the salary expense is
incurred. Judge Posner remarked that the distinction between
recurring and nonrecurring business expenses provides a very crude,
but perhaps serviceable, demarcation between those capital
expenditures that can be feasibly capitalized and those that cannot be.
The Service frequently has used this recurring analysis in Private
311
Letter Rulings and Technical Advice Memoranda.
Moreover, U.S.
12
Freightwayi approvingly cites Britannica for a regular and recurring
exception to future benefit capitalization as well as its conceptual
rigor point:
Recurrent expenses are more likely to be ordinary and
necessary business expenses. . . . Because they recur every
year, there is less distorting effect on income from future tax
year benefits over time. In every year, that is, while
Freightways will be able to reap the tax advantage of
deduction for some part of the following twelve months, it
will have "lost" the deductions for the months covered by the
prior year's licenses, for which it has already received the
benefit. In a hypothetical last year of Freightways' corporate
life, it would finally be entitled to only a prorated deduction
for licenses (if any) that are acquired during that year,
partially evening out the score with the first year of
313
.
de d uct10ns.
As we pointed out in our article,
310

•
See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 ( 2d Or.

1973).
311

See Lee et al., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1530-32.
U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001). In
U.S. Freightways, 46% of the expenditures for assets purchased in the current tax year
benefited the taxpayer in the current year and 54% benefited the next tax year. The
Commissioner proposed capitalization and permitted ratable deduction of the
current year's expenditure between the current and next tax year. The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that such expenditures benefit only the current and next tax years
because "they recur with clockwork regularity" due to the strict twelve-month life of
the annual permits, licenses, significant annual fees, and insurance premiums at issue.
Thus, the expenditures lack the "permanence" necessary to constitute a "permanent
improvement or betterment," the prerequisite for capitalization under section 263 or
under section 162 as not "ordinary." !d. at 1144-45.
313
!d. at 1145.
312
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[r]ecurring payments alone may not justify an immediate
deduction when the benefits obtained from the expenditures
lack a similar recurring pattern. If a substantial useful life
remains when the taxpayer next incurs the recurring expense,
the recurring expense is not incidental. The objective of
minimizing income distortion seeks to match expenses with
the income they produce. Mismatching occurs when
expenditures of a fairly constant amount produce benefits
that are disproportionally realized in future years: immediate
deductions understate income in early years when the
benefits occur in later years. In these situations, the duration
of the future benefits properly requires taxpayers to consider
314
capitalizing the costs as directed by INDOPC0.
Significantly, the Office of Chief Counsel has linked a de minimis
315
rule with recurring items. It also reasoned that "[i]t is clearly within
the Commissioner's discretion under section 446(b) to allow
expensing of such items as long as income is clearly reflected under
316
such method." Similarly, in advising an administrative rule to allow
a current deduction of a writer's prepublication costs of a "continuing
nature," the Office of Chief Counsel recommended that such
deduction should only "be allowed for expenses of a recurring nature,
317
such as rent, secretarial salaries or writing supplies. "
The primary
basis for the recommendation to allow a current deduction of a
writer's recurring prepublication costs was the difficulty of allocation
and the use of a "rather complex cost accounting system, based on
318
careful records of time spent on various projects."
319
This reading of section 446 and the Commissioner's broad
discretion in determining whether the taxpayer's method of
accounting for an item clearly reflects income reappears in Revenue
320
Procedure 2002-27, which also involves recurring items. Revenue
321
Procedure 2002-27 provides an optional safe harbor, the "Original
314

Lee et a!., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1539-40.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,959, at 26 (July 25, 1972) ("We believe that the Service
is not inalterably bound to abide by a strict capitalization rule when dealing with
minor, recurring-type small items.").
316 !d.
315

317

Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,968, at 10 (Nov. 18, 1968).
!d. at 8; see discussion infra Part IV.F.
319
See I.R.C. § 446 ( b ) .
320
2002-17 I.R.B. 802.
ill
Taxpayers not so electing are to be taxed under the tax common law, which
requires capitalization of new and replacement truck tires with useful lives longer
318
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Tire Capitalization Method," under which the original tires on certain
322
business vehicles are capitalized and depreciated over the same
recovery period and at the same rate as the "qualifying vehicle;"
replacement tires are currently deductible. The revenue procedure
justifies this two-part rule, pursuant to the Commissioner's broad
authority to determine whether a method of tax accounting clearly
23
reflects income/ on the basis of administrative convenience - "[t]o
minimize disputes regarding the useful lives of original tires and
324
replacement tires for certain vehicles. "
The two-part rule could,
however, be justified upon the rough justice factors of regularly
325
•
. bl e term 1'1ves,326 an d perh aps
recurnng,
apparent1y sh ort or vana
27
insubstantial in amoune compared to the total value of truck, trailer,
or tractor. The Service should issue a revenue ruling grounded in
these principles and referring to Revenue Procedure 2002-27. The
proposed regulations should, in turn, follow such Revenue Ruling.
Commentators Evans and Gallagher advise against a steady state
328
recurring rule due to the permanent deferral of tax, the same point
329
•
330
made by Professors Larry Lokken and earher by Cal Johnson.
than one year as separate assets. Id. 'll 4.02; see also 2001 FSA LEXIS 26 (Jan. 30,
2001) (stating that despite taxpayer's contention that "tires and tubes are rapidly
consumable separate assets[, t ]he Service believes that its ongoing factual
development will show that Taxpayer's tires and tubes last several years", and
concluding that "[i]f the factual development indicates that the tires and tubes at issue
have a useful life of more than one year, the cost of the tires and tubes must be
capitalized and recovered through depreciation.").
322
Light and heavy general-purpose trucks, tractor units for use over-the-road,
trailers and trailer-mounted containers, etc. See Rev. Proc. 2002-27, <J[ 3.01; Rev. Proc.
87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, <J[<J[ 00.242, 00.26, 00.27.
323
See Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 187-88;
Lee et a!., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 708-12.
324
Rev. Proc. 2002-27, <J[ 2.06. Administrative convenience also supports the
allowance in Revenue Procedure 2001-10, 2001-2 I.R.B. 272, for "small taxpayers"
with average gross receipts of $1 million or less to use the cash method of tax
accounting rather than the accrual method while maintaining inventories or supplies
that are not incidental.
325
. text.
See supra notes 308-17 an d accompanymg
326
See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 264, 266 an d accompanymg
. text.
328
Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 63. Judge Posner, however, pointed out
that where a taxpayer's income is in a steady state, i.e., output is neither increasing
nor decreasing, his taxable income will be approximately the same whether recurring
expenses are capitalized or expensed. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
The burdens of capitalization in such circumstances outweigh the benefits, although
technically some distortion of income occurs.
329
Lokken, supra note 35, at 1363.
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Specifically, Evans and Gallagher argue that recurring expenses make
it "worthwhile to incur the expense of accurate precise accounting for
331
the items correctly."
Such permanent deferral is real, but the
Seventh Circuit pointed out in U.S. Freightways that permanent
deferral always arises with the current deduction of recurring
332
expenses.
The only difference between a twelve-month rule and a
recurring rule is the duration of the deferral. The fundamental issue
still is whether the administrative burdens of capitalization outweigh
the benefits of conceptual rigor. While a steady state recurring might
provide an incentive to the taxpayer to keep track of exact matching,
review courts may be more likely to reverse capitalization. Thus, the
administrative burden on the Service is increased, not decreased, by
recurring expenses, as may be seen in the case of replacement truck
333
tires.
Heather Malloy, Associate Chief Counsel, Income Tax and
Accounting, has pointed out a perceived difficulty with a regular and
recurring costs exception: "the Service's goal was to eliminate
334
controversy, not to move the debate to a different issue."
In other
words, the Service should not move the question from whether a cost
should be capitalized to whether the cost is regular and recurring.
Andrew Keyso, in the same division, added that the Service has not
335
been able to come up with a bright-iine rule. One solution would be
to allow a current deduction when the recurrence cycle is up to three
36
years/ and particularly where it is annually recurring in the

° Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing under the Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL.

33

L. REV. 1019, 1072-77 (1989) (criticizing "steady state fallacy").
331
Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 51.
332

U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137, 1145-46 (7th Cir.

2001).
333

See supra notes 321-24 and accompanying text.
Jon Almeras, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Officials Talk Capitalization and
Lease Stripping, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 13, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 2002 TNT 92-21).
335
See id.
336
The Service in private rulings has permitted a current deduction for expenses
recurring every two years. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996) (the
current deduction by the taxpayer of the cost of minor repairs routinely performed by
the taxpayer every one or two years "has not been raised by the agent in the present
case"). In addition, the Service once suggested that a current deduction for expenses
recurring every year in the aggregate but on a three-year cycle as to the particular
item, as in annual dredging one-third of a harbor, was easier administratively than
capitalization with subsequent depreciation over a three-year period. See Gen.
Couns. Mem. 34,102 (Apr. 17. 1969) (whether such dredging benefited prior three
years or future years "conjures visions in legalistic semantics"). This also suggests a
334
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aggregate, and to capitalize with subsequent depreciation over the
337
entire recurrence cycle when the cycle is more than three years.
Under the suggested approach, the short and variable lives of the
38
high-risk auto loans in Lychue imply that capitalizing a small part of
the loan review employees' compensation in proportion to the
percentage of loans approved was incorrect on the facts, since the
acquired automobile loans had an average duration of less than
twenty-four months and were uncertain since the loans were made to
high credit risk car buyers. Transaction costs and other indirect costs
of acquiring or enhancing intangible assets, such as the Lychuk loans,
should be currently deductible when the costs are regularly recurring
over cycles of either twenty-four or thirty-six months. If the cycle is
longer, then the costs could be treated as a deferred charge or
intangible depreciable ratably over the cycle, as in Wolfsen Land &
..
339
C
attleco. v. Commzsswner.
As an alternative to amortization over the recurrence period of
three years or more, a "sliding scale" amortization schedule might be
easier to administer. One approach would be a current deduction if
the estimated useful life of the asset is two years or less; if the
estimated useful life or the ACRS class life is three years, there should
340
be 50%, 25%, and 25% deductions for tax years one, two, and three,
respectively; for four years, deductions of 50%, 30%, 15%, and 5%;
and for five years or longer, deductions of 45%, 35%, 10%, 5%, and
5% should be taken. Under this approach, there would be no legal
question as to whether an expenditure was sufficiently regular and
recurring as to be currently deductible. Instead, there would be a
factual question as to the duration of the recurrence cycle or the year
under the sliding scale in the case at hand.

better rationale for the result in Ingram Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.M.
(CCH) 532 (2000). See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
337
Lee et a!., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1543-56. I would not require the
first expenditure in an: expected three-year cycle to be capitalized on the grounds that
it is not yet recurring. Glenn Walberg points out that otherwise the taxpayer might be
required to change the relevant tax accounting method if the taxpayer wished to
deduct the costs of the first recurrence. E-mail from Glenn Walberg, Accounting
Methods and Inventory, Ernst & Young, to John Lee, Professor of Law, College of
William and Mary School of Law (August 20, 2002) (on file with author).
m Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 376 ( 2001); see supra note 299.
339
72 T.C. 1 (1979).
340
Service Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548 inspired this suggestion. See infra note
445 and accompanying text.
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F. Difficulty of Allocation Between Current and Future Benefits
Difficulty of expenditure allocation between current and future
tax years is one of the oldest and strongest rough justice factors
supporting a current deduction. The current deduction of advertising
expenses has rested for more than fifty years on this factor. 341
Revenue Ruling 92-80 held that "[t]he INDOPCO decision does not
affect the treatment of advertising costs under section 162(a) of the
Code. These costs are generally deductible under that section even
though advertising may have some future effect on business activities,
342
as in the case of institutional or goodwill advertising. " The Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation explains that considerations of
343
administrative convenience underlie the current deductibility of
341

The unusual treatment of expenditures for ordinary business advertising
manifest in Rev. Rul. 92-80, supra, is longstanding. Its genesis is in efforts
by taxpayers in the early years of income taxation to capitalize the costs of
large-scale advertising campaigns and to amortize the capitalized amounts
over a period of years, efforts that were consistently opposed by the
Commissioner on the ground that allocating advertising expenditures
between current expenses and capital outlays was not feasible. See, e.g.,
Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Commissioner [Dec. 1842], 5 B.T.A. 232, 237
(1926). Although the courts did not entirely foreclose the propriety of
capitalizing some advertising expenditures, taxpayers found it difficult to
prove an appropriate allocation between current and long-term benefits. In
time, this insistence on evidence hardened into a rule of law that
capitalization is proper only if the taxpayer can establish "that the future
benefits can be determined precisely and are not of indefinite duration."
A. Finkenberg's Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner [Dec. 18,662], 17 T.C. 973, 982983 (1951); see also E.H. Sheldon & Co. v. Commissioner [54-2 USTC
«J1 9526], 214 F.2d 655, 659 (6th Cir. 1954) (taxpayer must show "with
reasonable certainty the benefits resulting in later years from the
expenditure"), affg in part, and rev'g and remanding in part [Dec. 19,358] 19
T.C. 481 (1952). See the discussion of advertising expenses in BITIKER &
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, par. 20.4.5
at 20-86 to 20-88 (2d ed. 1989). But see Durovic v. Commissioner [76-2
USTC «JJ 9732], 542 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1976) (cost of free samples must be
capitalized; amortization denied in absence of proof of limited life), affg.
[Dec. 33,534] 65 T.C. 480 (1975).
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71, 82 (1998) (relying on
Northwestern Yeast, a 1926 excess profits case where the government opposed
capitalization of advertising costs because it would reduce a corporation's excess
profits tax, which was much greater than the corporate income tax at that time). See
generally, Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20
VA. TAX REV. 347,422-36 (2000).
342
1992-2 C.B. 57.
343
The Service often uses "administrative" convenience or policy to refer to
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advertising costs. 344 The Tax Court in RJR Nabisco applied this
345
analysis after INDOPCO to the costs of cigarette package designs.
The RJR Nabisco court declined to accept the Commissioner's
distinction between the costs of developing advertising campaigns and
the costs of executing such campaigns by, for instance, producing
allowing, for example, a current deduction of costs that under strict application of
precedent would be capitalized, on the grounds of difficulty of the taxpayer complying
with the conceptually pure rule. See Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance,
supra note 241, at 182-86; Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 704-08. This is,
of course, the main justification in general for the rough justice rules permitting a
current deduction under a balancing of burdens and benefits of capitalization. See
supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text; U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner,
270 F.3d 1137, 1146 (7th Cir. 2001).
344
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., IMPACT ON SMALL
BUSINESS OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 83 (Joint Comm. Print 1996).
See generally Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 640. The tax revenue at
issue as to deduction versus amortization of advertising costs is substantial. For
instance, capitalizing and then amortizing 20% of advertising costs was estimated to
increase tax revenues by $37.9 billion in 1987, Revenue Options Book Released but Is
It a Best Seller?, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 29, 1987) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 87 TNT 125-1), and $18 billion over five years in 1993, Alexander Polinsky,
News Analysis: Amortizing Advertising Expenses- Not in the Foreseeable Future, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 27, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 93 TNT
199-2). The pressure group opposition to capitalization of advertising costs is even
more substantial. Polinsky; supra; Barbara Kirchheimer, Proposal to Capitalize
Advertising Expenses Draws Fire at W&M Revenue Hearing, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Sep. 5, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 93 TNT 187-1). Hence,
nothing legislative came to pass from staff proposals over the past decade to capitalize
a portion (say 20%) of such costs which then would have been amortizable over four
years or so. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE PROPOSALS SCHEDULED FOR A HEARING BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS ON SEPTEMBER 8, 21, AND 23, 1993 AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON WAYS AND MEANS ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1993, Proposal II.B.3 (Joint Comm. Print
1993), reprinted in JCT Releases Description of Miscellaneous Revenue Items, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 20, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 93 TNT
194-50).
345
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998). The
litigated capitalization versus expensing costs in RJR Nabisco principally involved
graphic design of cigarette packaging materials and in a relatively small amount
involved package design, i.e., the physical construction of the package. Graphic
design "is a combination of verbal information, styles of print, pictures or drawings,
shapes, patterns, colors, spacing, and the like that make up an overall visual display"
while package design "refers to the design of the physical construction of a package."
Id. at 79. Graphic designs are developed for cigarette cartons, packages, messages
temporarily applied to cartons or packages, tipping around the filter, cigarette papers,
foils, and closure seals for soft packs.
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television commercials on the basis of short-term benefits such as
advertising campaigns and long-term benefits such as advertising
executions because both types of benefits posed the same
administrative difficulty of allocation between current and future tax
346
years.
The court explained that "at the time graphic designs or
advertising campaigns are introduced, no one can determine how long
the graphic designs, advertising campaigns, or elements of such
designs will be used, including whether or not they will be used for
347
more or less than a single year."
Thus, capitalization would not be
followed by amortization because it requires a length of useful life
348
that can be "estimated with reasonable accuracy."
Accordingly, a
rough justice current deduction produces minimal distortion of
income because the deduction causes less distortion than
349
capitalization without amortization.
RJR Nabisco found that
successful advertising builds goodwill whether in the form of trade
dress, created by graphic designs or long-term advertising
350
campaigns.
Therefore, the litigated costs were deductible as
••
~I
ad verttsmg costs.
Prior to INDOPCO, the Fourth Circuit in NCNB pz reached a
similar conclusion with respect to the difficulty of allocation regarding
expenditures in general. The Fourth Circuit, based upon financial
accounting principles, reasoned that
there is a residuum of current expenditures which will have
some future benefit but which "cannot, as a practical matter,
be associated with any other period" and allocation of which
"either on the basis of association with revenue or among
several accounting periods is considered to serve no useful
purpose. These also are currently deductible. An example
might be the salary of a high corporate officer whose time is
not practically allocable between present operations and
346
347
348

Id.
/d.

Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2000).
My notion that capitalization without depreciation produces more distortion
than a current deduction has become conventional wisdom. See Hal I. Gann,
Capitalization: Get Back to Where You Once Belonged, 149 U.S.C. ANN. TAX INST.
(MAJOR TAX PLAN.) Cj['j[ 200, 205.3, at 2-21 (1997); Brett M. Alexander, Note, An
Analysis ofiNDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1505, 1516-19 (1993).
350
RJR Nabisco, Inc., 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 84.
351
The Commissioner conceded that graphic design costs "fit the textbook
definition of advertising." /d. at 80.
352
NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.1981).
349
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,353
.
f uture proJects.

The Office of Chief Counsel, in Private Letter Rulings prior to
INDOPCO, also recognized the difficulty of allocation to costs in
contexts other than advertising. For instance, the Office of Chief
354
Counsel's reasoning in General Counsel Memorandum 35,681 - that
salaries, rents, and mortgages incurred in originating a mortgage and
not directly attributable to the acquisition of a mortgage should be
currently deductible -turned on difficulty of allocation. Specifically,
the Office of Chief Counsel stated, "[t]o determine which portion of
otherwise current operating expenses benefits future periods would be
355
impossible to do accurately."
This difficulty of allocation analysis
supports the results in several of the post-INDOPCO circuit court
cases treating transaction costs, such as, PNC Bancorp, Inc. v.
..
356
D
& co. v. commtsswner.
. • 357
an d H1f[
yye s rargo
Commtsswner
Significantly, the Third Circuit in PNC Bancorp pointed out that the
Service did not include the capitalized loan origination costs in the
358
basis of each loan.
G. Speculative Future Benefits
The Advance Notice discusses a . contemplated proposed
requirement to capitalize amounts "paid to another person to induce
353

/d. at 961-62 (footnotes omitted) (citing AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD STATEMENT NO.4: BASIC
CONCEPTS AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES ( 1970)).
354
)
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,417 ( Feb. 19,1974.
35s Id.
356

212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000).
224 F.3d 874 ( 8th Cir. 2000 ) , rev'g Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C.
89 (1999).
358
For example, if the loan origination costs were required to be capitalized,
it would seem to follow that these costs would have to be included in the
basis of each loan. Such inclusions would apparently be a departure from
current practice .... However, the IRS conceded at oral argument that a
requirement of capitalization of loan origination costs would probably mean
that these complex basis adjustments would need to be made. The IRS's
apparent failure to consider these and other tax ramifications of
capitalization suggests that the IRS's borrowing of the line that the SFAS 91
standards draw between current-year costs and deferred costs was not based
on any independent tax analysis, but was simply a "bootstrapping" of the
financial accounting standards into the tax arena.
PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 832-33 n.16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
ill
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that person to enter into, renew, or renegotiate an agreement that
produces contract rights enforceable by the taxpayer, including
payments for leases, covenants not to compete, licenses to use
359
intangible property, customer contracts and supplier contracts."
It
notes, however, that "[t)his rule also would not require a taxpayer to
capitalize a payment that does not create enforceable contract rights
but, for example, merely creates an expectation that a customer or
360
supplier will maintain its business relationship with the taxpayer."
Authorities before and after INDOPCO allowed a current deduction
of costs yielding only speculative future benefits.
Tax Court Judge Tannenwald, in exploring INDOPCO's
incidental future benefit limitation in Sun Microsystems, Inc. v.
361
Commissioner,
took a speculative benefits tack.
There, the
taxpayer, a new high-tech company (SMS), maintained that warrants
were included as an incentive to purchase $20 million and $30 million
worth of workstations; the issuance of stock warrants - with exercise
rights contingent upon the volume of future purchases - to a new
major customer (CV) constituted currently deductible sales
362
discounts. The Commissioner argued that under INDOPCO's "new
look," the warrants should be capitalized as an investment made to
develop a long-term relationship with a customer. Judge Tannenwald
responded by pointing to the parties' stipulation that "the anticipated
long-term benefits to SMS from the relationship with CV were 'softer'
and were speculative, compared to the immediate benefits to SMS of
359

Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3461, 3463 (Jan. 24, 2002).
360
Jd. (citing Van Iderstine Co. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1958)). ·
361
66 T.C.M. (CCH) 997 (1993).
362
Revenue agents have argued that Sun Microsystems is merely a discount case.
See Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 179. I believe that
Judge Tannenwald, while indicating that such narrow analysis resolved the
controversy in front of him, deliberately pointed to the precedent permitting current
deduction of future benefit expenses to give meaning to "incidental" future benefit:
Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1365 (lOth Cir. 1982) (author's
expenses in connection with a book to be published in future held
deductible); Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374 (1970) (fee in order to
secure employment held deductible); Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57
(INDOPCO does not preclude deduction of advertising expenses having a
future benefit); Lee, "Doping out the Capitalization Rules after
INDOPCO," 57 Tax Notes 669 (Nov. 2, 1992) ....
Sun Microsystems, 66 T.C.M. 997. I like to speculate that Judge Tannenwald was
implicitly approving a balancing test minimum distortion of income analysis as it was
a major theme of my article that he cited.
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the anticipated sales of computer workstations to CV under the
363
Purchase Agreement."
The Service followed Sun Microsystems' incidental/speculative
benefit reasoning in Technical Advice Memorandum 96-45-002,
extensively discussing deductibility of pre-opening costs incurred by a
364
retailer opening new stores in the same field.
Indeed, the Service
has long followed such a speculative benefit approach. The reasoning
of the Office of Chief Counsel took the same tack for allowing current
deduction of advertising costs in a sales campaign by public utilities to
increase sales of gas or electricity through providing incentives to
builders and owners to install equipment using substantial amounts of
electricity or natural gas.
[I]n the case of ordinary advertising it is generally recognized
that there is only a hope that new customers will be secured
by the expenditure, and there is no guarantee that new
customers will be so obtained. Furthermore, the benefits that
will result in later years from the expenditure cannot usually
be ascertained with reasonable certainty. In light of these
facts, the Service and the Courts have generally held that such
advertising costs are deductible currently as ordinary and
365
.
necessary b usmess expenses.
Thus, the reasoning of the Office of Chief Counsel appeared to turn
both on speculative benefits and on an inability to depreciate if
capitalized. The former was clearly more important:
On the other hand, however, where the acquisition of new
customers can be attributed directly to particular
expenditures, those expenditures must be capitalized since
they have resulted in the acquisition of a benefit extending
into subsequent years, i.e., the increased earning capacity to
366
be generated from the new customers obtained.
Such capitalized costs would not have been depreciable unless the
life of this intangible benefit could have been determined with
certainty. A memo attached to General Counsel Memorandum
33,784 reveals that the Associate Chief Counsel would have allowed a
363

Sun Microsystems, 66 T.C.M. 997.
See Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996).
365
Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784 (March 29, 1968) (considering Revenue Ruling 68561, 1968-2 C.B. 117).
366 ld.
364
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current deduction for the salaries to the taxpayer's sales
representatives conducting the campaign and the costs of the
advertising campaign for a slew of broader reasons consonant with the
367
modern rough justice factors.
The Office of Chief Counsel
concurred in the result suggested by the Associate Chief Counsel,368
but the published ruling considered in General Counsel Memorandum
33,784, articulated as the basis for allowing a current deduction of the
salaries paid to the taxpayer's representatives and advertising
payments in the sales campaign that they were "less directly and
significantly productive of intangible assets having a value extending
beyond the taxable years in which they were paid or incurred." 369 The
incentives to the builders and owners were required to be
370
capitalized.
Interestingly, this analysis is similar to that later
adopted by the Tax Court in Lychuk in allowing the current deduction
371
of overhead costs associated with loan origination operations.
The
distinction between similar costs on the grounds of depreciability was
372
also drawn in Revenue Ruling 94-38 with respect to soil remediation
373
costs, as well as in several landmark pre-INDOPCO decisions.
Ultimately, the availability or not of depreciation if the costs in
question are capitalized is one of the rough justice distinctions
between costs incurred in connection with the acquisition, creation, or
367

Id. (salaries of representatives and advertising costs are not as closely
connected to the acquisition of future benefits as the bonus payments and "could be
said to be in payment for the services currently being rendered;" the connection with
a future benefit of increased electricity consumption is tenuous; establishing a direct
connection between the advertising expenses and increases in the future consumption
of electricity would be inherently difficult; "capitalization of salary and advertising
expenditures could logically be extended to other businesses and industries where
traditionally an expense deduction has been allowed;" and another objection to
capitalization of the salaries and advertising costs "is the difficult task of determining
the useful life of the asset acquired." The suggestion of using "the useful life of the
building involved" was rejected "[s]ince the salaries and advertising costs do not
appear to be related to any particular building").
368 !d.
369

Rev. Rul. 68-561, 1968-2 C.B. 117.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,784 (March 29, 1968) (Associate Chief Counsel
Memorandum).
371
See Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 392 (2001}.
372
1994-1 C.B. 35; see also John W. Lee & W. Eugene Seago, Policy
Entrepreneurship, Public Choice, and Symbolic Reform Analysis of Section 198, the
Brownfields Tax Incentive: Carrot or Stick or Just Never Mind?, 26 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 613,702-03,716-17 (2002) (discussing this point).
373
See, e.g., Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl.
1978).
370
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enhancement of tangible and intangible assets.
H. Slow or No Depreciation is More Trouble than It Is Worth
•
375 h
Both Southland Royalty 374 and Iowa-Des Momes
el d th at
capitalization was not appropriate where depreciation was not
376
available. Perhaps Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States,
377
a business expansion decision, most extensively analyzes this notion.
378
I believe that this is also the better ground in Revenue Ruling 94-38
379
for currently deducting soil remediation costs.
As shown in the
preceding section, this was also one of the reasons for allowing the
current deduction of the salesmen's salaries and the advertising costs
of the promotions to use or convert to electric or gas heat. This
reasoning, however, was not reflected in the final published ruling, for
the Service historically has appeared reluctant explicitly to pursue this
380
route. Avoidance of "perpetual capitalization," or capitalization

374

3~

ld.

Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433 ( 8th Cir. 1979 ) .
See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
377
The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a property
interest. They produced nothing corporeal or salable. They are recurring.
At the most they introduced a more efficient method of conducting an old
business. The government suggests no way in which they could be
amortized. The government's theoretical approach ignores the practicalities
of the situation, and permits a distortion of taxpayer's financial situation. If
an expenditure, concededly of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor
amortized, the adoption of technological advances is discouraged.
505 F.2d 1185, 1192 (lOth Cir. 1974).
378
1994-1 C.B. 35.
379
Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 197 n.140.
Perhaps the strongest point of Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, was that
rough justice administrable solutions are preferable to overreaching capitalization by
the Service without allowing adequate capital recovery. See also Alexander, supra
note 349, at 1516-17. Some but not all judges are tempted to award a current
deduction as less income distorting. It is possible that this point was behind the
compromise in Technical Advice Memorandum 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992) of
providing amortization of capitalized toxic waste soil remediation costs over a
surrogate of the life of the taxpayer's core business asset. See 1993 House Hearings,
supra note 37, at 1689, 1702; Hal Gann & Roy Strowd, INDOPCO- Time for the
Second Shoe to Drop, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 21, 1995) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 95 TNT 227-140). For interesting practitioner tips on how to
convince a revenue agent of the theorem of less (or minimum) distortion of income,
see Gann, supra note 349, at 2-21 to 2-26.
380
See supra note 251.
376
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without depreciation, has often convinced tribunals other than the
382
Tax Court. In this regard, Wolfsen Land & Cattle is a welcome
exception. Even where these exceptions are not applicable, several
authorities hold that if depreciation is not available, capitalization is
not appropriate because capitalization without depreciation would
383
distort the taxpayer's income.
Moreover, where depreciation is
available, distortion of income would also result when the recovery
period is much longer than the future benefit of the expenditure. This
384
was the unacknowledged problem presented in Ingram Industries
385
and the aircraft engine inspection Technical Advice Memorandum.
In both instances, the recovery period for the capitalized expenditure
was more than twice as long as the repair cycle. Thus, a current
deduction or amortization over an arbitrary period would produce less
distortion of income, or minimal distortion of income, than such ideal
386
slow or no depreciation would cause.
This "second best" approach
is demanded by clear reflection of income as a rule of equity or rough

381

See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner 72 T.C. 1 (1979); see infra notes
396-403 and accompanying text.
383
See Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978);
Lee, et a!., Rough Justice II, supra note 25, at 1549. In the repair versus improvement
context, Revenue Ruling 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35, reasoned alternatively that where
amortization is not available, capitalization is not appropriate.
384
Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 532 (2000).
385
Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996); see Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft
Maintenance, supra note 241, at 163-64, 213.
386
Lee et a!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 214-16.
Support for this approach is found in Wolfsen Land & Cattle.
382

To permit a current deduction of such a large expenditure with a
beneficial effect lasting on the average of 10 years would surely distort that
years's [sic] income. Yet to deny even an amortization deduction for an
expenditure with a specific demonstrable beneficial life on the grounds that
its deductibility is contaminated by its relationship to an asset of indefinite
life, i.e., the land, would similarly require an uneven reporting of income.
Since a basic premise of the income tax laws is to relate expenses to the
income which they helped earn, a reasonable solution to our conundrum is
to hold that the expenses in issue should be written off over their useful life.
In short we would subscribe independent status to those expenditures on
the basis that they create a free-standing intangible asset with an
amortizable 10-year life.
Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13; see Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at
680. This approach was in effect followed in the repair versus improvement context in
Technical Advice Memorandum 93-15-004 (Dec. 14, 1994). See also supra note 358.
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387

I. Amortization Periods

The Advance Notice announces that the Service and the Treasury
Department "expect to provide safe harbor recovery periods and
methods for certain capitalized expenditures that do not have readily
388
Both the Service and the Treasury
ascertainable useful lives."
Department requested comments "regarding whether guidance
should provide one uniform period or multiple recovery periods and
.
389
what the recovery periods. and methods should be."
Case law has
resolved, on occasion, the current deduction versus capitalization
without depreciation dilemma by fashioning an amortization period
for the expense, or even a deferred charge or freestanding amortizable
intangible. The Service also has offered this golden mean, based upon
its clear reflection of income authority, as the resolution of intractable
390
capitalization issues.
91
More than two decades ago, NCNB l showed that the ideal
answer to many of the future benefit expenses controversies,
particularly where the issue was posed as a choice between the income
distorting extremes of current deduction or perpetual capitalization,
was depreciation of an intangible over some period. Many courts
once permitted current deduction of business expansion costs creating
intangibles benefiting future years under the now discredited
definitional separate, saleable asset doctrine. Courts adopted this
approach in order to prevent distortion of income where amortization
392
of the capitalized amounts would not be allowed by the Service on
the grounds that the life of the resulting intangible could not be
387

See infra notes 403-04 and accompanying text.
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3461, 3464 (Jan. 24, 2002).
389 /d.
388

390

See infra notes 405-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of writer's
prepublication costs and package design safe harbor amortization.
391
NCNB I, 651 F.2d 942,947,962-63 (4th Cir. 1981).
392
Rejecting a scheme under which "an expenditure, concededly of
temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized," the court allowed
the current-expense deduction. "The government suggests no way in which
they could be amortized." It was, in short, an attempted overreaching by
the tax collector. If he failed, he had less basis for protest than if he had
confined his demands to those which were properly Caesar's.
/d. at 959-60 (quoting Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185,
1192 (lOth Cir. 1974)).
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393

"estimated with reasonable accuracy." The NCNB I panel reasoned
that a court's flexibility in avoiding distortion of income as to business
394
expansion costs instead should lie in a Cohan-like approximation of
395
the amounts of the benefit allocable to current and future tax years.
The conceptually correct approach, however, would have been to
estimate the useful life of the capitalized expenditure; or if that life is
sufficiently short or variable, or the amount is insubstantial, the court
should determine that a current deduction would produce minimal
distortion of income.
3
The Tax Court in Wolfsen Land & Cattle, % faced with a similar
dilemma, came up with the innovative and more conceptually correct
solution of treating the expenditure itself as a "deferred charge" in
397
financial accounting terms or freestanding intangible amortizable
over the period benefited. In this case, the taxpayer operated a ranch
with an irrigation system that prevented the ranch from being a bog of
398
little or no worth.
It could have maintained the system by annual
draglining the ditches, or it could "dragline periodically when and
399
where necessary to prevent dysfunction."
As it worked out, the
ditches could be ignored for about nine years and continue to function
even though gradually clogging up, then in the tenth year the clogging
would have "gone far enough to affect drastically the ditch's hydraulic
400
capacity."
The cost of draglining the ditch was about the same for
its original creation, for each year in annual maintenance, or for
401
draglining in the tenth year. Not surprisingly, the taxpayer chose to
dragline the ditch only when it clogged up to the extent that it could
not be used. The Tax Court characterized the issue as a current
402
deduction or "perpetual capitalization."
Reasoning that both
alternatives would distort the taxpayer's income, the Wolfsen Land &
393

Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2000).
Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 ( 2d Cir. 1930).
395
NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 947, 962. Of course, the panel decision was overly
influenced by financial accounting notions. See id. at 952-53. Tax accounting does not
allocate to each year the actual use of a capitalized intangible (except perhaps in
income forecast depreciation), but rather estimates the period of benefit and then
depreciates under the straightline method. See Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 10, at
38-41, 58-62.
396
72 T.C. 1 (1979).
397
NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 948-50.
398
Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 6.
399
Id. at 11.
400
Id. at 12.
394

401
402

/d.

See Gideon, supra note 248, at 109.
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Cattle court concluded that:
Since a basic premise of the income tax laws is to relate
expenses to the income which they helped earn, a reasonable
solution to our conundrum is to hold that the expenses in
issue should be written off over their useful life. In short we
would subscribe independent status to those expenditures on
the basis that they create a free-standing intangible asset with
403
an amortizable 10-year life.
I would add that if the period benefited is short or highly variable,
so that amortization is difficult or impossible, and the expenditure is
at least "steady-state" recurring, then the cost treated as a separate
404
asset should be expensed in its entirety in the year made.
Ironically, the Service has often offered the ideal of amortization
over some fixed period of expenditures creating intangibles too late in
the process, and that offer has been successfully rejected by taxpayer
groups in favor of a current deduction. Perhaps the best known
example is package design costs. In this instance, the Service first
took the tack of capitalizing and denying any deduction due to lack of
405
a life that could be estimated with reasonable certainty.
Amortization over a fixed period, instead of the ali-or-nothing current
406
deduction or "perpetual capitalization," was apparently offered too
407
late to the industry by the Service.
Resting on "administrative
408
convenience" to "minimize disputes,"
the Service offered
403

Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13.
See Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 617 (Ct. Cl. 1978);
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 436, 436 (8th Cir. 1979);
Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982).
405
See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-005 (Nov. 26, 1985) (costs of a new product
package design must be capitalized since they create "intangible assets with useful
lives in excess of the taxable year in which such costs were incurred"). The design at
issue was a unique cardboard base hosting an extending container for marketing
women's hosiery, which enjoys wide customer recognition. See Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,483 {Mar. 5, 1986) {the "L'Eggs" GCM). Revenue Ruling 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85,
required package design costs incurred after 1986 to be capitalized and denied
depreciation under Treasury Regulation 1.167(a)-3 because a useful life could not be
ascertained.
406
See Gideon, supra note 248, at 109.
407
Instead, the result was the current deduction taxpayer victory in RJR Nabisco,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998). See supra notes 346-51 and
accompanying text.
408
See Rev. Proc. 90-63, 1990-2 C.B. 664, <j[ 3.05; Rev. Proc. 89-17, 1989-1 C.B.
827, <j[ 3.02; cf Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,074 (Nov. 11, 1974) ("In view of the lack of any
404
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amortization procedures for package design costs. The Service
permitted sixty-month amortization on a design-by-design basis or
forty-eight-month amortization on a pool-of-cost basis, as set forth in
a series of Revenue Procedures referred to by commentators as
409
"administrative grace."
The most widely discussed of these was
410
Revenue Procedure 90-63,
and the most recent is Revenue
411
Procedure 98-39.
Such safe harbor amortization became the
preferred model for Chief Counsel's tax treatment of recurring costs
benefiting a number of years. For instance, Associate Chief Counsel
Glenn Carrington pointed to Revenue Procedure 90-63 as a model for
amortization over five to ten years to resolve capitalization issues.
"Asked whether IRS believes it has regulatory authority to
'arbitrarily' require capitalization over a fixed period, such as five
years or [ten] years, Carrington responded, 'It would be arbitrary, but
412
we've done arbitrary - reasonably arbitrary - things in the past."'
413
The rest of the story is RJR Nabisco, where, ironically, the Service's
lawyers argued for capitalization without providing for such
•
•
•
414 p
.
d
compromise
amortizatiOn.
re d'rcta bly,415 t h e court grante d mstea
a current deduction due to the difficulty of allocating the expenditure
416
between current and future benefits.
Exactly the same thing happened with writers' prepublication
demonstrable legislative purpose or legal reason, we think it appropriate to consider
questions of administrative convenience.").
409
Gann & Strowd, supra note 379.
410
1990-2 C.B. 664.
411
1998-1 C.B. 1320.
412
IRS Environmental Cleanup Guidance May Be Out by July, Official Says, 1993
DAILY TAX REP., May 11, 1993, at G-8. Carrington said that Chief Counsel's office
was considering a five-year amortization period for all clean-up costs but was doubtful
that the industry would sign on to such an approach. See also J. Andrew Horner,
Service Ponders Environmental Cleanup Costs; Carrington Uncertain of Outcome,
TAX NOTES TODAY (May 12, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 93
TNT 102-10); F.R. Nagle, IRS's Carrington Says Asbestos Abatement TAM Under
Reconsideration, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 9, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 93 TNT 31-2) (Carrington said that one suggestion in the Service to aid firms
with asbestos remediation was to allow amortization over seven or ten years).
413
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998).
414
See Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Filling the Void: Can the IRS Restructuring Bring
Purpose and Meaning to the Random World of Tax Litigation?, 77 TAXES 179, 185
(Mar. 1999) (former Chief Counsel, Commissioner, and Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy).
415
See Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 677.
416
See supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text. In theory, the Service does
not follow RJR Nabisco. See 2001 FSA LEXIS 158 (Aug.15, 2001).
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costs.
Service Notice 88-62 attempted to resolve the issue of
deductibility of writers' prepublication costs by allowing a current
deduction of a writer's prepublication costs over a three-year period
417
on the sliding-scale basis of 50%/25%/25%.
In the early stages of
development of the three-year safe harbor adopted in Service Notice
88-62, the Service considered allowing (1) current deduction of a fixed
amount of a writer's prepublication expenses (such as $5,000-$10,000)
to be deducted annually, and (2) amortization of expenses above that
418
level ratably over the next three years. Probably tasting blood in the
water, the Writers Coalition, a special interest group, opposed
compromise as still requiring allocations and decisions as to whether
income forecast recovery would be more favorable and argued that
419
the floor was too low for any writer with an office.
The acquisition cost doctrine is compatible with the timingminimal distortion of income doctrine only so long as the expenditure
does not produce benefits for a shorter period than the asset to the
basis of which it is added. If, however, the expenditure's benefits last
for a shorter period than the useful life of the capital asset acquired,
capitalization of the expenditure and its addition to the basis of the
asset acquired produces distortion of income through depreciation or
amortization over a longer period than that benefited by the
expenditure, or at worst, by no amortization at all. In summary, the
free-standing asset model entails a two-step analysis: (1) look at
whether current deduction of an expenditure will distort the
taxpayer's income because the expenditure provides future benefits
and is neither sufficiently insubstantial nor recurring frequently
enough to be nondistorting if currently deducted; if this is the case,
then (2) estimate the period benefited by the expenditure (i.e., the
useful life), and amortize the expenditure as a free-standing asset over
. d 420
t h e peno .
417

I.R.S. Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548.
See Letter from Writers Coalition, New York, to Don Chapoton, Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury (Oct. 5, 1987), reprinted in Writers
Object to Proposed Section 263A Compromise, TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 8, 1987)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 87 TNT 196-9).
419
Id. The coalition represented almost fifty groups. Id. At this time there were
61,000 free-lance writers, 20,000 photographers, and the later-formed Artists for Tax
Equity of forty-five groups led by the 3500 member Graphic Artists Guild. See Anne
Constable, Write-Off- or Tax Shelter; Artists Try to Erase Part of the New Tax Law,
TIME, Apr. 18, 1988, at 57; Judith Michaelson, "The Boston Tea Party of the Arts;"
Visual and Free-lance Artists Claim New Tax Law Unfairly Limits Deductions, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1988, at 6-1.
420
See Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 10, at 12-15. For suggestions as to safe
418
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J. Conclusion

In essence, the rough justice rules advocated are simplified tax
accounting methods. This strongly suggests, as a broad tax policy
matter, that they be limited to the same class of taxpayers to whom
such simplified methods traditionally have been granted in order to ·
reduce transaction and tax costs, as well as provide a tax subsidy. The
statutory limitations on use of the cash method of income tax
accounting under section 448 constitute a Congressional highlighting
of the classes of taxpayers for whom it believes the burdens of more
complex rules outweigh the clearer reflection of income. Even closer
conceptually are the limitations on expensing small amounts of
depreciable assets under section 179. The Joint Committee Staff has
pointed out that small businesses are granted many exceptions from
the normal tax accounting rules, amounting to tax preferences, in
order "to serve the dual purpose of easing the administrative burdens
421
of, and providing a tax subsidy to, small businesses. "
Should expensing and amortization safe harbors also be limited to
small income taxpayers? Approaching the question solely from a
422
taxpayer's cost/benefits analysis perspective, I would answer yes.
423
Apart from a general populist perspective in my more recent work, I
have long advocated a two-track regulatory system with simpler rules
424
whenever greater numbers of smaller taxpayers are affected.
Elaborate, more theoretically correct rules may be in order for those
425
who can handle them.
Arguably, that is the case for more
theoretically correct, but frightfully complex provisions, like section
263A. Congress appears to have recognized this in its small business
harbors here, see text following supra note 340.
421
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., IMPACT ON SMALL
BUSINESS OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 74 (Joint Comm. Print 1996).
The perceived difficulty of some of the tax accounting methods from which
small businesses are granted exceptions are a result of the need to measure
income under the present-law income tax. These methods generally
attempt to match income and expense by requiring capitalization of costs
that benefit future periods and providing when and how these capitalized
costs are taken into account.
!d.
422

See Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 732-38.
See Lee, Business Tax Entities, supra note 60, at 962-79.
424
John W. Lee, The Art of Regulation Drafting: Structured Discretionary Justice
under Section 355, 44 TAX NOTES 1029, 1031 n.18 (Aug. 28, 1989) [hereinafter Lee,
Art of Regulation Drafting].
425
!d. at 1031.
423
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•
426
.
. .
427
exceptiOns
an d , a b ove a 11, time
va1ue o f money provisions.
Nevertheless, the rough justice proposals should apply to large
income taxpayers for both a practical reason and a statutory
interpretation reason. The practical reason is the inefficiency of
devoting such a high percentage of the Service's enforcement
428
resources to transaction costs issues.
Capitalization and expensing
are currently significant audit issues only at the big, usually public, C
429
corporation level.
Concentrating audit resources on these issues
when large corporations are abusing corporate tax shelters is
analytically equivalent to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic as it
430
began to tilt while the band kept on playing.
The second reason is that, theoretically, an interpretative
regulation can rise not higher than the statute and its case-law glosses.
Unlike Congress, the authorities have tended not to draw distinctions
431
between large and small taxpayers and, indeed, as a corollary of the
audit patterns, most of the cases with INDOPCO issues to date have
involved large taxpayers. For example, in U.S. Freightways, the
taxpayer had a fleet of 14,766 trucks and growing in 1993; the twelve-

426

See I.R.C. §§ 263A(b)(2)(B); 453A(b)(1), (b)(2)(B).
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1274(c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(C); 1274A; 7872(c)(2), (d).
428
See Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002); supra note 182 and accompanying text.
429
Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 654-63. I note, however, that the
SB/SE as well as LMSB divisions of the Service are issuing directives as to the
Advance Notice. See, e.g., Memorandum from Larry R. Langdon, Commissioner,
Large and Mid-Size Business Division, and Joseph G. Kehoe, Commissioner, Small
Business/Self-Employed Division, to LMSB and SB/SE Employees (Feb. 26, 2002),
reprinted in Internal Guidance for Applying Proposed Rules on Capitalizing Cost of
Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 28, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 2002 TNT 40-12); Memorandum from Larry R. Langdon, Commissioner,
Large and Mid-Size Business Division, and Joseph G. Kehoe, Commissioner, Small
Business/Self-Employed Division, to LMSB and SB/SE Employees (Apr. 26, 2002),
reprinted in IRS Memo Provides Guidance for Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (May
9, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 90-8).
430
The media has widely reported the drop in the tax audit rate for large firms,
growth in the use of tax shelters by such firms as audit scrutiny faded, and the decline
in reported taxable income while book earnings soared. See supra notes 124-26 and
accompanying text.
431
A rare exception proving the point is the dissenting opinion of Judge
Murnaghan in NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285, 296 (4th Cir. 1982) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting)
("Other taxpayers must capitalize and not deduct all at once expenditures having
extended lives or applications. The taxpayer here, and others, preeminently banks,
who will benefit from the decision of the en bane majority, can by no means merit
description as 'economically deprived.' The benefit heaped upon them further
contributes to the deserved description of our income tax system as a disgrace.").
427
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month licenses and permits were more than $5 million a year.
Incidentally, the rough justice proposals should explicitly be made
433
inapplicable to tax shelters.
V. POST- IN DO PCO APPELLATE DECISIONS, TRANSACTION COSTS,
AND THE ADVANCE NOTICE

A. Introduction

1. Advance Notice
The Advance Notice contemplates that the proposed regulations
will require capitalization of transaction costs that "facilitate" a capital
transaction while permitting a current deduction of costs that do not
434
so facilitate.
This contemplated rule appears to be derived from
435
A.E. Staley. Additionally, "this rule would not require capitalization
of employee compensation (except for bonuses and commissions that
are paid with respect to the transaction), fixed overhead (e.g., rent,
utilities and depreciation), or costs that do not exceed a specified
436
dollar amount, such as $5000. "
437
This regular salary rule is expressly based on Wells Fargo.
The
438
general fixed overhead rule appears to be based upon Lychuk. The
Advance Notice further contemplates that outside transaction costs
432

U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001).
See Lee et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 733-34; Rev. Proc. 2001-10,
2001-2 I.R.B. 272 (making elective simplified accounting method inapplicable to tax
shelters).
434
See Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3463 (Jan. 24, 2002) (capitalization of amount in excess of the safe
harbor amount "paid to facilitate the acquisition, production, or installation of
tangible property that is owned by a person other than the taxpayer" resulting in
intangible future benefits to the taxpayer); id. at 3464 (capitalization required of
"transaction costs that facilitate the taxpayer's acquisition, creation, or enhancement
of intangible assets," but is not required of "post-acquisition integration costs or
severance payments made to employees as a result of an acquisition transaction
because such costs do not facilitate the acquisition.").
435
A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'g and
remanding 105 T.C. 166 (1995).
436
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 3464.
437
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000), rev'g in part
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89 (1999); see Guidance Regarding
Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. at 3464.
438
Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 376 (2001); see supra note 434 and
accompanying text.
433

360

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 22:273

such as loan origination costs (credit history and property appraisal to
facilitate a loan) not in excess of a de minimis amount would not have
to be capitalized and that "the taxpayer also would not be required to
capitalize the amount of salaries paid to employees or overhead costs
439
of the taxpayer's loan origination department."
The latter rule
440
appears to be based on PNC Bancorp.
In short, a "practical" line
can be drawn between inside and outside transaction costs on the
basis of difficulty in allocation to the particular asset benefited.
In this context, the Advance Notice stated, "IRS and Treasury
Department are considering alternative approaches to minimize
uncertainty and to ease the administrative burden of accounting for
transaction costs. For example, the rules could allow a deduction for
all employee compensation (including bonuses and commissions that
441
are paid with respect to the transaction) .... "
Whether the cost is an outside or inside commission, generally,
there should be little difficulty in allocating it to the transaction for
which the commission was paid. A current deduction of inside
commissions, therefore, should turn on whether the transaction is de
minimis, yields short-term benefits, or is recurring and insubstantial.
Otherwise, a current deduction for such commissions ultimately must
rest on the administrative difficulties of the Service in policing
unprincipled deductions.
This rationale, standing alone, is
unconvincing.
On the other hand, if the commission is more like a bonus that is
442
not tied to specific transactions, then the difficulty of allocation
439

Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 3464. The implication is that such outside costs would be required to be
capitalized if in excess of the threshold dollar amount. The Advance Notice expressly
provides that amounts paid for portfolios of loans or the amounts loaned to borrowers
would have to be capitalized. Id. at 3462. In most cases, inside transaction costs
would be more difficult to allocate than such outside transaction costs.
440
See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'g 110
T.C. 349 (1998) (permitting a current deduction of the loan reviewers' salaries). The
Third Circuit had decided National Starch & Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner, 918
F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990). In INDOPCO, Justice Blackmun affirmed National Starch on
much the same reasoning as the Third Circuit.
441
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 3464.
442
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) favors
deducting inside bonuses, and in any event where the "bonus or commission is paid to
the employee for overall performance above a set floor of acquisition or other
activity." Letter from Pamela J. Pecarich, Tax Accounting Technical Resource Panel,
AICPA, to Pamela F. Olson, Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department
of the Treasury, and Charles 0. Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
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factor could apply.
The Advance Notice implies that the
contemplated revisions probably would provide that outside
transaction costs in excess of a de minimis amount must be
443
capitalized.
Picking up on this, the AICP A argues correctly that
requiring capitalization of outside transaction costs while allowing a
deduction for comparable inside transaction costs creates a tax
disparity favoring "taxpayers that can support in-house legal and
financial resources. Accordingly, to· minimize the disparity in
(May 14, 2002) [hereinafter AICPA Comment], reprinted in A/CPA Suggests Changes
to Proposed Regs on Capitalizing Expenditures, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 17, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 96-18). This makes sense. The
next step is external costs that are difficult to allocate to particular tangibles because
the taxpayer's accounting system does not capture them. See Letter from Stephen
Elkins and Craig Jones, Tax Team, American Chemistry Council (ACC), to the
Internal Revenue Service (Mar. 25, 2002), reprinted in Writers Comment on Proposed
Regs on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 23, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 78-23). Others want to go
further.
ACC argued that an inside bonus on a deal that closes includes
compensation for deals that fell through. !d.; see also Organization Seeks Clarification
of Deductible Expenses, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 17, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 96-33). The INDOPCO Coalition argues that employee
compensation in any form should be deductible. See Letter from Fred T. Goldberg,
Jr., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Harry L. Gutman, KPMG LLP, and
Nick Giordano, Ernst & Young LLP, on behalf of INDOPCO Coalition, to Mark
Weinberger, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury, Charles
Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, and B. John Williams, Chief
Counsel, Internal Revenue Service (Apr. 8, 2002), reprinted in INDOPCO Submits
Additional Comments on Proposed Capitalization Regs, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 25,
2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 80-38); accord
Memorandum from Abraham N. M. Shashy, Jr., KPMG LLP, on behalf of Cellular
Telecommunications & Internet Association, to Mark Weinberger, Assistant
Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury, Charles Rossotti, Commissioner,
Internal Revenue Service, and B. John Williams, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue
Service (Mar. 20, 2002), reprinted in CTIA Suggests Changes to Proposed Guidance on
Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 29, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 61-23).
443
The IRS and Treasury Department expect to propose a rule that requires
a taxpayer to capitalize certain transaction costs that facilitate the taxpayer's
acquisition, creation, or enhancement of intangible assets or benefits ....
[T]his rule would not require capitalization of ... costs that do not exceed a
specified dollar amount, such as $5,000.
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. at
3464. Implicitly, outside transaction costs would have to be capitalized. Inside
transaction costs would be excepted from capitalization because the above transaction
costs "rule would not require capitalization of employee compensation (except for
bonuses and commissions that are paid with respect to the transaction), [or] fixed
overhead (e.g., rent, utilities and depreciation) .... " Id.
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treatment resulting from this proposed rule, the AICP A recommends
that the de minimis threshold dollar amount be increased to $10,000,
and that the threshold be applied on a transaction-by-transaction
444
basis."
A number of commentators agreed on both points. For
instance, America's Community Bankers forthrightly argued that as a
matter of tax parity, outside transaction costs should be deductible as
well so that larger firms would not competitively injure smaller firms
445
without inside counsel.
This would nicely sidestep INDOPCO in
many cases, but appears to lack a policy basis beyond a bootstrapping
rule of tax parity.
444

AICP A Comment, supra note 442, <J[ 24.
We also believe that expenses for legal fees paid to an outside attorney,
or outside law or consulting firm for routine legal or administrative work on
a recurring basis should be deductible, not capitalized. For example, fees
paid to attorneys who routinely conduct settlements for a bank or who
perform other routine duties such as reviewing documents and other regular
tasks should be deductible. Smaller community banks are less likely to have
large legal or management staffs and may have to rely on outside sources
for these services. They will be placed at a competitive disadvantage if they
cannot deduct costs for routine services provided by outside firms while
competitors who have larger in-house staff performing the same functions
can take a deduction.
Letter from Charlotte M. Bahin, Director of Regulatory Affairs and Senior
Regulatory Counsel, America's Community Bankers, to the Internal Revenue Service
<j[ 14 (Apr. 18, 2002), reprinted in ACB Says Loan Origination Costs Should Be
Deductible, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 8, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec.
cit., 2002 TNT 89-26); cf Letter from Joseph Barry Schimmel, Cohen Chase Hoffman
& Schimmel P.A., Miami, to the Internal Revenue Service <J[ 24 (Mar. 11, 2002),
reprinted in Attorney Suggests Changes to Proposed Regs on Rules on Capitalizing
Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 27, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 59-20).
445

[W]ith regard to the capitalization of legal fees paid to outside attorneys (or
to other fees paid to outside consultants), the rule should state the purpose
of differentiating between outside attorneys and consultants versus in-house
attorneys and other employees.
Such a rule does provide some
administrative convenience, but at the cost of substantial potential
unfairness. Larger organizations are more likely to be able to provide
service "in-house," and thus to avoid capitalization. Attorneys and other
professionals kept "on retainer" may, for practical (non-tax) purposes be
in-house counsel (and may be unable to allocate their fees between
acquisitions and other transactions), yet their fees would be treated
differently than that of "in-house" counsel.
Letter from Joseph Barry Schimmel, Cohen Chase Hoffman & Schimmel P.A.,
Miami, to the Internal Revenue Service <j[ 24 (Mar. 11, 2002), reprinted in Attorney
Suggests Changes to Proposed Regs on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles,
supra.
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2. Case Law and Customary Expenses
In response to the Commissioner's and the Tax Court's broad
reliance on INDOPCO and future benefits in capitalizing everyday
recurring costs in the taxpayer's business or costs incurred in
connection with a nondepreciable intangible, a series of circuit court
decisions have allowed a current deduction for such costs by either
ignoring or taking an excessively narrow approach to the origin of the
claim doctrine and to the creation of a separate asset where dealing
446
with "customary" expenses. The Seventh Circuit in A.E. Staley, the
447
Third Circuit in PNC Bancorp, and the Eighth Circuit in Wells
448
Fargo each reversed the Service's and Tax Court's future benefit
449
capitalization of expenditures customarily deducted by taxpayers
and allowed them a current deduction. Unfortunately, Wells Fargo
and A.E. Staley failed to consider explicitly (1) a burdens and benefits
balancing test as to distortion of income arising from lack of
450
depreciation; (2) the possible character distortion aspect of incurring
a cost incident to a restructuring of the target corporation taxpayer
which is treated as an ordinary deduction while the target taxpayer
realizes
income associated with, but not recognized in, the
restructuring; or (3) administrative costs to the taxpayer and the
government in enforcement of capitalization with conceptual vigor.
In short, the reasoning in all three circuit court opinions distorted
or at least eroded the acquisition cost and origin of the claim doctrines
451
and the rule of tax parity. At the same time, all or part of the results
reached in each could have been supported on some more functional
test theory that would balance the burdens and benefits of
452
capitalization.
Pursuing such a course would have been far better
446

A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'g 105
T.C. 166 (1995).
447
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'g 110
T.C. 349 (1998); see supra note 440.
448
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000), rev'g
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89 (1999).
449
In PNC Bancorp, the transaction costs arose from the taxpayer's customary
business activities; in Wells Fargo, from customary salary and insubstantial activities;
and in A. E. Staley, from activities customary in industry.
450
The Wells Fargo court also did not consider application of such a balancing
test taking into account both insubstantiality of costs .and the difficulty of costs'
allocation arising either in identifying them or identifying the particular asset to which
they are to be allocated and the recovery period or lack thereof.
451
See supra Part III.
452
See supra Part VI.
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than the definitional approaches actually taken by each appellate
decision which have wreaked havoc with the traditional doctrines
applicable to acquisition of tangible assets and have failed explicitly to
453
follow a policy of minimal distortion of income.
Ironically, that
policy probably influenced in a nontransparent fashion the outcome of
454
these appellate decisions.
Hopefully, the proposed capitalization/
expensing intangibles regulations will avoid the same mistake by (1)
explicitly stating as the basis for their transactional cost rules a
balancing of taxpayer and government burdens and benefits of the
capitalization standard, and (2) fitting the various rules into such a
balancing paradigm.
B. Facilitating the Acquisition of a Capital Asset

In A.E. Staley, the Seventh Circuit claimed that the Supreme
Court in INDOPCO "was merely reaffirming settled law that costs
455
incurred to facilitate a capital transaction are capital costs."
The
453

See supra Part IV.
[Professor] Lokken believes that the courts are paying more attention to
the potential administrative burdens of capitalization than they are willing
to admit. In his view, that explains the Eighth Circuit's refusal to require
capitalization of bank officer's salaries allocable to the acquisition in Wells
Fargo, a decision that Lokken called wrong .
. . . [In that case, t]he Eighth Circuit got hung up on the word "ordinary,"
which is the initial inquiry that determines whether the expenditure is any
kind of business cost for which the law permits recovery, not the touchstone
of immediate deduction.
Lee A. Sheppard, NYU/TA Tax Conference - Participants Consider INDOPCO,
Alternative Minimum Tax, 90 TAX NOTES 992, 993 (Feb. 19, 2001); see also Lokken,
supra note 35, at 1363-65.
455
A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1997).
Field Service Advisory, 1993 WL 1470162 (1993), took much the same tack. "Since
items are deductible under Lincoln Savings if certain conditions are met, we should
not cite INDOPCO to support capitalization of an item which would have been
deductible under these conditions before the case was handed down." !d. (citation
omitted); accord Rev. Rul. 94-12, 1994-1 C.B. 36; Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19;
Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-2 C.B. 9; I.R.S. Notice 96-7, 1996-1 C.B. 359. See generally Lee
A. Sheppard, News Analysis- What Part of "Capitalize" Don't You Understand?, 88
TAX NOTES 1435 (Sept. 18, 2000). The Service's former Associate Chief Counsel
(Domestic), Stuart Brown, once candidly admitted, however, that the Service had not
known prior to INDOPCO what that law was. Brown Lists Factors that Could Be
Used to See if Cleanup Costs Must Be Capitalized, DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 10, 1993, at
G-11. An excellent discussion from the Treasury Department's viewpoint is
presented in Transcript of Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two, supra
note 34, lj[<J[ 498-506 (comments of Joseph Mikrut, Treasury) ("Our plan was to take
454
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Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court's capitalization of the costs of
unsuccessfully defending against a hostile takeover because the
taxpayer's purpose for incurring such costs was defending its business
rather than "facilitating a capital transaction."
In fact, A. E. Staley relied on precedents that generally did not use
456
the term "facilitate a capital transaction." Instead, these precedents
mostly used the broader term "in connection with" a capital
457
transaction. Justice Blackmun in INDOPCO did, however, cite an
article, which he read as concluding that "expenses incurred to
facilitate transfer of business ownership do not satisfy the 'carrying on
458
[a] trade or business' requirement of § 162(a)."
That article
those issues off the table to do some safe harbors, to provide some rough justice, to
try to develop new types of guidance that take issues away for an entire industry"). In
fact, rejection of the separate asset test did affect a sea change in the understanding of
capitalization, but the inquiry should have shifted to a balancing standard.
Examination was not cautious and g~vernment litigators failed to argue for a
balancing standard. See id. «Jl«Jl 522-23 (comments of Mark Mullett, with Verizon
Communications); accord id. «JJ 526 (comments of Pamela Olson, Treasury) ("I find
often in audit situation that the INDOPCO issue seems to come up because it's
something that the agents understand."). The understandability factor may underlie
an LMSB agent's vehement opposition to the Advance Notice. IRS Agent Criticizes
Proposed Guidance on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Mar. 29, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 61-22).
"Facilitate" might be more relevant to future benefit capitalization than to
distortion of character capitalization. On the other hand, the ultimate basis for the
origin of the claim test is avoidance of distortion of income (more character than
timing). See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text. Therefore, it probably
should be subject to the same balancing of burdens and benefits.
456
INDOPCO's reference in a footnote to an article using the facilitating
terminology could be viewed as an exception to this statement. See infra note 458 and
accompanying text.
457
[A]n expenditure that would ordinarily be a deductible expense must
nonetheless be capitalized if it is incurred in connection with the acquisition of a
capital asset. The function of these rules is to achieve an accurate measure of net
income for the year by matching outlays with the revenues attributable to them
and recognizing both during the same taxable year. When an outlay is connected
to the acquisition of an asset with an extended life, it would understate current
net income to deduct the outlay immediately. To the purchaser, such outlays are
part of the cost of acquisition of the asset, and the asset will contribute to
revenues over an extended period.
Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); see also Fishing Tackle
Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 638, 645 (1957) (expenses incurred by taxpayer
"in connection with increasing its capitalization" constituted capital expenditures).
458
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 90 n.8 (1992) (citing Brian R.
Greenstein, The Deductibility of Takeover Costs After National Starch, 69 TAXES 48,
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contrasted defense of a business with facilitation of a takeover, as
did A.E. Staley. Justice Blackmun, however, surely cited the article
for the point that costs of facilitating a transfer of ownership are not
related to carrying on a trade or business in order to dismiss the
government's argument that capitalization of transaction costs of a
target's acquisition was necessary to prevent character and timing
distortions of income. 460
In reality, once a target corporation is "put in play," it generally is
461
acquired by one corporation or another.
Thus, the purpose of
49 (1991)).
459
See Greenstein, supra note 458.
460
Assistant Solicitor General Kent Jones in arguing INDOPCO relied upon
Motion Picture Capital Corp. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1936), for the
proposition that
the Second Circuit emphasized that reorganization expenses don't provide
any current benefit to the corporation. They do not assist in the production
of current income, they do not- they are not incurred in the ordinary course
of producing income, certainly none of the expenses incurred by Indopco
have anything to do with generating income for the corporation in 1978, the
year they were incurred.
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,
No. 90-1278, 1991 WL 636242, at *33-34 (Nov. 12, 1991) (oral argument by Kent L.
Jones on behalf of the respondent). Other authorities and commentators more
clearly articulate a distortion of income basis for capitalization of expenses incurred in
connection with a nonrecognition or other tax preferenced transaction. See Missouri
Pacific Corp. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 296, 308-11 (1984); Lee & Murphy, supra note
3, at 521-26, 545; Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or
Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 443, 492-95 (1974); Calvin H.
Johnson, Capitalization After the Government's Big Win in INDOPCO, 63 TAX
NOTES 1323 (1994); Paul J. Green, Authors' Prepublication Expenses: The Second
Circuit's Response to the Capitalization Versus Deduction Question: Hadley v.
Commissioner, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 673, 703 (1988); Lee et al., Rough Justice II, supra
note 25, at 1521 & n.147.
461
Because of the arbitageur activity, the perception that a corporation is
"in play" tends to become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Once arbitragers buy
up the stock of a corporation, the willingness of the corporation
shareholders to sell is established, and the management's ability to resist an
acquisition is effectively reduced.
The certain knowledge that the
arbitragers own working control of the target company's stock in turn
makes sure that the potential acquirer's bidding for the corporation stock
will surely be successful.
Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Fin.,
lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989) (statement of Nicholas Brady, Secretary, Department
of the Treasury). The "rest of the story" is that junk bond issuers, viz., allegedly
Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., fed tips about the upcoming
targets to arbitrageurs, viz., allegedly Ivan Boesky, etc. See In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec.
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defending the target is inseparable from the board of directors' duty
to obtain the best ultimate price for the target's shareholders in the
462
auction for control.
Such efforts clearly result in a capital
463
expenditure, if not a dividend to shareholders. More fundamentally
erroneous is A.E. Staley's looking at the taxpayer's purpose for the
expenditure. This is revealed by the A. E. Staley court's statement that
"[t]he purpose of the expenditures was not to facilitate a change in
464
corporate structure, but to prevent such change."
Contrary to this
focus on taxpayer purpose, many progeny of Woodward flatly state
that the taxpayer's intent or purpose for the transaction is not
465
relevant, which is correct since Woodward specifically rejected a
466
467
Moreover, the preprimary purpose test just as Gilmore had.
468
INDOPCO case law following Idaho Power capitalized indirect
469
costs incurred in connection with acquisition of tangible assets.
Notwithstanding all of this, the "facilitate the transaction" notion
will surely prevail. For instance, the Tax Court in Lychuk, in
providing the most recent detailed analysis of the origin of the claim
doctrine, pointed out that the Supreme Court in Woodward "held that
the central inquiry was whether the expenditure originated in 'the
Lit., 125 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In Re The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group,
Inc., 995 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir.1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-01-025 (Jan. 17.1995).
462
See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, Toward an Auction Market for Corporate
Control and the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 68
(1989) (discussing changes in the law of tender offers toward the model that "once a
bona fide offer is made for a corporation, its directors should react in a way that
maximizes the return to shareholders, generally through an auction for the
corporation's shares."); Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers:
Bridging the Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 989 (1993).
463
Calvin H. Johnson, The Expenditures Incurred by the Target Corporation in an
Acquisitive Reorganization are Dividends to the Shareholders: (Psst, Don't Tell the
Supreme Court), 53 TAX NOTES 463 (Oct. 28, 1991). But see 1993 FSA LEXIS 191
(June 16, 1993) (Service should not raise whether expenses incurred by a publiclyheld target corporation in being acquired are constructive distributions to the target
shareholders).
464
A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 1997)
(describing reasoning of dissenting judge below, with which the Seventh Circuit
agreed).
465
See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 935 (3d
Cir. 1976); Keller St. Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1982);
Frederick Weisman Co. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 563 (1991); Am. Stores Co. v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 458 (2000).
466
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
467
United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
468
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
469
See supra notes 225-3 6 and accompanying text.
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470

process of acquisition. "'
Lychuk's "process of acquisition" is not
necessarily limited to the A.E. Staley notion of facilitating the
acquisition; rather, Lychuk focuses more on the distinction between
471
direct and indirect costs.
Nevertheless, subsequent Tax Court
decisions have followed A.E. Staley's "facilitate" formulation
472
explicitly.
The Advance Notice consistently uses the "facilitate"
473
concept. It appears to be a bad idea whose time has come.
C. Costs Incurred in Connection with Acquisition of Loans Do Not

"Create" Loans
The Advance Notice requests comments about whether a
"separate and distinct asset test" could "be used to identify other costs
that should be capitalized under section 263(a) and the
474
administrability of such principles. "
Simply put, the rule requiring
the capitalization of costs that "create or enhance a separate asset" is
not administrable. For instance, the Third Circuit in PNC Bancorp,
475
adopting a "technical argument not articulated before," excluded
from the term "create or enhance a separate and distinct asset," the
taxpayer bank's recurring origination costs associated with, and
476
The Third Circuit's approach
related to, the creation of loans.
conflicts with rules as to the creation, acquisition, or enhancement of
tangible assets and thus renders the separate asset test
477
inadministrable.
PNC Bancorp, reasoning that the loan origination
470

Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 390 (2001) (quoting Woodward, 397
U.S. at 577).
471
See discussion infra Part V.E.
472
See, e.g., Stark v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1181 (1999); Am. Stores
Co. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 458, 470 (2000) ("[W]e must determine whether the
costs incurred in defending the State of California's antitrust litigation are better
viewed as costs associated with defending a business or as costs associated with
facilitating a capital transaction") (citing Woodward, 397 U.S. 572).
473
The Advance Notice uses "facilitate" in Part B.7, Amounts Paid in
Connection with Tangible Property Owned by Another, and especially in Part C,
Transaction Costs. See Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461, 3463-64 (Jan. 24, 2002).
474
!d. at 3464.
475
Barton Massey, PNC Bancorp Heightens Need for Broad Capitalization
Guidance, 88 TAX NOTES 160 (July 10, 2000) (paraphrasing Henry Ruempler of Ernst
& Young).
476
See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 2000)
(expenses were merely associated with originating the loans, they did not become part
of the balance of the loan).
477
See Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 404 (1965), affd, 373 F.2d 45
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costs were incurred in the day-to-day maintenance of the taxpayer
478
bank's business, allowed a current deduction of those costs.
This
479
holding has been adopted in part in the Advance Notice.
The Tax Court below held that a corporation that acquired the
interests of two banks must capitalize loan origination costs which the
banks incurred when making loans, because the loans had lives
480
extending beyond the year in which the expenditures were incurred.

(lOth Cir. 1967) (salaries of officers capitalized to basis of building constructed by
corporate taxpayer).
478
PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 828. Some of these costs, such as recording a
security interest, traditionally would have been viewed as acquisition costs and
capitalized. Hopefully, the proposed regulations will change this result. See infra
notes 479-80.
479
The IRs and Treasury Department expect to propose a rule that
requires a taxpayer to capitalize certain transaction costs that facilitate the
taxpayer's acquisition, creation, or enhancement of intangible assets or
benefits described above .... In addition, this rule would require a taxpayer
to capitalize transaction costs that facilitate the taxpayer's acquisition,
creation, restructuring, or reorganization of a business entity, an applicable
asset acquisition within the meaning of section 1060(c), or a transaction
involving the acquisition of capital, including a stock issuance, borrowing, or
recapitalization. However, this rule would not require capitalization of
employee compensation (except for bonuses and commissions that are paid
with respect to the transaction), fixed overhead (e.g., rent, utilities and
depreciation), or costs that do not exceed a specified dollar amount, such as
$5,000. The IRS and Treasury Department request comments on how
expenditures should be aggregated for purposes of applying the de minimis
exception, whether the de minimis exception should allow a deduction for
the threshold amount where the aggregate transaction costs exceed the
threshold amount, and whether there are certain expenditures for which the
de minimis exception should not apply (e.g., commissions).
Conversely, a taxpayer that originates a loan to a borrower in the course
of its lending business would not be required to capitalize amounts paid to
secure a credit history and property appraisal to facilitate the loan where
the total amount paid with respect to that loan does not exceed the
threshold dollar amount. The taxpayer also would not be required to
capitalize the amount of salaries paid to employees or overhead costs of the
taxpayer's loan origination department.
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. at
3464 (emphasis added).
480
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 349, 364 (1998), rev'd, 212 F.3d
822 (3d Cir. 2000). Unlike Lychuk, there was no evidence as to the specific lives of
the loans. Id. at 364 n.14. The costs went far beyond the inside salaries and overhead
which together with de minimis outside costs are all that the Advance Notice
indicated can be currently deducted.
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The Tax Court rejected PNC's arguments that the loan origination
costs were currently deductible because they were (1) recurring, (2) an
integral part of daily banking operations, and (3) provide only short481
term benefits, holding that a current deduction is allowable only if
.
d o not create a separate property mterest.
.
482
t h e expen d1tures
Actually, they appeared to be more like a purchased intangible, which
483
in a tax year beginning after 1993 would have been amortizable over
fifteen years by the purchaser, even though previously deducted by
484
the seller, and probably not subject to recapture (although it should
485
As to whether the costs were an integral part of'the banks'
be).
business, the Tax Court was satisfied that the costs the banks deferred
for purposes of SFAS 91 were "only those directly related to the
creation of the loans. They do not include costs associated with loans

The costs at issue include amounts paid to record security interests and
amounts paid to third parties for property reports, credit reports, and
appraisals. In the case of FNBP, the costs at issue also include an allocable
portion of the salaries and fringe benefits paid to employees for evaluating
the borrower's financial condition, evaluating guaranties, collateral and
other security arrangements, negotiating loan terms, preparing and
processing loan documents, and closing the loan transaction.
/d. at 364.
481
/d. at 364-65. The Tax Court admitted that
[w]hile the specific information available when a loan is made may become
outdated in a relatively short period of time, the quality of the decision to
make a loan (and thereby acquire an asset) is predicated on such
information. The soundness of the decision to make a loan is assimilated
into the quality and value of the loan. Thus, the direct costs of the decisionmaking process should be assimilated into the asset that was acquired.
/d. at 370. Under a minimum distortion of income analysis the credit information
costs should have been treated as a separate asset and thus so short lived as to be
currently deductible. See supra note 404 and accompanying text. Additionally, the
record did not contain a breakdown of recording costs, which conceptually should be
added to the cost of the individual loans, and credit costs, which suggests a difficulty
in allocation. PNC Bancorp, 110 T.C. at 369 n.21. Such cost allocation was not done
with respect to each loan, anyway. See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d
822, 832-33 n.16 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'g 110 T.C. 349 (1998).
482
PNC Bancorp, 110 T.C. at 364-65.
483
The effective date of section 197 is August 10, 1993. Omnibus Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, § 13,261(g), 107 Stat. 312, 540.
484
The tax benefit rule does not apply to intangibles created and expensed by the
taxpayer. Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84.
485
Compare section 198(e) with Justice O'Connor's reference in Hillsboro
National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 386 n.20 (1983), to statutory recapture
as a codified tax benefit rule.
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that were not completed, nor do they include costs incurred after the
486
closing of a loan. "
The Third Circuit, reversing the Tax Court, believed "that the
Tax Court took too broad a reading of what Lincoln Savings meant by
'separate and distinct assets,' as well as an overbroad reading of what
487
can be said to 'create' such assets." The taxpayer argued that
[w]hile purporting to apply the Lincoln Savings language,
both the Tax Court and the government effectively have
transformed that language, by subtle but significant degrees,
from a test based on whether a cost "creates" a separate and
distinct asset, into a much more sweeping test that would
mandate capitalization of costs incurred "in connection with"
488
or "with respect to" the acquisition of an asset.

486

PNC Bancorp, 110 T:C. at 369.

The costs at issue are directly connected to the creation of loans, which
constitute separate and distinct assets that are the banks' primary source of
income. Revenues, in the form of interest payments, are received over the
life of the individual loans. In order to accurately measure the banks' net
income, the direct costs of originating the loans must be capitalized and
amortized over the life of the loans.
I d. at 372.
487
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'g
110 T.C. 349 (1998).
On the "separate and distinct" issue, the Third Circuit elaborated that unlike
PNC Bancorp, in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345
(1971), "the Secondary Reserve fund was an asset that existed quite apart from
Lincoln's main daily business[,] ... [was] separate from FLSIC's other revenues, and
was distinctly earmarked as Lincoln's property." PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 830.
As for the "create" issue,
the Tax Court proceeded from the clearly accurate premise that the
expenses in question were associated with the loans, incurred in connection
with the acquisition of the loans or "directly related to the creation of the
loans" to the faulty conclusion that these expenses themselves created the
loans. We conclude that the term "create" does not stretch this far. In
Lincoln Savings, it was the payments themselves that formed the corpus of
the Secondary Reserve; therefore, it naturally follows that these payments
"created" the reserve fund. In PNC's case, however, the expenses are
merely costs associated with the origination of the loans; the expenses
themselves do not become part of the balance of the loan.
I d. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
488
Appellant's Reply Brief at 4, PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d
822 (No. 95-16002) (quoted in PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 830).
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The Third Circuit "decline[d] to follow the Tax Court's broad
interpretation, for to do so would be to expand the type of costs that
must be capitalized so as to drastically limit what might be considered
489
as 'ordinary and necessary' expenses."
The Third Circuit overlooked, however, the "in connection with"
491
490
approach of Woodward, Hilton, and their progeny as well as the
rule of parity and clear reflection of income approach of Idaho
492
Power. It relied upon cases addressing the expansion of bank credit
cards as supporting its "finding that Lincoln Savings does not compel
493
a conclusion that FNPC's and UFB's costs should be capitalized."
In fact, each of these bank credit card cases used a no separate asset
analysis and was heavily relied upon by NCNB II in its adoption of the
494
no separate asset test.
The Supreme Court in INDOPCO
495
specifically rejected both this test and NCNB 11, which it saw as
496
conflicting with National Starch.
Indeed, the Court granted
497
certiorari to resolve just this conflict.
Nevertheless, most of the
489
490
491
492

493

PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 830.
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572,574 (1970).
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580, 582-84 (1970).
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 15 & n.lO (1974).
PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 830.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Iowa Des Moines, anticipating the
"future benefit" concerns later stated in INDOPCO, emphasized the "short
useful life" of credit information as a reason for deductibility. Iowa Des
Moines, 592 F.2d at 436. The Iowa court stated that the prospective future
benefit that could accrue beyond the taxable year as a result of credit
screening was "very slight," and thus capitalization was "not easily
supported." !d. In National Starch, the decision that the Supreme Court
affirmed in INDOPCO, we found that these credit card cases contained the
seed of the "future benefit" analysis, citing these cases as evidence that
several Courts of Appeals "look[ed] to whether an ensuing benefit was
created to determine whether the expense was ordinary and necessary,"
National Starch, 918 F.2d at 431, and that these courts found that future
benefit was not substantial in situations similar to the case at bar. See id.
(citing Iowa Des Moines and Colorado Springs). We conclude that the
credit card cases not only continue to have vitality after INDOPCO, but in
fact anticipated some of the concerns addressed by INDOPCO.
PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 833-34.
494
See NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285, 290-91, 293-94 (4th Cir. 1982), overruled by
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
495
See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 83 & n.3, 86-87.
4
% !d. at 83 & n.3, 86-87 (discussing taxpayer as overreading Commissioner v.
Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971)).
497
!d. at 83 & n.3.
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bank credit card cases, along with the circuit court cases decided after
INDOPCO, could have been justified on the basis of rough justice
exceptions under a balancing of burdens and benefits of
498
capitalization. PNC Bancorp was on somewhat more sound ground
in concluding that "the Tax Court erred in its interpretation of the
'future benefit' analysis by relying on the fact that the loan itself was
usually of several years' duration and by reasoning that the loan
499
origination costs were, thus, essentially directed at future benefit." I
have long argued that where the· benefits of an expenditure are
shorter than the life of the asset in connection with which it is
incurred, the expenditure should be treated as a freestanding
500
amortizable asset.
The Third Circuit, however, concluded that no
distortion of income arose "because of the regularity of these
501
expenses. "
The fact that the costs were incurred in the day-to-day operation
of the bank's business was the driving force behind the Third Circuit's
502
decision in PNC Bancorp.
The court relied upon Welch v.
498

See, e.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1192
(lOth Cir. 1974) (no depreciation); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner,
592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979) (short term, recurring, and difficulty of allocation);
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1973) (regularly
recurring).
499
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 834 (3d Cir. 2000)
(emphasis in original).
[W]e must remember that the "future benefit" analysis adopted in
INDOPCO is not meant as a talismanic, bright-line test. See A.E. Staley
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 1997)
("[T]he Court did not purport to be creating a talismanic test that an
expenditure must be capitalized if it creates some future benefit."). Rather,
the INDOPCO analysis demonstrates the contextual, case-by-case approach
to determining whether an expenditure better fits under the "ordinary and
necessary" language of section 162(a) or the "permanent improvements or
betterments" language of § 263(a). We conclude that the loan origination
expenses incurred by UFB and FNPC have the characteristics of the former,
rather than the latter, statutory language.
/d.
500
501
502

Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 10, at 27-28.
PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 835.
/d. at 828.

[T]he loan marketing activities at issue here lie at the very core of the
banks' recurring, routine day-to-day business. The Commissioner has not
been able to articulate a principled reason why these normal costs of doing
business must be capitalized, while other ordinary banking costs need not
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505

He l vermg an Deputy v. du Pont for "ordmary" as customary.
Some published rulings do hint at an ordinary course of business
justification for current deduction of expenditures with future
506
benefit.
Such an exception might seem to flow from the Supreme
Court's classic, but perhaps dated, definition in Welch and duPont of
"ordinary" as "normal, usual, or customary" in a taxpayer's trade or
507
business. Justice Stewart, in Commissioner v. Tellier stated much
later, however, that "the principal function of the term 'ordinary' in
section 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between
those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the
nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be
508
amortized over the useful life of the asset." Judge Ruwe of the Tax
Court combined both the Tellier and the duPont definitions in PNC
509
Bancorp. To some extent, PNC Bancorp as well as Wells Fargo
reflect Judge Posner's insight in Encyclopaedia Britannica that the
[appellate] "courts naturally shy away from" capitalizing every
expenditure yielding future benefits, because that would require
510
capitalization of virtually all business expenses. In the words of
Judge Posner, "[i]t would require capitalizing every salesman's salary,
since his selling activities create goodwill for the company and
goodwill is an asset yielding income beyond the year in which the
salary expense is incurred. The administrative costs of conceptual
.
,511
ngor are too great.
PNC Bancorp provides a particularly transparent instance of
be. Instead, the Commissioner relies on the line drawn by SFAS 91, a
standard whose rationale we conclude is far removed from the concerns of
the tax system .... We remain unconvinced that the line drawn by the
F ASB in SFAS 91 has any relevance here for tax purposes.
/d. at 834.
503
290 u.s. 111, 113-15 (1933).
504
308 u.s. 488, 495-96 (1940).
505
PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 828.
506
See Rev. Rul. 73-463, 1973-2 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-2 C.B. 9.
507
Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
508
!d. at 689-90.
509
See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 349, 362-63 (1998); see also
Cheryl A. Cunagin, Note, The Double Standard Under Section 162: Why the
Employee Business Deduction Is No Longer for Employees, 82 KY. L.J. 771, 775-76
(1994) (discussing the lack of a clear standard of what is "ordinary" and what is
"necessary" in various cases).
510
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir.
1982).
511
ld. Although not cited in Encyclopaedia Britannica, preceding it Professor
Boris Bittker had used virtually the same reasoning and example. See infra note 584.
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shying away from capitalizing virtually all business expenses. In this
case, the Third Circuit focused on the loan origination costs such as
appraisals and credit checks as being incurred in the "normal method
512
of doing business. "
Of course, in the case of tangibles, the direct
and indirect costs of creating and acquiring assets must be capitalized,
513
even if this is the taxpayer's normal method of doing business. The
Third Circuit, in questioning the rationale for the Commissioner's
514
insistence upon capitalization of these costs, parallels the antistealth tax movement in Congress.
This movement opposes
administrative changes that raise the effective tax rate of a market
515
segment of taxpayers that Congress cannot then reverse without
512

We cannot conclude that in performing credit checks, appraisals, and
other tasks intended to assess the profitability of a ioan, the banks "stepped
out of [their] normal method of doing business" so as to render the
expenditures at issue capital in nature. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982). As we stated in National
Starch, an important determination is whether given expenditures "relate to
the corporation's operations and betterment into the indefinite future,"
indicating the need for capitalization, or are instead geared toward "income
production or other current needs," suggesting deductibility. National
Starch & Chern. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 433 (3d Cir.1990),
affd, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 112 S.Ct. 1039, 117
L.Ed.2d 226 (1992). The facts before us demonstrate that loan operations
are the primary method of income production for the subject banks. We
have no doubt that the expenses incurred in loan origination were normal
and routine "in the particular business" of banking. See Deputy v. du Pont,
308 U.S. at 496, 60 S.Ct. 363.
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 829 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in
original). PNC overlooked that the loan operations generated loans yielding income
over a number of years. A taxpayer's direct costs in acquiring or creating tangible
assets must be capitalized under Idaho Power or section 263A even if such
acquisition/construction is normal and routine and the everyday source of its income.
Thus, another rationale must be found if the PNC loan origination costs are to be
currently deductible.
513
Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 389-92 (2001), sets forth the
precedents quite nicely. See supra notes 227-29, 235-36 and accompanying text for a
discussion of full absorption accounting.
514
PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 824. The court's partial answer to this question was
that INDOPCO "may well have been viewed by the IRS as a green light to seek
capitalization of costs that had previously been considered deductible in a number of
businesses and industries." Id.
515
See, e.g., Stealth Tax Prevention Act, S. 276, 107th Cong. (2001) (referred to
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs as of Feb. 7, 2001).
Congress passes a law. We want to tax at a certain level and a certain group
of people. A lot of times those laws have been in place for a long period of
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516

meeting the "pay-as-you-go" budget rules. The Tax Court in effect
rejected the taxpayer's argument in PNC Bancorp. Specifically, the
taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that it should be permitted to take
current deductions for its loan origination costs in view of (1)
Congress's legislation concerning the income taxation of banks and
capitalization without addressing the deductibility of loan origination
costs, and (2) a long-standing industry practice of currently deducting
517
such costs.
In the end, the Third Circuit's opinion in PNC Bancorp rested on
the costs being incurred in the banks' normal method of doing
518
business.
Its result cannot be justified, however, on traditional
acquisition cost or origin of the claim doctrines. While the current
deduction of internal costs might be justified on the grounds of
time. Congressional intent was followed for a long period of time. And
then there is somebody sitting in some bureaucracy - in this case, the
Treasury Department - that says, oh, no, that is not what Congress
intended; this is what they intended. Then he changes it. We don't have a
process for reviewing that. This legislation will give a process for that
review. But we will not find ourselves in a position of having to correct
something that is contrary to congressional intent, but also with the idiotic
situation that we somehow have to come up with revenue to offset a change
of policy that we never intended in the first place.
144 CONG. REc. S4419 (1998) (remarks of Senate Finance Chairman, Sen. Charles E.
Grassley, R-Ia.); accord 147 CONG. REC. S1132 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Burns); see also Transcript of Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two,
supra note 34, 'll'll 515-16 (Ken Gideon stated that capitalizing under INDOPCO
traditionally deducted expenses raises taxes "just as surely as if you had passed an
explicit tax increase," generating a bad reaction).
516
See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset
Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 503-04 & n.6
(1998) ("the 'pay-as-you-go' provision ("PAYGO") enacted in the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990 ... requires advocates for new tax expenditures to pay for
them in one of three ways: raising taxes, reducing current tax subsidies, or reducing
spending for existing entitlement programs.") (footnote omitted) (citing the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1994))). This forces Congress to pay for remedial reforms
of inadministrable rules obtained by judicial victories even if taxpayers generally have
been reporting differently than those new rules so that there would be no revenue loss
in the real world or further erosion of the actual tax base as contrasted with the
theoretical tax base. See Goldberg, supra note 414, at 183, 186; accord 144 CONG.
REC. S4419 (1998) (remarks of Senate Finance Chairman, Sen. Charles E Grassley,
R-Ia.).
517
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 349, 374-75 (1998), rev'd, 212
F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000).
518
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 829 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'g
110 T.C. 349 (1998).
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difficulty of allocation or administrability, the outside costs cannot be
519
so justified.
The Third Circuit's strained definition of "create"
would seemingly apply to the creation of tangible · and intangible
assets, thereby permitting a purchaser of rental real estate to deduct
currently the recording costs of the acquisition. This should not be the
520
case since such costs clearly constitute acquisition costs.
The appellate courts shy away from capitalization even more,
albeit less transparently, where depreciation is not available at all, as
522
21
in A.E. Stale/ and Wells Fargo.
The ideal answer to taxation of
transaction costs would be amortization over a fixed period, say sixty
523
months.
Nevertheless, Congress's opposition to depreciation of
transaction costs of tax-free reorganizations manifested in section
24
525
19i should be noted. Such a practical rough justice solution would

519

See discussion infra Part VI.E.
Cf Oriole Homes Corp. v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 1531 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(impact fees required for the approval and recordation of plats for subdivisions
constitute capital expenditures); Von-Lusk v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 207 (1995)
(costs of obtaining permits, zoning variances and negotiating permit fees constitute
indirect costs that a taxpayer can capitalize under section 263A).
521
See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'g
and remanding 105 T.C. 166 (1995).
522
See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000), rev'g
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89 (1999).
523
Cf I.R.C. § 248 (providing for sixty-month amortization of costs of organizing
a corporation, which would otherwise be conceptually nondeductible since property is
received tax-free by a corporation upon its incorporation. See Lee & Murphy, supra
note 3, at 524).
524
See I.R.C. § 197(e)(8).
525
The transparent origin of this provision was a desire to backstop INDOPCO.
See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., FISCAL YEAR
1994 BUDGET RECONCILIATION RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS 332-33 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter WAYS & MEANS REPORT];
Technical Memorandum from Calvin H. Johnson, Professor of Law, University of
Texas, to Fred J. Goldberg, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of
Treasury (July 8, 1992), reprinted in Texas Law Professor Suggests Modifications to
Amortization Proposal, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 23, 1992) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 92 TNT 150-72). A nontransparent reason, however, may have
been covert opposition to mergers in general. See Staff Recommendations to Revise
Subchapter C: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Mgmt., Senate
Comm. on Fin., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 121-22 (1986) (colloquy between Sen. Danforth,
R-Mo., and Assistant Secretary Ron Pearlman). On the other hand, Congress
expressly stated that "no inference is intended regarding the proper treatment of
professional fees or transactions costs in other circumstances under present law."
WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra, at 333.
52

°
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526

probably be too late at this point.
The appellate courts
27
predictabll have rejected capitalization in favor of a current
deduction where no depreciation is available, as in A.E. Staley and
Wells Fargo. It is thus an easy, but false, step to reach the same result
528
where depreciation is available as in PNC Bancorp.

D. Customary Executive Salaries
In Wells Fargo, the Eighth Circuit held that officers' salaries of an
acquired subsidiary paid during the year of acquisition, as well as legal
and investigatory expenses incurred before the acquisition, are
deductible. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Tax Court below
529
had mistakenly interpreted INDOPC0.
Therefore, in Wells Fargo,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the officers' salaries were
530
"incidental" to the future benefit and were common or frequently
526

See supra notes 515-25 and accompanying text.
See Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 13, at 677 n.72 ("unjust rules,
capitalization without adequate amortization, will cause some (but not all) courts to
seek other solutions promoting uncertainty"). Further, Moss v. Commissioner, 831
F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987), "is another example of judicial overreaction to the Service's
income distorting adjustment [requiring depreciation over thirty years of costs that
would be repeated in three years]." !d. at 677.
528
The same progression occurred where precedents permitting current
deduction of recurring short-term benefit costs for which no deduction was permitted
under the start-up cost doctrine was improperly extended to long-lived costs. See
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Duniway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recurring costs of advertising,
etc., are properly deductible, but the cost of a computer program used for five years
and costing a substantial amount should be capitalized and amortized over that period
rather than currently deducted under the majority's separate, saleable asset test);
NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (permitting current deduction of an
expenditure for a branch banking permit with indefinite life); Lee, Start-Up Costs,
supra note 10, at 25.
529
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000), rev'g in part
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89, 100 (1999).
530
The Tax Court below had held that the costs were "incurred ... before and
incidentally with its acquisition." Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89, 100
(1999). The Tax Court surely meant at the same time or in connection with. A
common formulation of the origin of the claim doctrine speaks of costs "incident" to a
capital transaction. See, e.g., Estate of Baier v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 117, 120 (3d
Cir. 1976) ("We are satisfied that the 'origin of the claim test' applies to expenses
incident to the disposition of property, as well as to the acquisition of property.");
Brown v. United States, 75-1 U.S.T.C. 'li 9123 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (fees incurred
incident to the sale of stock are capitalized under the origin of the claim doctrine),
rev'd, 526 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1975); Brown v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 286, 288
(E.D. Mich. 1970) ("origin and character of the claims, incident to which legal
527
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occurring expenses. Noting that the transaction costs in INDOPCO
were directly related to the acquisition of the taxpayer in a friendly
takeover, the Wells Fargo court held that the salaries before it were at
531
best indirectly related to the acquisition and hence were deductible.
In so holding, it misread the origin of the claim doctrine, or at least
532
the acquisition cost doctrine of Idaho Power, as applying only to
costs directly related to an acquisition. The Wells Fargo court also
misread a series of Technical Advice Memoranda and a Private Letter
533
534
Ruling involving severance payments, bonus payments to equal
535
taxes triggered on stock options triggered by going private, and
payments upon cancellation of stock options and stock appreciation
536
rights paid incident to a reorganization, as holding "that payments
made by an employer are deductible when they are made to
employees, are compensatory in nature, and directly related to the
employment relationship (and only indirectly related to the capital
537
transaction, which provides the long term benefit)."
The Eighth
Circuit does not mention that most of these authorities carefully noted
that the disputed compensation was not for services incident to the
538
reorganization itself and was for past services.
The issue in all of
these authorities was whether the "origin-of-the-claim" was (a) the
triggering reorganization, or (b) the pre-transaction compensatory
expenses were incurred"); Rev. Rul. 67-125, 1967-1 C.B. 31 {"legal fees incurred for
services performed in drafting a corporate merger agreement are to be capitalized as
incident to the reorganization since the effect of a merger is to change the capital
structure of the surviving corporation."). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit court twisted
this unfortunate choice of words into INDOPCO's "incidental ·future benefit,"
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87 {1992), which does not have to be
capitalized. "Thus, the Court did not create a new test requiring capitalization
whenever an expenditure is incidentally connected with some future benefit." Wells
Fargo, 224 F.3d at 885 {footnote omitted).
531
Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 886.
532
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 {1974).
533
See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 886.
534
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-26-001 (Mar. 18, 1993) (severance pay was not intended as
compensation for services rendered to effectuate merger); Tech. Adv. Mem 97-21-002
(Jan. 24, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem 97-31-001 (Jan. 31, 1997) {based on years of service
with target; none of service payments made for service attributable to the merger).
535
Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-27-005 {Mar. 15, 1995) (compensation for past services).
536
Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-40-003 (June 30, 1995) (options constituted
compensatory obligations from prior years).
537
Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 887.
538
I am assuming that the court read carefully the cited authorities. Possibly, the
briefs slanted discussion of these authorities and the court did not go beyond the
briefs.
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obligation. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit overlooked that each of
539
these authorities cited Revenue Ruling 73-580, which held that the
portion of compensation paid by a corporation to its employees
attributable to services performed in connection with corporate
acquisitions must be capitalized. An early Field Service Advice
(FSA), however, spoke of "salaries of the executives involved in the
leveraged buyout were deducted [by the taxpayer] because these. were
either fixed or computed using a fixed formula regardless of the
540
nature of their work." The FSA, however, applied the origin of the
claim test to capitalize expenses incident to the corporate
•
541
restructunng.
The Advance Notice follows Wells Fargo with respect to regular
compensation of employees who are performing services in
connection with a capital transaction, but distinguishes regular
compensation, as Wells Fargo did, from commissions or bonuses paid
542
to such employees in connection with a capital transaction.
While
543
the landmark decision in Acer Realty Co. v. Commissioner involved
special compensation to corporate officers that was tied to a specific
construction project that they oversaw, this was not the case in
544
Perlmutter, a Tax Court decision that the Supreme Court relied
545
upon in Idaho Power.
The Tax Court in Perlmutter required
capitalization of the portion of the top executives' salaries of a real
estate leasing corporation allocable to the three to five hours a week
one top executive spent, and the five to seven hours a week the other
spent, overseeing construction of a building for use in their rental
539

1973-2 C.B. 86.
1993 FSA LEXIS 7, *54 (Sept. 20, 1993); accord 1997 FSA LEXIS 119, *5
· (Dec. 15, 1997) (citing Revenue Ruling 73-580, 1973-2 C.B. 86).
540

You should also inquire into whether the options might have been paid for
services rendered or to be rendered by the officers in connection with the
acquisition, rather than in connection with the ordinary course of the
taxpayer's business. If this were to be the case, the expenses should be
capitalized.
/d.
541

See 1993 FSA LEXIS 7 ( Sept. 20, 1993).
542
See Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3464 (Jan. 24, 2002); cf Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d 874, rev'g in part
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89, 100 (1999).
543
132 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1942).
544
See Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 404 (1965), affd, 373 F.2d 45
(lOth Cir. 1967).
545
See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 13 (1974); supra note 225
and accompanying text.
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546
.
b usmess.
The Wells Fargo approach does have support in some preINDOPCO decisions that adopted rough justice balancing approach
reasoning.
For instance, Southland Royalty, a pre-INDOPCO
decision, took an approach analogous to Wells Fargo's "customary"
547
tack.
In that case, the then Court of Claims (now the Court of
Federal Claims), noting that the reserve survey was not used to
determine whether oil drilling was feasible prior to acquiring the
548
mineral interest,
allowed the deductions because they were
"functionally part of, and indistinguishable from, expenditures for
549
ordinary management planning." If the company had obtained the
mineral interest, the survey cost would have constituted part of the
cost of such interest under the acquisition cost doctrine. At the same
time, the decision turned on the fact that the lives of the surveys were
short and indeterminable with the result that amortization was not
550
available.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Iowa-Des Moines
reasoned that "had taxpayers directly acquired credit information,
capitalization of the expense, including employee wages, would not
have been required. Credit screening is a necessary and ordinary part
551
of the banking business; it is not a capital expenditure. " The Eighth
Circuit further noted that "[a]lthough the Government contends that
the law is not certain that such expenditures need not be capitalized,
we note that it has not appealed from the adverse judgment of the Tax
Court regarding expenditures incurred when employees of the
552
taxpayers
accumulated
additional
credit
information. "
Nevertheless, these decisions are inconsistent with the reasoning of
the full absorption cases resting on clear reflection of income mandate
553
of section 446.
Moreover, both Southland Royalty and Iowa-Des

546

See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d 874; Perlmutter, 44 T.C. 382. Fon Howard Paper
Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 286 (1967), distinguished Perlmutter on the grounds
that the parties stipulated to an allocation. See supra note 226.
547
See Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 616 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(surveys of the kind at issue, while providing some future benefits (three to four
years), were used in current operations "to make income projections, develop shortand long-term budgets, arrange financing, and prepare reports to shareholders and
regulatory authorities.").
548
See id. at 617 n.20.
549
/d. at 617.
550
See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
551
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir.
1979) (footnote omitted).
552
/d. at 436 n.5.
553
See I.R.C. § 446(b); Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 1280 (lOth
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Moines also employed a balancing of burdens and benefits of
capitalization standard, and they were strongly moved by the notion
that capitalization without depreciation distorted the taxpayer's
•
554
mcome.
U.S. Freightways implicitly agreed with Judge Posner's
observation that courts shy away from the conceptual rigor of future
benefit capitalization where "the result will be to force the
555
capitalization of virtually every business expense" and expressly
adopted his conclusion that "the 'administrative costs [of) conceptual
557
556
rigor' ... become too great." These cases must be rationalized on
the balancing approach inherent in Posner's observation which U.S.
D
• h
• 558
rrezg
tways rnak es even more exp1"tctt.
E. Overhead Expenses

The Lychuk court concluded that "in connection with" meant
559
"directly related" and that the overhead costs did not originate in
560
the process of acquisition of the loans. The Tax Court distinguished
561
Perlmutter on the grounds that it preceded Woodward,
but
overlooked that in Idaho Power, the Supreme Court relied on
62
Perlmuttei in requiring capitalization of inside indirect acquisitions
incurred in connection with the acquisition of a tangible asset. The
Lychuk court determined, in contrast, that the costs of salaries of
employees who spent almost all their time on the acquisition of
installment obligations had to be capitalized to the extent allocable to
563
successful acquisitions, which was 38%. The Lychuk majority cited
Idaho Power, Woodward, and a number of circuit decisions564 that
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976).
554
See supra notes 374-77 and accompanying text.
555
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc: v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir.
1982).
556
U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137, 1146 (7th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 217).
557
See discussion infra Part VI.
558
See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
559
Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 386 (2001).
560
!d. at 392.
56!
Id. at 392-93 (citing Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 403-05 (1965),
affd, 373 F.2d 45 (lOth Cir. 1967); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970)).
562
See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 13 (1974).
563
See Lychuk, 116 T.C. at 386 n.9.
564
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., supra 418 U.S. at 13; see Woodward
v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. at 575 ("It has long been recognized, as a general
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"reflect a longstanding, firmly established body of law under which
expenditures incurred 'in connection with' the acquisition of a capital
asset are considered capital expenditures includable in the acquired
565
asset's tax basis. "
Further, while the reasoning of the Lychuk court with respect to
the salaries paid to the taxpayer's loan origination department
employees is more consonant with Idaho Power on its facts, the
capitalization result is inconsistent with a balancing of the burdens
and benefits of capitalization analysis due to the short life (with an
average of around eighteen months) of the loans recurrently created.
Additionally, current deduction of both overhead and of the loan
officers' salaries can be justified under a balancing of burdens and
benefits of capitalization due to difficulty of allocation to individual
loans since time spent on each loan under consideration probably
varies greatly and time sheets apparently were not kept detailing the
time spent on each loan.

matter, that costs incurred in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset
are to be treated as capital expenditures"); see also Johnsen v.
Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir.. 1986) ("costs incurred in
connection with the acquisition or construction of a capital asset are capital
expenditures"), revg. on other grounds 83 T.C. 103 (1984); Ellis Banking
Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 1379 ("an expenditure that would
ordinarily be a deductible expense must nonetheless be capitalized if it is
incurred in connection with the acquisition of a capital asset"); cf. A.E.
Staley Manufacturing Co. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 489 (7th
Cir. 1997) (costs are capital expenditures if they are "associated with"
facilitating a capital transaction), rev'g. on other grounds and remanding
105 T.C. 166 (1995); Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Association v. United States,
731 F.2d 1181, 1184 (5th Cir. 1984) ("expenditures incurred in the
acquisition of a capital asset must generally be capitalized"); Commissioner
v. Wiesler, 161 F.2d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1947) ("well settled rule that
expenditures incurred as an incident to the acquisition or sale of property
are not ordinary and necessary business expenses, but are capital
expenditures which must be added to the cost of the property"), affg. 6 T.C.
1148 (1946).
Lychuk, 116 T.C. at 389. PNC Bancorp v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000),
is criticized (see supra notes 477, 493 and accompanying text) for holding that
employee salaries incurred in connection with the acquisition of capital assets (credit
checks, etc., as to loans) do not come within the definition of acquiring a capital asset
See supra notes 475-76 and accompanying text.
565
Lychuk, 116 T.C. at 388-89.
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VI. BALANCING BURDENS AND BENEFITS: PROPOSING A
RESOLUTION TO THE TRANSACTION COSTS CASES

A. Introduction
566

561

The circuit opm10ns in PNC Bancorp,
Wells Fargo,
and
568
Lychuk conflict with the origin of the claim doctrine and Idaho
569
Power's approach to both tax parity and the matching of expenses
570
A burdens and benefits of capitalization
with future benefit.
balancing standard, on the other hand, can explain these decisions.
571
When the burdens of capitalization are heavy to both the taxpayer
572
and the government, and the revenue advantage to the government
573
is slight,
then the balance of factors under the Code and the
566

PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d 822 (permitting the current deduction of the salary of
loan origination employees).
567
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000) (permitting
the current deduction of target corporation officers investigating the acquiring
company), affg in part and rev'g in part Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89
(1999).
568
Lychuk, 116 T.C. 374 (permitting current deduction of overhead of the loan
origination department).
569
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
570
See discussion supra Part V.
571
See supra note 241 and accompanymg text.
572
See Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 185-86.
0

When you have this much controversy about something that it is a
fundamental business activity and when you've got an income measurement
problem so fundamental you have to ask yourself whether have [sic) you
have your rules right. INDOPCO after all is not an issue that anybody can
think of as a tax shelter, a tax abuse. I think the answer is if we're having
this much controversy, maybe we don't. We probably do need, either
legislation or a super regulation project. But we ought to be able to do a lot
better than we're doing on an issue that is as core as this one to our tax
system.
Even if you want to have a special set of tax rules such as MACRS, as we
have always had, recognizing that there will be boundary drawing issues and
recognizing that those boundary drawing issues will cause some to believe
that the system has been unjust, I suggest to you that MACRS, even with its
issues and 197 are a lot better place than the world we are jumping off into
with infinite INDOPCO litigation.
Transcript on Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two, supra note 34, <JI<JI 519,
546 (comments of Ken Gideon).
573
See Lee et al., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 181-82 &
n.79 (citing Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th
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Regulations cuts in favor of a current deduction under section 162.
Unlike the origin of the claim doctrine and the tax parity rule as
articulated in Idaho Power, such balancing could produce different
575
results between internal and external costs because external costs
usually can be clearly identified and allocated. Two commentators in
particular acknowledge that such different results between inside and
outside costs create "significant concerns of allocative efficiency (and
perhaps fairness)" but, in spite of this risk, they "believe that the
benefits of reducing the administrative and compliance costs of these
576
rules will exceed the costs of making the system more nonuniform."
Given the relationship between the government's allocation of
compliance resources at the LMSB level and the corporate tax shelter
problem,577 I wh oleheartedly agree.
Note that the Advance Notice's "overhead" rule is supported by
the Tax Court's holding with respect to overhead expenses in Lychuk
as well as the single earlier decision applying a "facilitate a particular
578
capital transaction" rule.
Currently, deduction of overhead costs is
inconsistent, however, with the full absorption line of cases
579
exemplified by Adolph Coors.
These cases, like Idaho Power,
demonstrate a concern for the clear reflection of income with respect
to direct and indirect costs, including overhead, of constructing
tangibles or acquiring them for resale. For instance, in PNC Bancorp,
the Third Circuit addressed the anti-distortion of income concern of
Idaho Power with a rough justice approach insofar as the court stated
that "[t]here need be no concern about a distortion of income because

Cir. 1979); Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 424
F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970)).
574
See supra notes 241-49 and accompanying text; I.R.C. § 162(a).
575
Christine M. Turgeon, a senior tax law specialist in Treasury's Office of
Tax Policy ... said the administration questions whether it makes sense to
capitalize external employee compensation costs - external Counsel, for
example - but not internal costs. The government recognizes it may be
more burdensome to taxpayers to allocate those [internal] costs, she said,
adding that simplifying these rules is under consideration.
Amy Hamilton, Treasury Official Assesses INDOPCO Coalition Proposal, 93 TAX
NOTES 745, 747 (Nov. 5, 2001).
576
Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 55. See Transcript of Conference on Tax
Legislative Process, Day Two, supra note 34, <JI<JI 569-79 (comments of Joseph Mirkut)
for an excellent counter argument.
577
See supra notes 117-33, 174-81 and accompanying text.
578
Munson v. McGuiness, 283 F.2d 333, 336 (3d Cir. 1960).
579
Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 1280 (lOth Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); see supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
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of the regularity of these expenses." ° Currently deducting overhead
costs incurred in connection with an intangible ironically is less
inconsistent with section 263A, the uniform capitalization rules whose
58

Thrust . . . was to require various producers of tangible
property already capitalizing direct and some indirect costs to
more comprehensively capitalize other indirect costs.
Congress meant to exempt from the new uniform
capitalization rules those taxpayers, or expenditures, that
were already exempted under prior law from the general
. 1"1zat10n
. ru Ies. ssJ
capita
Further confirmation may be seen in the Congressional intention
582
to exclude the costs of creating intangibles from section 263A. The
Treasury Proposals forming the basis for section 263A had excepted
(without explanation) from the Uniform Capitalization Rules
marketing, selling, and advertising expenses, and research and
583
development costs unrelated to particular production activities.
In
this context, the Joint Committee Staff had read case law such as
Lincoln Savings as adopting "a rule of reason approach to applying
section 263, tacitly acknowledging the impracticality of requiring that
580

PNC Bancorp, Inc., v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 2000). The
Seventh Circuit in U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137, 1146-47
(7th Cir. 2001), provides a much more sophisticated analysis of recurring. See supra
text accompanying note 243.
581
134 CONG. REC. 9160 (1988) (extension of remarks of Rep. Thomas J.
Downey, D-N.Y, member of House Ways & Means Committee).
582
The Senate Finance Committee Report stated that the new provision was not
intended to modify
·
present-law principles governing the determination of whether an
expenditure results in a separate and distinct asset that has a useful life
substantially beyond the taxable year. See Treas. Reg. sec. 1.263(a)-1, (a)-2;
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan, 403 U.S. 345 (1971). Thus, if
the costs of producing an intangible item such as goodwill are deductible
under current law, such costs will continue to be deductible under . . .
[section 263A]. The uniform capitalization rules merely will prescribe which
costs associated with an asset required to be capitalized must be included in
its basis or otherwise capitalized.
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 99-313, at 141 & n.38 (1986) (footnote
combined with text).
583
See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
207 (1984); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE
CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY 203 (1985).
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every cost with some conceivable future benefit be capitalized. "584
This concept is the ultimate foundation for the Seventh Circuit's
adopting in U.S. Freightways a balancing of burdens and benefits test
for determining whether to expense or capitalize a cost producing
585
future benefits. The remainder of this article applies various rough
586
587
justice balancing factors to the facts of the cases discussed above.
B. Lack of Depreciation
A rough justice basis for the result in both A.E. Staley and Wells
Fargo could be the unavailability of depreciation if the costs are
capitalized to the nondepreciable corporate structure. A major
difficulty with this analysis, although it certainly has the appeal of
avoiding "perpetual capitalization," is that logically it should apply to
inside and outside transaction costs. Under the rationale of the
unavailability of depreciation, the outside transaction costs in
INDOPCO would be currently deductible or, better still, depreciable
over sixty months. Abrogating either INDOPCO or section 197 in
interpretative regulations is not advisable. Therefore, the "facilitate
the transaction" gloss of A.E. Staley should be followed, as the
Advance Notice contemplates.
584

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., TAX REFORM PROPOSALS:
AcCOUNTING ISSUES 50 (Joint Comm. Print 1985). Note the close parallel to the
Bittker formulation:
This emphasis on the long-run consequences of the taxpayer's accounting
practice acknowledges that a rule of reason is essential. If every cost
contributing to the profits of future periods were to be disallowed, it would
be necessary to divide almost every salary and advertising expense between
its immediate impact on the customer and its contribution to the company's
long-lived goodwill. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court has said that "the
presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not
controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect
beyond the taxable year." ... [E]venthe most routine repairs often have a
long-term impact but are, nevertheless, classified as deductible expenses
rather than as nondeductible capital expenditures.
1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFTS 'II 20.4.1, at 20-68 (2d ed. 1989) (quoting Commissioner v.
Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 354 (1971)).
585
U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001),
literally based its approach on Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d
212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982), but the latter expressed just the same thought, probably also
influenced by Bittker. See supra note 584.
586
See supra Part IV.
587
See supra Part V.
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C. Insubstantial Expenditure

A rough justice rule that would apply to Wells Fargo, but not to

A.E Staley or, in all likelihood, to PNC Bancorp, is the current
deduction of insubstantial costs notwithstanding future benefit.
Indeed, a concurring opinion in Wells Fargo thought the record
588
inadequate to show substantiality.
Moreover, the Tax Court
589
majority in Lychuk distinguished Wells Fargo on just that ground.
The result in Wells Fargo is probably correct on the theory that the
expenditure was not substantial, but incorrect on the theory that the
salaries were deductible because they would be paid anyway as is
customary. The reality, however, is that the Service apparently cannot
590
administer a facts and circumstances substantiality test.
For
591
instance, Revenue Ruling 2001-4 turns current deduction of certain
cyclical aircraft maintenance costs on undefined factors such as
"significant portion," "substantial structural part," "major
component," or "material upgrade or addition," which are not
592
administrable in the field.
Further, an insubstantiality approach
588

[The Tax Court's) finding does not address whether some officers at any
particular period of time devoted substantial work to the acquisition or
whether the officers during the period of time in question only incidentally
worked on the acquisition while doing regular banking duties.
In order to determine whether an allocation of officers' salaries to an
acquisition-transaction such as made here qualifies as a deduction from
income or should be capitalized, the taxing authorities should require the
taxpayer to show officers' time devoted to the acquisition as compared to
time spent on regular work during a particular and relevant time period.
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874, 890 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bright, J.,
concurring) (the Service capitalized only $150,000 of the nine executives' and seventythree other officers' salaries).
589
Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 404-05 (2001).
590
See infra note 592 and accompanying text.
591
2001-31.R.B. 295.
592
Some of the terminology used in the ruling (i.e. "significant portion,"
"substantial structural part," "major component," or "material upgrade or
addition") is undefined. Pending clarification of these terms, this document
is intended to provide guidance to examiners on the efficient use of time
and resources in the examination of this issue. Based on the ruling, the
commitment of staffing to examine airframes, which underwent the first or
second HMV, is usually not an effective utilization of those resources.
At the beginning of an examination, you should contact the Air
Transportation Technical Advisor group and obtain a listing of the
taxpayer's fleet composition. . . . This list can be shared with the taxpayer
and used to confirm the type and age of their fleet. From this, you will
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does not address PNC Bancorp or Lychuk:

D. Recurring Expenditures with Short- Term Future Benefit
The Lychuk court, although it correctly rejected the reasoning of
PNC Bancorp, was incorrect on the facts before the court. While the
reasoning of Lychuk with respect to the salaries paid to its loan
origination department employees is more consonant with PNC
Bancorp than with Idaho Power on the facts, the capitalization of 40%
of the employees' salaries is inconsistent with a balancing of the
593
burdens and benefits of capitalization analysis.
The costs were (1)
594
recurring, (2) difficult to allocate to particular loans, (3) almost
insubstantial insofar as only 38% of the loan applications were
accepted, with the result that 62% of these costs and all the overhead
was held currently deductible, and (4) most significantly, the accepted
loans had an average life of less than two years since they were made
595
to high credit risk car buyers. Under a balancing test, the rest of the
salaries (and the overhead) should have been currently deducted.
This answer, however, will not cover loans of longer length, such as
residential mortgages with an average duration of seven years, or the
596
average duration before the homeowner moves or refinances.
In PNC Bancorp, the Third Circuit did not mention the length of
the loans. I will assume, for purposes of this analysis, that the length
quickly see if the taxpayer has an aging fleet that would be subject to a third
HMV or a newer one that would not be subject to it. If they have few
aircraft subject to a third HMV, you should not spend significant resources
on this issue.
2001 FSA LEXIS 195 (Sept. 28, 2001).
593
Iowa-Des Moines applied a balancing test in allowing a current deduction for
purchased credit information which it emphasized was short lived and subject to
sudden change, thereby precluding depreciation under the certainty requirement for
intangibles. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433,436 (8th Cir.
1979) ("Where the prospective benefit is very slight, capitalization is not easily
supported.").
594
See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
595
The average lives of accepted car loans were 17.5 months and 19.5 months for
the tax years at issue. Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374,420 n.1 (2001) (Swift, J.,
concurring mostly to show PNC Bancorp erred in its reasoning).
596
Scott Burns, It's Balanced Budget Deja Vu All Over Again, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 7, 1996, at H-1; Mortgages in 1990s: Faster, Cheaper, More Flexible, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 1989, at 6F ("The 30-year fixed mortgage is a bit
outmoded, says John E. Hemschoot, director of home-mortgage standards for Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (Freddie Mac). That's because few borrowers buy a
house and live in it for a lifetime; the average stay is seven years.").
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of the loans was seven years. The short-term recurring factors will not
produce an ordinary deduction in this case. Another rough justice
factor should be used rather than PNC Bancorp's definitional, result597
oriented test, a "technical argument not articulated before," as to
598
the meaning of "create or enhance a separate and distinct asset. "
That factor is the difficulty of allocation of the costs to each loan.

E. The Difficulty of Allocation
The difficulty in allocating overhead or officers' salaries .to
particular assets, particularly to recurring costs as in PNC Bancorp
and Lychuk, justifies a rough justice current deduction as a matter of
599
administrative policy.
Conventional wisdom presumes that
capitalization or expensing in the taxpayer's book accounting lessens
the taxpayer's burden of compliance sufficiently enough to require
600
capitalization.
PNC Bancorp reveals this logical fallacy: The
capitalized book cost was not allocated to each loan as conceptual
rigor would require; rather, an aggregate amount was amortized over
601
a predetermined period. If we are just going to guess, then a guess
guided by tax principles is preferable to a guess based on accounting
602
concepts, which have "vastly different objectives."
There is a significant difference in administrability at the taxpayer
level between outside and inside transaction costs, since outside
transaction costs often are separately itemized while internal costs
603
often are not separately accounted for.
A broader rationale would
take into account the difficulty of allocating costs to individual loans.
Interestingly, when the Office of Chief Counsel characterized loan
origination fees as acquisition costs of mortgage servicing contracts, its
conclusion did not turn on the difficulty of allocating the costs, but
604
rather on the speculative nature of such assets.

597

See Massey, supra note 475 and accompanying text.
See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 2000);
supra note 476 and accompanying text.
599
See Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,968 (Nov. 18, 1968).
600
Lokken, supra note 35, at 1365; Evans & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 51.
601
PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 825 n.3, 432-33 n.16.
602
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979) (not
surprisingly written by Justice Blackmun); accord PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 832.
603
See supra note 575.
604
See Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,681 (Feb. 19, 1974).
598
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F. Conclusion: How Should the Regulations Be Structured?

Hopefully, the proposed regulations on intangible expenditures
will explicitly state the policy of minimal distortion of income as the
basis for, and apply a burdens and benefits balancing standard to,
605
their transaction costs rules.
Most likely, it is now too late to
provide a framework for the trier of fact or taxpayer actually to apply
a case-by-case balancing test with the appropriate factors and method
606
of allocation. The proposed regulations will probably take the form
of either specific rules or even a list of capitalizable expenditures with
607
unlisted costs being deductible
for deducting and capitalizing
608
specified expenses that create or enhance tangible assets.
Even so,
these rules should specifically apply a balancing test both in the
605

[A]n expenditure should not be capitalized in any case where the
resulting enhancement of accuracy in the measurement of income is
outweighed by the burden of separating capital from current items. If the
expenditure directly creates or enhances a separate and distinct asset, this
burden is seldom great, and capitalization should usually be required. If no
separate or distinct asset is created or enhanced, or if the expenditure
indirectly relates only to such an asset, compliance and administrative
burdens should be considered explicitly. The Service might consider these
burdens in formulating objective rules governing particular types of
expenditures, rather than requiring case-by-case determinations, but the
objective rules should be justified by evaluating and explaining the burdens
involved with the costs affected by each rule.
Lokken, supra note 35, at 1369.
606
Treasury Regulation 1.355-2(d) comes to mind. See Lee, Art of Regulation
Drafting, supra note 424, at 1032, 1039-41. I am proud that my scholarship played a
role in those regulations. Id: at 1032 n.30. Mark L. Yecies once told me that he
drafted the 1977 proposed revised version with a copy of my "Rafferty" article in
front of him. Besides the new balancing approach of bail out potential appearing in
both the regulations and my article, this is indirectly confirmed by General Counsel
Memorandum 36,387 (Aug. 25, 1975) and General Counsel Memorandum 36,069
(Nov. 5, 1974). Even more transparent is my contribution to the "related function"
rule of section 1.355-2( d)(2)(iv)(C), since the absence of an "impairment of equity"
factor was my only criticism of the 1977 version (not then knowing of my role). See
John Lee, Proposed Regs. Under 355 Overhaul Device Test and Single-Business
Divisions, 46 J. TAX'N 194 (1977).
607
Sheryl Stratton, Federal Bar Association - Tax Accounting Guidance Will
Address New Jobs Law, Intangibles, 94 TAX NOTES 1434 (Mar. 18, 2002) ("There will
be a list for what should be capitalized, and if an item is not on the list, capitalization
is not appropriate, [Heather] Maloy[, Service associate chief counsel (Income Tax &
Accounting)] said.").
608
It would be possible, however, to provide a balancing test with the rough
justice rules as safe harbors. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2), (d)(5) (as amended in
1992).
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preamble and in the body of the proposed regulations introducing the
. cost ru1es. 609
transactiOn
VII. CONCLUSION
A decade ago, it was foreseeable from the ISP and GAO studies
of the most common business audit issues that capitalization would
610
become the biggest tax audit issue. It was also foreseeable from the
Service's experience with purchased intangibles leading up to section
197 that the litigation costs to both taxpayers and the government
611
would be substantial. Based on the courts' experience with start-up
costs prior to section 195 as well as the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine, it was also foreseeable that if auditors and litigators pushed
for capitalization resulting in perpetual capitalization or too slow
depreciation, some circuit opinions would permit a current
612
deduction.
This approach has had unintended consequences, and
has generated conflicts with prior decisions. It was somewhat more
613
surprising that (1) the audit levels dropped so precipitously and (2)
614
corporate tax shelters would become either the largest or second
615
largest tax issue. With all these developments, the ideal regulations
616
embodying the principles of "structured discretionary justice" and

609
610
611

Cf § 1.355-2(d)(1).
See 1993 House Hearings, supra note 37, at 1687-88.
Id.

612

See supra note 527 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
614
•
See supra note 132 and infra note 615 and accompanymg text.
615
[W]e identified four important areas of systematic non-compliance.
They are misuse of devices such as trusts and passthroughs to hide or
improperly reduce income; use of complex and abusive corporate tax
shelters to reduce taxes improperly; failure to file and pay large
accumulations of employment taxes; and erroneous refund claims.
However, there is one common element in all four. These schemes are
organized and actively promoted.
613

Abusive corporate tax shelters are the second major compliance
problem.
CHARLES 0. ROSSOTfi, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PROGRESS REPORT
(2001), reprinted in IRS Releases December 2001 Progress Report, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Mar. 4, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 42-6, Cj[<[ 129,
136).
616
See Lee et a!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 200-02;
Lee et a!., Rough Justice I, supra note 17, at 688-89.
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617

transparent "negotiated regulation" are no longer feasible. The
administrative costs to the Service are too great.
·The answer now is a principled withdrawal by the Service and the
Treasury Department from capitalizing costs that were traditionally
deductible and that Congress obviously wanted to remain deductible.
Nevertheless, Congress bet on the wrong horse: the no separate asset
618
rule.
As a guiding principle, the Service and the Treasury
Department should ask, with respect to self-created intangibles,
whether the burdens of capitalizing to the taxpayer (and to the Service
from the taxpayer currently deducting future benefit costs) outweigh
the· benefits. The Advance Notice takes some giant steps toward this
goal.
The proposed regulations should explicitly base the
contemplated transaction costs rules on a burdens and benefits
analysis. When these and other capitalization regulations are made
final so that they become the revenue baseline, Congress should
revisit the area and codify or modify these regulations as it sees fit.

617
618

See Lee eta!., Capitalizing Aircraft Maintenance, supra note 241, at 238-40.
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.

